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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation seeks to present a reductive definition of the concept of literary 
modernism.  As such, I identify the metaphor of the postmodern structure of consciousness, 
as the best tool by which to both identify and understand postmodernism in its literary 
expression. This is done through an analysis of epistemological and ontological questions, 
considered specifically in the genre fiction categories of detective fiction and science fiction 
respectively.  Those genres were specifically chosen as they best exemplify texts which have 
epistemological and ontological dominants, and through an analysis of the genres themselves, 
and their inherent structures, I argue that one can see how the postmodern structure of 
consciousness comes to serve as the best means by which to understand our contemporary 
society. Through the structural nature of this understanding that I see this as reflective of a 
postmodern understanding of society, I argue that postmodernism allows for the change 
sought after within society as currently constructed, and this project identifies the structural 
means by which such change can come about.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 In a project that has taken more than a decade to complete, the sheer number of 
people that deserve gratitude and recognition is nearly boundless.  I am eternally grateful to 
those who have helped, aided, supported, listened, critiqued, criticized, or in other ways have 
influenced my project and life since 2002.  In many ways, this project is the culimination of 
my entire academic career, which has had a roundabout journey through philosophy, Italian 
and Italian Studies, as well as its home in Comparative Literature. In that process, a great 
many professors provided influence. I need to thank, in particular, Dr. Ray Fleming of 
Florida State University, who provided much advice and support, both before I joined his 
Department, as a mentor in my years in Tallahassee, and as a friend and mentor in the years 
since. Dr. Rob Rushing, who was instrumental in my joining the Comparative Literature 
Department at the University of Illinois, has been a rock of support since I arrived at campus, 
serving as an instructor,  teaching supervisor, sounding board, and remaining my lifeline to 
the program through years of intermittent contact while I was abroad. One couldn’t have 
asked for a better Chair.  My project itself was a product of two courses I took in 
Postmodernism at the University of Illinois in my first year of residence, so I need to 
recognize Dr. Steven Davenport and the ever insightful Dr. Nancy Blake, who I was honored 
to have serve on my committee.  I also would like to thank other members of my committee 
for valuable insight throughout the process, including Dr. Mark Thompson, Dr. Anna 
Stenport, and Dr. Jim Hansen.  The late Dr. Larry Schehr was also instrumental, as I still 
clearly remember and use his advice and commentary often.   
 I have also been greatly aided by the many opportunities I have had to teach at the 
University level, both for the financial support but also, and perhaps primarily, all that I have 
learned both from my students and the need to find ways to explain things to them.  The 
students who have influenced me are far too many to recount (and these days, far too 
iv 
numerous to recall), but I would like to thank them all.  I was allowed to teach in the English 
as a Second Language Program at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, Florida State 
University’s Department of Italian, The University of Illinois’s then Department of Spanish, 
Italian and Portuguese as well as the Program in Comparative Literature, and for the past six 
years at the English Department of Aarhus University in Denmark. Particular thanks to Laura 
Hill, Dr. Diane Musumeci, Dr. Ray Fleming, Dr. Johanna Wood, and Dr. Jody Pennington, 
for hiring me for those positions. Each of those experiences has enriched this project 
immensely.  My project has been funded, through the years, through a series of grants and 
fellowships, including the teaching assistantships at the University of Illinois, numerous 
conference travel grants from the same institution (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006), a Summer 
Scholarship for Danish Study in 2004, a European Union Center FLAS Fellowship for 
Danish Study in 2007, an Erasmus Mobility Grant from Aarhus University (to teach at the 
University of Limerick), and many years of support the Gudrun Gytel Foundation, who 
provided me with financial support in 2005-6, 2007 and 2011.  I have also received valuable 
feedback on my project and ideas from many colleagues over the years at conferences and 
conventions, meetings of international networks, lunchtime lecture presentations, and at 
events at student run lecture societies.  
 I could never have come this far without the support of my family and friends.  I spent 
countless hours in residence at the University of Illinois meeting with my PhD reading group 
(at Espresso Royale), including EK Tan, Jessica Weinhold Brokish, Misty Houston 
Chelmecki and Sonja Schoene Wandelt.  I credit Dr. Maria Beville for kickstarting my 
academic career when it had nearly stalled before I moved to Aarhus in 2009.  I am forever 
grateful.  I also have to thank Maria, as well as Dr. Anne Sophie Haahr Refskou, for reading 
and providing feedback on early parts of the thesis, and Dr. Lea Madsen for reading latter 
sections. Gry Faurholt, my dear friend, also read several chapters and provided (sometimes 
v 
harsh) very needed feedback on some of my least polished ideas and pushed me to make the 
final product as good as it is.  I likely couldn’t have pushed through to the end without the 
inspiration and support of Dr. Susan Sencindiver, co-instructor on courses too numerous to 
mention, and always willing to support me in times of need, no questions asked.  Thank you 
Susan.  
 Last, but certainly not least, my family has always provided me with support and 
inspiration. It was the legacy of my grandfather, A. Robert Caponigri, that inspired my choice 
of profession (if not the field). On the other side, my Uncles Charles and James Stephan 
always kept me focused on the practical issues, which I hope will show through this project. 
Both my mother and grandmother, Victoria Stephan and Winifred Farquhar, have always 
been supportive in any way that I asked (and in many ways that I didn’t), and no amount of 
thanks could ever be sufficient.  I need to thank my Danish Family, Frank Randrup and 
Birgitte Lønsgaard, for more support than any son-in-law could expect.  Finally, and certainly 
in no way least, my loving wife, Maria Lønsgaard Randrup, and my two adorable children, 
Philippa Lønsgaard Stephan and Tristan Lønsgaard Stephan, are the reason that any of this is 
worthwhile.  Jeg elsker jer så meget!  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
What is Postmodernism? …………………………………………………………….………1 
 
 
Whodunit? And how do we know? (or do we?) –  
The structure of the epistemological investigation in detective fiction ……………………..91 
 
 
What world is this? Who am I (in it?)? –  
The structure of the ontological formation in Science Fiction ……………………………..144 
 
 
The Postmodern Novel …………………………………………………………………......194 
 
 
Coda: Where do we go from here?: Postmodernism’s Possible Afterlives?..................……233 
 
 
Works Cited ………………………………………………………………………………...255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
What is Postmodernism? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
We are already beyond postmodernism, it’s dead, dead and gone, don’t you know.  
Raymond Federman, Aunt Rachel’s Fur 
 
We are at the end of postmodernism. So it has been argued for the past twenty years 
(at least), since a conference held in Stuttgart in 1991 with the title The End of 
Postmodernism: New Directions. Recently, Stephen Burn published a book on a 
contemporary writer, Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism (2008)
1
 which argues 
that certain works around the end of the twentieth century contains aspects that moved, in 
some sense, beyond that of postmodernism. Others have argued that postmodernism has 
‘died’2 or has been passed over (or superseded). Neil Brooks and Josh Toth edited a volume 
which presides over its wake, The Mourning After: Attending the Wake of Postmodernism. 
Even Brian McHale, one of literary postmodernism’s prime theorists, wrote an article in 2007 
entitled ‘What was Postmodernism?’, the title of which was taken directly from John Frow’s 
article of the same name from 1997. However, it seems, there has been no definitive 
definition of what postmodernism is (or was). Yet, in order to assert that we are at end of 
pomo, it seems we need to know what precisely we are at the end of (and how we would 
determine that this is, or was, the end). It is time to go back and look for a definition.  
The need for this definition is also found in (postmodern) literature itself. In decrying 
the death of postmodernism, or the end of the period, many of these works are looking for the 
‘next thing’. McHale, tellingly, quotes Raymond Federman’s novel Aunt Rachel’s Fur, which 
has a character who asks that very question: 
It was sad to see postmodernism disappear before we could explain it, I kind of liked 
postmodernism, I was happy in the postmodern condition, as happy if not happier 
than in the previous condition, I don’t remember what that was called but I was glad 
to get out of it, and now here we are again faced with a dilemma, what shall we call 
                                                 
1
 Lise Mortensen was recently awarded a PhD on a thesis entitled Towards a Revival of Representation: 
Ekphrasis in the Contemporary Novel at the end of Postmodernism, which argues for a post-postmodern reading 
of David Foster Wallace and Richard Powers. 
2
 Alan Kirby’s article “The Death of Postmodernism and Beyond” in Philosophy Now 58 (Dec 2012) is just one 
the latest of many examples.  
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this new thing towards which we are going, this new thing I haven’t seen yet, did you 
see it Gaston, what can we call it, postpostmodernism seems a bit too clumsy, and 
popomomo not serious enough (Federman 245). 
 
One of the things that Federman presents here is the idea that postmodernism was never fully 
explained, and yet at the same time there is a need to move beyond, to look ‘post-’ 
postmodernism to another era, which has been (as was postmodernism) called many things 
but which seems to be concentrating (sadly enough) on the term of postpostmodernism.
3
  
The idea of using the prefix post-, for a second time, not only makes the phrase seem 
ridiculous, but also brings up many of the same problems that arose with the original use of 
the term postmodernism (Federman was a proponent of surfiction, for example, which did not 
catch on). Jean-François Lyotard elucidated a number of the problems with the idea of post-
4
, 
explaining that it carries in a number of its iterations, firstly, a chronological connotation, 
“the sense of a simple succession, a diachronic sequence of periods in which each one is 
clearly identifiable” (Lyotard, “Note” 76)5, as well as, secondly, an implication of the end 
(e.g. of history, or the ‘modern project’) and, finally, the sense of the Greek term ana-, 
meaning back or against (a reaction against modernism, in which we have reached a point 
‘beyond’ or ‘above’ from which we can gain insight upon looking back, representing a break, 
spatially, between modernism and its successor). The multiple interpretations of the prefix 
leave the concept ambiguous and this compounded issues that were not consistent with 
iterations of postmodern theory, exacerbating concepts like periodization and direct parallels 
with the modernist project, while simultaneously adding a taint of decadence. Scholars of the 
                                                 
3
 The terms ‘new sincerity’ and ‘post-ironic’ are also found. See Adam Kelly in ‘David Foster Wallace and the 
New Sincerity in American Fiction’ (based on a sentiment identified in Wallace’s ‘E pluribus unum’) and Tore 
Rye Andersen’s ‘‘Ned med oprøret!: David Foster Wallace og den postironiske’. 
4
 To be clear, Lyotard is, in this article, presenting a series of standard understandings of postmodernism of 
which he is critical. I am reiterating his summary because I both find them accurate articulations of those 
viewpoints, with which we both disagree (though sometimes for different reasons), and well summarized. 
5
 While Lyotard himself does not view postmodern in the ‘sense of simple succession’ he does, in this ‘Note’ 
retain the idea of postmodernism having moved beyond, so while he eschews ‘rupture’ he critically speaks of 
that term as a ‘way of forgetting or repressing the past, that is, repeating it and not surpassing it’ (76). The idea 
of surpassing ‘modernity’ is also progressive and modern (which Lyotard rightly points out elsewhere in the 
article) and I will return to this notion in my discussion of transcendence and Ihab Hassan later in the chapter.  
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postmodern have had to grapple with all three of these, as well as many other definitions, in 
attempting to understand the mode. Frow’s text is telling in this regard as it asserts the 
temporal aspect of postmodernism, claiming that “the paradoxical result of this is that, since 
this ‘post-’ must be a real alternative to modernism, it must be based upon a different 
temporality: not that of novation but that of stasis. It must be the end of history” (Frow 141, 
original emphasis). For Frow, as in the explanation by Lyotard, one aspect of the term ‘post-’ 
relates specifically to the chronological sequence, which underscores the oft cited need for 
dates of the beginning and the end of postmodernism (McHale puts the start in 1966 (‘year 
zero’) and notes that Federman posits Dec. 22, 1989 as the time of death, coinciding with the 
passing of Samuel Beckett (McHale, ‘What’ 3, 1)).Yet, the very ambiguity of meaning 
surrounding the idea of post- carries over to the rest of the concept of postmodernism. This 
term has been evoked countless times, and with seemingly as many different underlying 
definitions in mind. In the Arts section of the New York Times, in 1997, Richard Rorty 
evoked post-modernism as an idea which was losing altitude.
6
  
It’s one of these terms that has been used so much that nobody has the foggiest idea 
what it means. It means one thing in philosophy, another thing in architecture and 
nothing in literature. It would be nice to get rid of it. It isn’t exactly an idea; it’s a 
word that pretends to stand for an idea. Or maybe the idea that one ought to get rid of 
is that there is any need to get beyond modernity (Rorty). 
 
Rorty argues that the term has, essentially, no meaning (especially as a literary concept), and 
only seems to stand for something substantial. Terry Eagleton, similarly, in The Illusions of 
Postmodernism, argues that “postmodernism is such a portmanteau phenomenon that 
anything you assert of one piece of it is almost bound to be untrue of another” (Eagleton viii). 
Thus, neither of these scholars (who represent examples of both proponents and critics of 
postmodernism) would agree that postmodernism has been convincingly defined, and they 
are among the many scholars who contend that it resists definition.  
                                                 
6
 Interestingly, modernism was also listed as one of these concepts, by Witold Rybczynski, professor of 
urbanism at the University of Pennsylvania, demonstrating perhaps that modernism itself is not dead yet.  
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Burn, in his book on Jonathan Franzen attempts to define the ‘new thing’, post-
postmodernism, and in so doing, in his opening chapter ‘Mapping the Territory,’ lays out the 
end of postmodernism based on author reactions, changing focuses in contemporary 
literature, and chronology (in the 1990s) and then posits a tentative definition of post-
postmodernism which both elaborates on the uncertainty of the new definition and is based 
on the definition of postmodernism in the first place, which he presents as already considered 
uncertain. “Obviously the haphazard and conflicting deployment of the term already suggests 
that it will be no more precise than its predecessor, postmodernism. It’s hard to feel good 
about the explanatory value of a term whose usage collapses the differences between such 
different writers and context” (Burn 18). In positing his definition, he resorts to a similar 
structure to that of Ihab Hassan, in his widely published article ‘Toward a Concept of 
Postmodernism.’ Hassan’s article consists of a list of tentative definitions posited at the 
beginning (or at least in the middle of) the postmodern period and first published in 1982, 
which is relatively late if accepting McHale and Federman’s dates. Yet, Hassan discusses the 
definition of postmodernism as too early to finalize as he is writing in ‘its relative youth, 
indeed brash adolescence’ (Hassan 87). As such, it is an interesting selection of a model to 
follow, as Burn describes postmodernism as both having a fixed set of characteristics and a 
nearly similarly fixed contradictory status, thus reifying the uncertainty and caveats of 
Hassan’s attempt at a definition of postmodernism, even while posing his own tentative 
definition of post-postmodernism.  
So, while it is perhaps too early to definitively define the new thing, post-
postmodernism, I argue that it is now that we both have the perspective and need to define 
postmodernism. This dissertation proposes to do just that, providing a reductive definition for 
postmodernism, and drawing specifically on examples of literary postmodernism to elucidate 
6 
the definition, one which can then be extrapolated to other fields as a model for how the 
postmodern consciousness is organized. So, what is literary postmodernism, after all?
7
 
 
 
Clearly, then, the time has come to theorize the term, if not define it,  
before it fades from awkward neologism to derelict cliché  
without ever attaining to the dignity of a cultural concept.  
(Hassan, Pluralism in Postmodern Perspective,  
Critical Inquiry 12.3, 503-520) 
 
Literary Postmodernism 
Postmodernism is a popular term, but has proven a difficult concept to decisively define. 
McHale, in Postmodernist Fiction, attempts to address this concern by applying the 
conceptual tool of the ‘dominant,’ the focusing component of a work. He claims that 
postmodernism can be understood in opposition to modernism, because the dominant of such 
fiction changes from epistemological to ontological (McHale, Postmodernist 9-10). In 
contrast to the encyclopedic exhaustiveness of his first approach, in a later work, 
Constructing Postmodernism, McHale “proposes multiple, overlapping and intersecting 
inventories and multiple corpora; not a construction of postmodernism, but a plurality of 
constructions” (McHale, Constructing 3), while at the same time continuing and expanding 
the first work, presenting the dominant shift as one of the means of constructing 
postmodernism. Similarly, Ihab Hassan proposes to define postmodernism through reference 
to modernism, either by using lists of characteristics, or through the use of a neologism, 
“indetermanence,” which is a construct of the “two central, constitutive tendencies in 
postmodernism” (Hassan 92), namely indeterminacy and immanence. He defines 
indeterminacy as a “complex referent that these diverse concepts help to delineate: 
ambiguity, discontinuity, heterodoxy, pluralism, randomness, revolt, perversion, 
deformation” (Hassan 92). Immanence is “a term that [Hassan] employ[s] without religious 
                                                 
7
 I have chosen to limit myself to literary postmodernism, as I believe that project alone is already a vast 
enterprise, and that the term postmodernism, as noted, has been used in widely different ways not only within 
fields, like literature, but in interdisciplinary methodologies as well. 
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echo to designate the capacity of mind to generalize itself in symbols, intervene more and 
more into nature, act upon itself through its own abstractions and so become, increasingly, 
im-mediately, its own environment” (Hassan 93). The compound of these concepts, extended 
by his delineation of the characteristics of each tendency, forms his understanding of 
postmodernism. Finally, Lyotard also conceives the distinction between the modern and the 
postmodern as primarily an epistemological one. The modern is defined as “any science that 
legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to 
some grand narrative” (Lyotard, Postmodern xxiii), whereas the postmodern is simply 
defined as the “incredulity towards metanarratives” (Lyotard, Postmodern xxiv). While each 
of these theories is satisfying to a degree, they all present some facet of a seemingly larger 
understanding of postmodernism. Further still, while each of them has valid points, the 
various theories presented do not cohere, and in fact, are in some ways contradictory. 
Through the use of the metaphor of the rhizomatic labyrinth, I provide a model by which 
postmodernism can be more fully understood.  
Postmodernism represents a different ‘structure of consciousness’ (to use William 
Spanos’s term), the structure of which can be defined as a structureless structure and is best 
epitomized by the metaphor of the rhizome. I call this the postmodern metaphor, as I contend 
that elucidating the characteristics of the rhizomatic labyrinth, and viewing postmodern 
literature with this in mind, incorporates other attempts at definitions or explanations of this 
phenomenon. The rhizome as concept was coined by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in 
1976 in Rhizome: Introduction and then presented again as the introductory chapter to the 
second volume of their Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, A Thousand Plateaus. The 
concept, further elucidated by Umberto Eco in Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, 
will be shown to encompass those concepts of the postmodern mode postulated by Ihab 
Hassan and Jean-François Lyotard, as well as theories proposed by Jean Baudrillard, Roland 
8 
Barthes, Patricia Waugh and Linda Hutcheon. Furthermore, the use of techniques like 
intertextuality, metafiction, pastiche, playfulness and the mixing of genres, can likewise be 
understood and explicated in a new way with reference to this structural paradigm.  
McHale, first in Postmodernist Fiction and later in Constructing Postmodernism 
offers, as I do, a reductive definition, rather than a list of techniques, characteristics or the use 
of a single technique or methodology as a synecdoche for the broad aspects of the mode. 
While I greatly admire the idea of a reductive definition, and propose one myself, I believe 
there is a flaw in McHale’s definition. Namely, he suggests that it is the dominant of a fiction, 
reflected in the type of questions suggested (epistemological rather than ontological) which is 
determinate. I contend that it is not the questions – posed by the generic nature of the 
literature in question – but the response (or lack thereof) to those questions, and the structure 
which explains how questions and potential answers are understood. Thus postmodernism, in 
operating with a postmodern structure of consciousness, (re)presents the uncertainty when 
faced with both epistemological and ontological questions (and a host of other philosophical 
questions) and thus conforms to a different structure of consciousness, one in which answers 
to those questions are not simply left unanswered but are ruled out. There is, simply, absolute 
uncertainty to those philosophical questions in postmodernism, as we have no vantage point 
in the rhizome from which to answer such questions with any objectivity. 
Essentially I am arguing that both epistemological and ontological dominants are 
present in postmodern fiction, which I argue entails the failure of McHale’s definition. Thus, 
I offer an alternative definition, which I contend provides a tool for understanding the 
postmodern condition, and literary postmodernism specifically. The postmodern structure of 
consciousness has numerous characteristics and traits, but a fundamental one, vis-à-vis 
McHale’s definition is that modernism operates on the assumption of answers and 
postmodernism operates without a search for answers. Both uncertainty (epistemological 
9 
lack) and indeterminacy (ontological lack) are traits of postmodern fiction, and can be 
understood in terms of the postmodern structure of consciousness. This moves beyond 
Lyotard’s definition in The Postmodern Condition in that it addresses concerns beyond the 
epistemological. It also both incorporates aspects of Hassan’s definition (indeterminacy) and 
is able to explain how immanence operates, but provides a fundamental means of explaining 
why both of those traits are characteristic of postmodernism. In addition, by using the 
rhizome as a structure of consciousness, I elucidate the characteristics associated with 
postmodernism and postmodern theory (e.g. metafiction, intertextuality), and provide an 
underlying justification of not only why those aspects are so prevalent, but addressing the 
way in which they are utilized and presented differently than in other fiction (e.g. modernist). 
The call for a ‘mapping’ of postmodernism, or a spatial metaphor, is outlined below.  
 
 
Today, however, it may be space more than time that hides consequences from us,  
the ‘making of geography’ more than the ‘making of history’  
that provides the most revealing tactical and theoretical world. 
(Soja, Postmodern Geographies, 1) 
 
The Call for a Spatial Metaphor 
One of the major turns with the advent of postmodernism is the reconsideration of how 
knowledge is understood, which has led to a call to change this understanding. Edward Soja, 
in Postmodern Geographies, makes this turn explicit. He argues that “the discipline imprinted 
in a sequentially unfolding narrative predisposes the reader to think historically, making it 
difficult to see the text as a map, a geography of simultaneous relations and meanings that are 
tied together by a spatial rather than a temporal logic” (Soja 1). Soja’s understanding of the 
historical trend towards positivistic, logical, understandings of conceptual frameworks is not 
new, and harkens back centuries, to the development of modern philosophy and the modern 
era generally (with its ever shifting chronological boundaries – consider the notion of the 
Early Modern in English Literature and Culture, as well as Renaissance literature in Italy, 
10 
which dates back to the 1300s). Soja suggests that we need to understand the text, and 
specifically the philosophical text, not linearly – the structure of a novel, for example – but as 
a map, spatially. Yet, this map that he proposes is also not as representational as those maps 
of traditional geography, but represent “a geography of simultaneous relations and meanings 
that are tied together” (Soja 1). Soja is not alone in this search for a spatial metaphor, so we 
will now explore the various calls, from Jameson, Eco, Deleuze and Baudrillard, and present 
why they too argue that a spatial metaphor is most appropriate, and how they have attempted 
to map the space of postmodernity. 
 
Postmodern Space, or the Cognitive Mapping of Late Capitalism 
In Postmodernism: or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Fredric Jameson outlines the 
historical stages of capital, rooted in Marxist theory. Each phase, market capitalism, 
monopoly capitalism (or the ‘stage of imperialism’) and the postmodern stage of late 
capitalism, is afforded a spatial metaphor, as he notes “that the three historical stages of 
capital have each generated a type of space unique to it” (Jameson 409). The classical phase 
of market capitalism is reflected with the grid, “a space of infinite equivalence and extension” 
and “geometrical and Cartesian homogeneity” (Jameson 410). In this space, the individual 
has a direct relationship to his surroundings, a one to one correspondence with things on a 
level with which the individual can have a straightforward connection. Essentially, he argues 
that the lived experience of the individual (the authentic) corresponds to the larger structural 
system (the truth) in market capitalism. However, in the next phase, monopoly capitalism, the 
individual is displaced from an understanding of his own labor, and thus his experience is 
disconnected from truth. As Jameson explains, “there comes into being, then, a situation in 
which we can say that if individual experience is authentic, then it cannot be true; and that if 
a scientific or cognitive model of the same content is true, then it escapes individual 
11 
experience” (411). This disenfranchisement of the individual gives rise, for Jameson, to 
literary movements like modernism(s), in “an attempt to square this circle and to invent new 
and elaborate formal strategies for overcoming this dilemma” (411). The disconnect between 
authenticity and truth is not brought about by a failure of the model of representation, but by 
the distance provided between the individual and the possibility of a more global knowledge. 
“The truth of that limited daily experience of London lies, rather, in India or Jamaica or Hong 
Kong … those structural coordinates are no longer accessible to immediate lived experience 
and are often not even conceptualizable for most people” (Jameson 411). Essentially, in the 
spatial model of modernism, here less a grid than a global network of connections, the 
individual does not have access to the entire picture at once (at least not for ‘most people’), 
but knowledge is fundamentally available.  
Throughout the text, Jameson proposes the idea of cognitive mapping as a means to 
understand the structural model of the stage of late capitalism. This model is meant to allow 
an understanding and analysis of the concept of representation as it has changed from the 
relatively simple classical market structure, through the modernist stage of imperialism, and 
into the postmodern era, “on a higher and much more complex level” (Jameson 51). This type 
of mapping is not meant to be “mimetic in the older sense” (51), but is meant to “enable a 
situational representation on the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly 
unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society’s structures as a whole” (51). 
Jameson intends the project of cognitive mapping to represent the structure that he finds in 
postmodernism in cultural studies, and hopes through its application to provide a structural 
metaphor for the global complexity of postmodernism. The problem with this formulation is 
that it attempts to use a recognizable mimetic structure (the map) to present the structure of a 
“new space [which] involves the suppression of distance (in the sense of Benjamin’s aura) 
and the relentless saturation of any remaining voids and empty places” (412) as well as a 
12 
space which is “simultaneously homogenous and fragmented” (413). Clearly Jameson wants 
to map out the territory of the space of late capitalism and believes that it is mappable. 
However the project of cognitive mapping seems to have been doomed from the beginning, 
by its very metaphorical origins.  
In contrast, what I have called cognitive mapping may be identified as a more 
modernist strategy, which retains an impossible concept of totality whose 
representational failure seemed for the moment as useful and productive as its 
(inconceivable) success. The problem with this particular slogan clearly lay in its 
own (representational) accessibility. Since everyone knows what a map is, it 
would have been necessary to add that cognitive mapping cannot (at least in our 
time) involve anything so easy as a map; indeed, once you knew what ‘cognitive 
mapping’ was driving at, you were to dismiss all figures of maps and mapping 
from your mind and try to imagine something else (409). 
 
This attempt, which I describe as late modernist, reflects an attempt to use modernist tools to 
describe the postmodern world. This attempt is flawed, as the tools in use do not adequately 
reflect new understandings of reality in the postmodern era. It is an attempt which allows for 
a limited understanding of the territory while both fundamentally misunderstanding some of 
its characteristics and misreading its potential to do more than serve functions, which 
Jameson laments the absence of, acknowledging the loss of any form of mimetic 
representation and understanding. At the end of his foundational text in postmodern theory, 
Jameson essentially calls for the mapping of the space; the space he feels still lacks a 
structural metaphor by which it can be more sufficiently understood.  
I take such spatial peculiarities of postmodernism as symptoms and expressions 
of a new and historically original dilemma, one that involves our insertion as 
individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous 
realities, whose frames range from the still surviving spaces of bourgeois private 
life all the way to the unimaginable decentering of global capital itself. Not even 
Einsteinian relativity, or the multiple subjective worlds of the older modernists, is 
capable of giving any kind of adequate figuration to this process, which in lived 
experience makes itself felt by the so-called death of the subject, or, more exactly, 
the fragmented and schizophrenic decentering and dispersion of this last (413). 
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While the older modernists do not have a means of ‘giving adequate figuration,’ I argue 
that there are spatial models elsewhere in postmodern theory that provide the type of 
structural metaphor for postmodernism that Jameson is calling for.  
 
The order that our mind imagines is like a net,  
or like a ladder, built to attain something.  
But afterward you must throw the ladder away,  
because you discover that,  
even if it was useful, it was meaningless.  
(Eco, The Name of the Rose, 599-600) 
 
The Name of the Map: The Skein, The Maze, and The Net 
In Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, while elucidating his concept of encyclopedia 
competence, Umberto Eco identifies three distinct types of labyrinth, which correspond to the 
spaces of Jameson’s stages of capital. Each of these labyrinths represents, for Eco, a spatial 
metaphor for a type of knowledge (or for the semiotician, a system of signs). These three 
metaphors are rich and nuanced, in that they provide insight based not only in their original 
application, but also through their associated characteristics. Furthermore, these metaphors 
can be applied across a vast number of fields, from cultural studies (as we have seen with 
Jameson), to linguistics, in philosophy and throughout the arts and humanities.  
The first labyrinth represents a classical phase, and Eco earlier associates this concept 
with the dictionary. This labyrinth, “the first, the classical one, was linear” (Eco, Semiotics 
80). In this type of labyrinth, modeled on the Cretan maze of the Minotaur, there is only one 
entrance, one path, and one goal. “Structurally speaking … it is a skein, and, as one unwinds 
a skein, one obtains a continuous line” (80). Thus, despite any potential turns or twists, it 
presents a system by which there is, and remains, a fundamental one-to-one relationship 
between the signified and signifier, as well as absolute possibility of complete knowledge on 
a relatively local level. This type of labyrinth is associated with classical forms of writing, 
either prior to the modern era traditionally or in certain genres in their classical formulation. 
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 The second type is the mannerist labyrinth, in which there are multiple paths and 
choices, which potentially could prevent one from reaching the goal or center of the 
labyrinth. This allows for a system whereby one could get lost, and reflects the larger, global 
scale that Jameson described in his own second phase. Eco identifies it with the term maze: 
“A maze displays choices between alternative paths, and some of the paths are dead ends. In 
a maze, one can make mistakes … Some alternatives end at a point where one is obliged to 
return backwards, whereas others generate new branches, and only one among them leads to 
the way out” (81). There are differences between the latter and the former, classical labyrinth, 
namely the possibility of choice, and the potential for error in judgment. However, both of 
these types assume a single goal, and subsequently a single ‘correct’ path by which to arrive 
at this goal. This presupposes a definition of truth as an essential and unwavering concept that 
is independent of factors pertaining to the participants in the labyrinthine structure, whether 
or not such participants have knowledge of this structure or access to the truth.  
 Eco associates the final type of labyrinth with the term net. The net identifies a 
structure that unlike the classical and mannerist labyrinths, contain neither a single 
identifiable goal, nor, consequently, a single correct path by which to arrive at any particular 
point. “The main feature of a net is that every point can be connected with every other point, 
and, where the connections are not yet designed, they are, however, conceivable and 
designable. A net is an unlimited territory” (81). This conception of the labyrinth is closely 
associated with the rhizome, a vegetable metaphor utilized by Deleuze and Guattari to 
describe their vision of the means by which books should be written and knowledge can be 
understood (Deleuze 10). This third type of labyrinth, which I call the rhizomatic labyrinth, is 
the type with which postmodernism has an affinity.  
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 Eco summarizes the characteristics of his rhizomatic labyrinth, based on a description 
by Deleuze and Guattari.
8
 First, “the rhizome has its own outside with which it makes another 
rhizome; therefore, a rhizomatic whole has neither outside nor inside” (Eco, Semiotics 81). 
Here Eco is trying to explain Deleuze and Guattari’s two levels of the use of a rhizome, the 
first of which corresponds to a two-dimensional ‘plane of consistency’, which has its own 
rhizomatic logic. The second level, which Eco calls a ‘rhizomatic whole,’ reflects the 
combination of various planes of consistency via lines of flight, which transforms otherwise 
disconnected rhizomes into an infinitely interconnected rhizomatic whole. It is this latter 
which I call the rhizomatic labyrinth and which I identify as the structural basis of the 
postmodern structure of consciousness.
9
 This structure would then be infinite, and as such 
cannot be comprehended in its entirety. It would require a perspective from outside the 
rhizomatic whole to accurately portray all of its particularities, but its three-dimensional 
nature does not allow for the panopticon point-of-view possible in the cases of the classical 
and mannerist labyrinths. In these first two structures, the conceptual figure of a tower
10
 
would be sufficient to allow either the character or the reader access to an outside view of the 
labyrinthine structure. In a rhizome, however, this panoptic view would not be possible.  
Subsequently, a global description of the rhizomatic labyrinth, as afforded by an 
outside perspective, is impossible. This leads to the second characteristic: “a structure that 
cannot be described globally can only be described as a potential sum of local descriptions” 
(Eco, Semiotics 81). Using this approach, and within the postmodern structural framework, it 
would not be possible to describe the entirety of the structure, only the piece with which any 
given subject were familiar. The whole of the rhizomatic labyrinth could be alluded to, and, 
perhaps using induction, described as a product of similarities, what Eco calls elsewhere 
                                                 
8
 For lack of space, I only discuss those characteristics which are most pertinent to this discussion. Eco’s 
summary is very clear, and my use of the rhizome assumes his descriptions of its attributes.  
9
 This discussion of Deleuze’s points will be taken up, and applied, later in the chapter. 
10
 The metaphor of the tower is taken from John Barth as utilized in James Robert Klein’s Dissertation The 
Tower and the Maze: A Study of the Novels of John Barth.  
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‘structural homologies’ (Opera Aperta 48), with the characteristics of the section known. Yet 
the infinite nature of the rhizomatic labyrinth also calls into question the very nature of a 
global description, as finding the ‘end’ or limit by which one could describe an entirety is 
also ruled out. Given the uncertainty of such a hypothesis, the rhizomatic structure would 
seem to also require a disavowal of the type of truth statements that seem possible in a 
classical or mannerist labyrinth, for which the right path or a correct goal is possible. As 
such, the rhizomatic labyrinth, if applied to knowledge structures or socio-historical 
descriptions, would then render doubtful any blanket truth statement or assumption made 
upon either the path undertaken or the result, or aim, of such actions. Actions could, at best, 
have local or specific consequences and any larger impact, if possible, would remain either 
speculation or completely unknown.  
 This third, epistemological characteristic of the rhizomatic labyrinth also becomes 
apparent in Lyotard’s analysis of the postmodern condition. Lyotard questions the very basis 
of knowledge systems, claiming that they themselves fail to obtain the perspective necessary 
to create the legitimation required by a knowledge claim. He asserts that the best that can be 
understood is a variety of “narrative language elements” (Postmodern xxiv) that at best are 
combined to give local descriptions. His argument gives rise to an “incredulity towards 
metanarratives” (xxiv) as those ‘local narratives’ become self-reinforcing absent a 
legitimating perspective. While he suggests critics of postmodernism would assert that such 
local descriptions could be combined to map the rhizomatic whole from within, Lyotard 
argues that these descriptions are incommensurable, unable to be combined in this fashion. 
Lyotard’s analysis suggests that the ‘little narratives’ themselves function within a rhizomatic 
labyrinth, from which no man has the perspective to see the whole. In this system, such a 
questioning of truth, such incredulity, is a consequence of this structure, and it is precisely the 
postmodern structure of consciousness which accounts for Lyotard’s knowledge structure. 
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We will return to Lyotard later, and consider the impact of the rhizomatic labyrinth as a 
metaphor for the postmodern structure of consciousness on his understanding of the 
postmodern condition.  
 Lyotard, however, does not call into question all narratives, or even all knowledge. 
The rhizomatic labyrinth still allows for local knowledge, without the benefit of an 
overarching metanarrative. Eco uses the rhizomatic labyrinth as a model for “an encyclopedia 
as a regulative semiotic hypothesis” (Semiotics 82) and suggests that this is the best model for 
understanding knowledge in a “universe of semiosis, that is, the universe of human culture” 
(83). Essentially, his encyclopedia could be understood as a series of weblinks, constantly 
changing and evolving, with no discernable pattern or controller. In presenting postmodern 
knowledge, in this fashion, he provides us with a model by which one could understand the 
functions of postmodern knowledge, and the structure of that knowledge follows the pattern 
of the rhizomatic labyrinth, and thus, using my terminology, Eco’s encyclopedia operates 
under a postmodern structure of consciousness. The consequences of such a structure are 
often described, especially by its critics, as falling into the trap of relativism, in which 
knowledge becomes so individualized as to be unable to be shared. Eco elaborates though, 
that “such a notion of encyclopedia does not deny the existence of structured knowledge; it 
only suggests that such a knowledge cannot be recognized and organized as a global system; 
it provides only ‘local’ and transitory systems of knowledge, which can be contradicted” 
(Semiotics 84). It is essentially not local knowledge that is precluded in Eco’s postmodern 
model, but rather the organization and systemization of knowledge.  
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An intersection, at right angles, shows another entirely similar street: the same roadway without traffic, the same 
high, grey houses, the same closed windows, the same deserted pavements. At the corner of the pavement a 
street lamp is alight, although it is broad daylight. But the daylight is without brightness, making everything 
look flat and dull. Instead of the spectacular perspectives which these rows of houses ought to display, there is 
only a meaningless criss-crossing of lines, and the snow that falls continuously, removing all depth from the 
landscape as if this blurred view were a badly painted trompe l’œil on a flat wall. (Robbe-Grillet, In the 
Labyrinth, 11-12). 
 
Rhizome – The Postmodern Metaphor 
Deleuze and Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, present a 
similar idea, limited not only to epistemological questions (as Eco presents with the idea of 
the encyclopedia), but also to all questions of “the organism, signifiance, and 
subjectification” (159). Their description of the model elaborates some of the points that Eco 
addresses more clearly, but also extrapolates the use of the idea of the rhizome to other fields. 
They operate with the concept of the book, a metaphor that both resembles and complements 
the encyclopedia metaphor used by Eco. The encyclopedia discusses the structure of 
knowledge on a grander scale, where Deleuze uses the book to refer more specifically to an 
individual, or an individual concept. Here too is the tripartite division of classical, modernist 
and postmodernist in play, as it was with both Jameson and Eco. Deleuze posits first the root 
book, a classical book which “imitates the world, as art imitates nature: by procedures 
specific to it that accomplish what nature cannot or can no longer do” (Deleuze, Thousand 5). 
This book works on binary logic, and he specifically claims that linguistics still functions in 
this mode. The second idea, with affinities to modernism, is the radicle, in which “the 
principal root has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; an immediate, indefinite multiplicity 
of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development. This time, natural 
reality is what aborts the principal root, but the root’s unity subsists, as past or yet to come, as 
possible” (Deleuze, Thousand 5). While it might seem that this modernist stance, in its 
‘indefinite multiplicity’, resembles the “unrepresentable totality” that Jameson describes, 
what is fundamental to this concept is the unity of the root, even in the absence of the 
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understanding of its nature, or even in its loss or lack. The root remains as nostalgia, or as 
possible (which, with nostalgia’s paradoxical look to the past in order to hope for the future, 
amounts to a similar conception), and thus remains the structuring principle for this 
metaphor. “The world has lost its pivot; the subject can no longer even dichotomize, but 
accedes to a higher unity, of ambivalence or overdetermination, in an always supplementary 
dimension to that of its object. The world has become chaos, but the book remains the image 
of the world: radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos” (Deleuze, Thousand 6). As with 
Eco’s description of the two first labyrinths, there remains in Deleuze’s root/radicle 
paradigm, a unity in terms of the representationality of the world, and it thus maintains a 
structure of consciousness which allows for objective knowledge, identity, signifiance, 
subjects, etc.  
 The final structure is that of the rhizome, which represents a fundamentally different 
approach to understanding, a break from the concepts that are described as modernist. The 
root that is either present (in the classical form) or cut off (in the modernist form), was never 
present, and can never be present, using the metaphor of the rhizome. While both the root and 
the radicle represent attempts to provide a metaphor for a system that is already in place, 
what Deleuze calls a ‘tracing,’ the rhizome represents a possibility of mapping out the 
territory in a new way. “The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing” 
(Deleuze, Thousand 12, original emphasis). While using a similar term, the Deleuzean 
concept of map differs from Jameson’s in its very representationality. The rhizome maps a 
territory in which all concepts are leveled on the same surface, and thus weighted equally. 
There is no hierarchy or privileging, in any objective sense, and any such ‘arborization’ 
would be done arbitrarily, thus becoming alterable (with limitations only through those of 
power relations, rather than natural or essential characteristics). He posits a metaphor for such 
a book, one modeled on the rhizomatic paradigm, as a single sheet of paper, on which one 
20 
could “lay everything out on a plane of exteriority of this kind, on a single page, the same 
sheet: lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social 
formations. … [Such] texts, therefore, are opposed in every way to the classical or romantic 
book constituted by the interiority of a substance or subject” (Deleuze, Thousand 9). This, in 
many ways resembles the way that knowledge is located and organized in the information age 
of cloud computing and a decentralized, hypertext-based internet, in essence positing an 
entirely different structural metaphor, one which destabilizes the existing referentiality and 
hierarchies of philosophy and presents a dynamic, ever-shifting paradigm on which all things 
are not equal, but weighted in shifting and non-foundational ways which can be more easily 
manipulated and altered, given new attitudes, perspectives, information, or even contact with 
new individuals.  
 Deleuze uses the rhizome as a metaphor in several ways. As he describes it, individual 
subjects – both in terms of linguistics, psychoanalysis, other fields of knowledge, as well as 
in the construction of identity (his “bodies without organs” or “BwO”) – are laid out as he 
describes the book, in a rhizomatic pattern which forms a “plane of consistency” (Deleuze, 
Thousand 9). These ‘planes of consistency’ are ordered in a way such that all points of 
identification, each of the ‘lived events,’ ‘concepts,’ ‘individuals’ are connected with every 
other, directly without a form of hierarchy, and without an imposed external order, a fixed 
order. This differs from the classical and modernist structure, which impose hierarchies and 
patterns to the knowledge systems being described or mapped. “Any point of a rhizome can 
be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, 
which plots a point, fixes an order” (Deleuze, Thousand 7). Deleuze uses this structure both 
to map what we call the postmodern condition (in a new way, essentially a map of the 
interconnectedness of all nodes), and to expose previous attempts at mapping this condition 
as failed enterprises. The rhizome is one structure which does not try to impose an order, but 
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in which connections are ever changing (as all of the nodes are also constantly in flux) and 
each connection equally possible (or, as he argues, necessary). The previous paradigms and 
attempts, both the high modernist efforts and those I characterize as late modernist, are 
exposed through this structural metaphor as not offering a sustainable description of 
postmodernity.  
 The rhizome is further used, in Deleuze, to represent not only the structure of the 
‘plane of consistency,’ but also how those planes interact with one another. Each plane is 
connected outside of itself through ‘lines of flight,’ which represent connections with other 
planes of consistency, essentially other fields and individuals. Those lines of flight, in 
connecting various planes, also function with a rhizomatic structure, with all connections 
equally possible (and necessary). Thus the flat rhizomatic planes of consistency are 
connected three-dimensionally with each other in a pattern which is also rhizomatic, but in all 
directions. In this way, diverse fields are also tied together without ‘natural’ modes of 
intersection using terminology and concepts from all fields. “Not every trait in a rhizome is 
necessarily linked to a linguistic feature: semiotic chains of every nature are connected to 
very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.) that bring into play not 
only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status” (Deleuze 7). My 
use of Deleuze’s term employs this larger, three-dimensional conception of the rhizome, in 
carrying over the rhizomatic labyrinth as the metaphor for a postmodern structure of 
consciousness.
11
 Deleuze uses the term rhizome to both describe the planes of consistency, 
and the larger rhizomatic whole including the lines of flight. More precision on Deleuze’s 
part would have limited the potential for misreading, especially given that even at the level of 
the planes of consistency, there is truly no ‘outside’ as it also expands infinitely.  
                                                 
11
 One might also consider this four-dimensionally, taking into consideration time which becomes particularly 
relevant given shifting conceptions over time and, in particular, the challenges of historiographic metafiction 
and the emerging Neo-Victorian. 
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Deleuze’s conception of an ‘open book’ is closely linked to Eco’s attempt at 
describing a semantic rather than pragmatic encyclopedia. I believe the metaphors work in 
tandem, as they provide different insights into the range of this structural metaphor. The 
Deleuzean ‘plane of consistency,’ representing the book, concentrates on single fields of 
knowledge, which then interacts (through ‘lines of flight’) with other concepts. This can be 
viewed through the perspective of the reader, who, while free in the rhizomatic description of 
a single field (think of a single book in a library), making numerous, untethered connections. 
There is no hierarchy, no ‘set’ means, by which such a type of reading should occur, either 
within the book, or within the library. Eco’s metaphor of the encyclopedia provides a 
different nuance to the rhizomatic structural metaphor. While the book remains linked to a 
closed off field (Deleuze distinguishes between items on a ‘plane of consistency’ and the 
lines of flight between them, even if both fields are described as rhizomes), the encyclopedia 
represents a collection of knowledge across fields, and seems to, using the library metaphor, 
represent something akin to a library itself (an image that Eco uses in his own fiction). The 
library then, represents the more three dimensional rhizome associated with the lines of 
flight, and represents a mapping of epistemology, one in which objective truths are 
unreachable. All connections are possible, probable, and in fact necessary, so in essence, they 
are all ‘true’. All assertions, both within each book (in which all points are connected with 
each other) and between the books are debatable, as there is no inherent or imposed structure 
governing the library. 
 The rhizome can furthermore be related not only to concepts within groups or even 
systems of knowledge, but reaches to the broader question of representation as well. The 
book, according to Deleuze, represents not only the knowledge it contains, but is at one with 
its surroundings, altering systems of knowledge that have already been codified. In essence, 
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both the book and the world are ever changing nodes in a rhizome.
12
 The rhizome is the 
metaphor which describes all of these possibilities, in postmodernity, and invoking the 
rhizome allows one to see previous paradigms as limited in comparison. One can map 
postmodernity, using a Deleuzean map, and through the characteristics of that map, come to a 
better understanding of how postmodernism, the aesthetic expression of postmodernity, 
comes to operate.  
 
… In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection  
that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City,  
and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province.  
(Borges, On Exactitude in Science) 
 
Mapping (hyper)reality: The Orders of Simulacra 
Jean Baudrillard, in Simulacra and Simulation, looks at how such a map would operate. He 
opens his “Precession of Simulacra” with a discussion of Jorge Luis Borges’ story “On 
Exactitude in Science”, in which Borges, characteristically through an excerpt from a non-
existent book, suggests a map “whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point 
for point with it” (Borges 325). Borges’ map seems to signal the end to mapping, for as the 
cartographers move towards accuracy, the simulation and the Empire become one and the 
same, eliminating the need for the simulation.
13
 Yet, as Baudrillard notes, this functions only 
as a second order simulacra, one which covers an existent reality, and one which does not 
reflect a postmodern understanding of contemporary society. “Today abstraction”, he asserts, 
“is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer 
that of the territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real 
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 “The same applies to the book and the world: contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of 
the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world; the book 
assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn 
deterritorializes itself in the world” (Deleuze, Thousand 11).  
13
 The need for simulation is removed, as there is no functional way to distinguish between the map and the 
territory. So, while Baudrillard argues that it is the map that remains (in an interesting reversal of Borges’ story, 
and demonstrating the principle of the ‘loss of the real’), it remains that one could distinguish between the real 
(now lost) and the simulacra (all that remains), a position which seems untenable.  
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without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard 1).14 Baudrillard presents the hyperreal as 
something parallel to, or underlying, the structure of postmodernity itself.
15
 In fact, he 
invokes hyperreal specifically to describe something akin to the postmodern condition, yet 
without suggesting that the term ‘hyperreal’ represents a new form of reality.  
Hyperreality is a description in which there are no reference points, and indeed in 
which referentiality and representation have no structural vantage point. While conservative 
attempts at recuperating representative meaning suggest that the simulacra is a false 
representation, Baudrillard asserts that simulacra subsumes the very act of representation, 
which loses its viability within this structural paradigm. In describing simulation as all-
encompassing within a hyperreal, he places hyperreality within the phases of representation: 
Such would be the successive phases of the image:  
It is the reflection of a profound reality;  
It masks and denatures a profound reality; 
It masks the absence of a profound reality; 
It has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum  
(Baudrillard 6).  
 
The hyperreal reflects those stages in which there is not a ‘real’ referent, but instead there 
exist only simulacra, that is to say within both the third and fourth stages of the image, as 
stated above. In the first two stages, a ‘profound reality’ grounds the representative process, 
both in determining the accuracy of a first stage representation, and being used as a point of 
departure in a second order representation (like that of Borges).  
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 There are semantic problems with ‘map’ as we have discussed with the distinction between Jameson and 
Eco/Deleuze and here in Baudrillard in separating the use of the psychoanalytic term ‘Real’ from the concept of 
‘reality’. He wants to separate the status of society (the real) from its reality (as opposed to simulacra). Again, as 
in Deleuze, precision of terminology would have helped elucidate this argument. The hyperreal operates in a 
world without discernable reality (simulacra representing simulacra).  
15
 Baudrillard never uses the term postmodern or postmodernity in Simulacra and Simulation. I am 
distinguishing here between postmodernism and postmodernity, the latter an understanding of social structures 
and the former an aesthetic representation of that understanding. I am also making a distinction between the 
hyperreal and the postmodern, which I view as related but not synonymous, which I will elaborate further within 
the chapter.  
25 
In describing the third stage, Baudrillard invokes a cultural artifact, the famous 
Disneyland example, and asserts that Disneyland serves a function of masking the lack of 
reality, not of Disneyland, but of America itself.  
But this masks something else and this ‘ideological’ blanket functions as a cover for 
simulation of the third order: Disneyland exists in order to hide that it is the ‘real’ 
country, all of ‘real’ America that is Disneyland (a bit like prisons are there to hide 
that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, that is carceral). 
Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, 
whereas all of Los Angeles and the America that surrounds it are no longer real, but 
belong to the hyperreal order and to the order of simulation (Baudrillard 12).  
 
This posits a dilemma, as it stages hyperreality not as a status of society now, but as a 
development from a previous stage into the status of hyperreality. America cannot belong 
both to hyperreality and have previously been ‘real’. Essentially, ‘no longer real’ is not a 
category that should exist in a hyperreal order, as that would assert that it is (or was) possible 
to distinguish ‘real’ and ‘simulation’, and thus reinforce those categories as functional. In 
hyperreality, however, ’real’ and ‘simulation’ do not seem to carry any meaning. This stage 
requires a new means of speaking, as the words that have previously been used all seem to 
reinforce a hierarchy, allow for the possibility of a rediscovery (of the real, meaning, 
sincerity, etc.). Essentially, this should not be possible, as hyperreality seems to function with 
a postmodern structure of consciousness (at least at the fourth stage of the image), and thus 
there is no vantage point from which to discern these ideas. Reality did not precede 
hyperreality; it was always already a simulation. “The impossibility of rediscovering an 
absolute level of the real is of the same order as the impossibility of staging illusion. Illusion 
is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible. It is the whole political problem 
of parody, of hypersimulation or offensive simulation that is posed here” (Baudrillard 19, 
original emphasis). As we will discuss later, parody and referentiality rely on an ability to 
distinguish precisely between illusion and reality, a situation which is complicated in 
hyperreality, and ruled out considering a postmodern structure of consciousness.  
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This represents not just a political problem, but a problem of communication. How do 
we justify our behavior in such a system? Can we have a metaphysics
16
, an ethics? There is a 
fundamental difference between the third and fourth stages of the image in Baudrillard, and it 
is at this point in which I argue there is a distinction between the hyperreal and the 
postmodern. Baudrillard asserts, both in the description of the phases of the image, and in the 
Disneyland example, that the ‘absence of a profound reality’ is essentially knowable, that the 
simulation is identifiable as such, as NOT real. This distinction is not simply on a level of 
limitations in epistemology, in which we know that there is a real, but we don’t know what it 
is. In the Disneyland example, a third order scenario, even if it is masked through the use of 
Disneyland, we can know that this is a simulation, and thus operate in a world in which such 
answers are in fact possible. When organizing our thoughts in such a manner, we are 
fundamentally operating in an arborescent methodology, what I call a modernist structure of 
consciousness and which parallels with Eco’s maze and the Deleuzean radicle. In the 
postmodern structure of consciousness such assertions are not possible, as a distinction 
between simulation and real is not possible; the concepts collapse onto each other. I would 
argue that the fourth stage of the image reflects this, as it gives no pretense to a nostalgia for a 
distinction, all manifestations function at the same level (which Baudrillard, confusingly, 
labels simulacra).  
 This can be explicated further as Baudrillard presents the idea of a simulated crime, in 
an effort to show how simulation works. He suggests: “Simulate a robbery in a large store: 
how to persuade security that it is simulated robbery? There is no ‘objective’ difference: the 
gestures, the signs are the same as for a real robbery, the signs do not lean to one side or 
another. To the established order they are always of the order of the real” (Baudrillard 20). 
Given enough ‘accuracy’ – a term which is difficult because it is often used to reflect 
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 Baudrillard, of course, explicitly says we cannot have a metaphysics in this scenario. Since metaphysics is the 
study of the ultimate nature of reality, given the ‘loss of the real’, it follows that there is also a loss of 
metaphysics, or at very least a fundamental change in how it is understood.  
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representation, but here needs to be invoked only in terms of fulfilling predetermined 
expectations – the crime will always be taken as ‘real’ by the police. The political 
consequences of not asserting the reality of the crime, at very least, would be untenable. This 
is perhaps more topical if one replaces the idea of crime with terrorism. One can invoke the 
sense of terror through a mere simulation of an event, e.g. discussing a bombing of an airport, 
and in effect both the ‘actual’ bombing attempt and the discussion of it are ‘acts of terror’ as 
they have the same effect. There is no distinction between them, at least in the eyes of the 
law. Yet, Baudrillard asserts that this simulation, this parody of a crime, can be differentiated.  
Parody renders serious crime, because it cancels out the difference upon which the 
law is based. The established order can do nothing against it, because the law is a 
simulacrum of the second order, whereas simulation is of the third order, beyond true 
and false, beyond equivalences, beyond rational distinctions upon which the whole of 
the social and power depend. Thus, lacking the real, it is there that we must aim at 
order (Baudrillard 21).  
 
 Baudrillard asserts that in these types of third order simulations, in which the 
simulation does not refer to a supposed real but to a preexisting simulation, it no longer 
matters what really happens, as these scenarios “function as a group of signs dedicated 
exclusively to their recurrence as signs, and no longer at all to their ‘real’ end” (Baudrillard 
21). This new end, as opposed to whatever end the bank robbers, hijackers, or terrorists 
supposedly intended, is simply power. Each of these simulations was used to reinforce a 
structural paradigm in which power dominated and an order was asserted. So, the lack of 
seeming reference, the multiplication of the simulations and seeming lack of foundation, 
masked an underlying order, and thus reestablished what I call a modernist structure. I call 
this stage late modernist, as it hints at the hyperreal, and even uses the invocation of the 
hyperreal, to assert its own order. This stage is demonstrable, as are the first two stages of 
Baudrillard’s four stage system, but the last stage, of hyperreality itself, is much harder to 
exemplify. Part of this comes down to justification, for if the third order simulacrum could be 
used to reproduce a power paradigm, what creates power in hyperreality?  
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This changes everything, because one can always ask of the traditional holders of 
power where they get their power from. Who made you duke? The king. Who made 
you king? God. Only God no longer answers. But to the question: who made you a 
psychologist? the analyst can well reply: You. This is expressed, by an inverse 
simulation, the passage from the ‘analyzed’ to the ‘analysand,’ from passive to active, 
which simply describes the spiraling effect of the shifting of poles, the effect of 
circularity in which power is lost, is dissolved, is resolved in perfect manipulation (it 
is no longer of the order of directive power and of the gaze, but of the order of 
tactility and commutation) (Baudrillard 41). 
 
As we have seen in descriptions by Lyotard and Eco, this allows for power to not be 
overarching, but instead stem from ‘inside’ the system, having no more authority than that of 
the local, and only upon consensus by members on equal footing. Existing in the hyperreal, or 
on a ‘plane of consistency’, disdains anything that could be seen as a metanarrative, and 
instead reinforces the slippery and temporary nature of any assertion of meaning or identity. 
Power in the realm of the hyperreal, or using the rhizome as a structure of consciousness, in 
other words in postmodernism, is a matter of consensus and choice, rather than conformity 
and deviancy, crime and punishment. This concept plays out not only in epistemology, but in 
ethics, politics, and ontology, such as in the construction of identity. It has been called 
postmodern, but could just as easily be termed post-gender (in terms of identity) and even 
posthuman. In her description of the cyborg, Donna Haraway recognizes just this lack of 
historical construction because such a creature “has no truck with bisexuality, pre-oedipal 
symbiosis, unalienated labour, or other seductions to organic wholeness through a final 
appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity” (Haraway 150). In the 
hyperreal, a different understanding of one’s individual identity, separate from an imposed 
(classical) or an identity constructed through exclusion and difference (modernist), moves 
into a concept of post-humanity.  
 Baudrillard argues that trying to describe the hyperreal is a problem for fiction itself. 
If that is the case, then a postmodernist aesthetics would prove untenable. His arguments are 
based on the representational nature of our understanding of, above all, literature.  
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The models no longer constitute either transcendence or projection, they no longer 
constitute the imaginary in relation to the real, they are themselves an anticipation of 
the real, and thus leave no room for any sort of fictional anticipation …nothing 
distinguishes this operation from the operation itself and the gestation of the real: 
there is no more fiction (Baudrillard 122, emphasis original).  
 
Baudrillard writes this specifically in relation to science fiction, a genre that has been invoked 
as strikingly parallel, and sharing elements (especially an ontological poetics) with that of 
canonically understood postmodernist fiction. Yet, Baudrillard makes distinctions between 
the types of novels, even within the realm of science fiction, which could represent the 
hyperreal. He furthermore collapses his numbers of simulations from four to three, seemingly 
collapsing the second and third order of simulacra. “To the first category belongs the 
imaginary of the utopia. To the second corresponds science fiction, strictly speaking. To the 
third corresponds – is there an imaginary that might correspond to this order?” (Baudrillard 
121). As with the earlier examples of the staged crime, finding a model to represent 
Baudrillard’s hyperreal seems, even conceptually, elusive. Those novels that even invoke 
simulacra, like many of the stories and novels by Philip K. Dick, do so at the risk of 
reinforcing an illusory/real paradigm (as science fiction often does, with its possible worlds, 
parallel universes, utopias and dystopias). A representation of the hyperreal in literature 
would have to reflect a world in which “the double has disappeared, there is no longer a 
double, one is always already in the other world, which is no longer an other, without a 
mirror, a projection, or a utopia” (Baudrillard 125).17 Baudrillard suggests that, perhaps, 
novels like J.G. Ballard’s Crash could be seen as “the current model of science fiction that is 
no longer one” (Baudrillard 125) because “Crash is our world, nothing in it is ‘invented’: 
everything in it is hyperfunctional” (Baudrillard 125). Invoking such a paradigm suggests that 
what would perhaps be needed to properly reflect the world of the hyperreal, is a literature 
that is, in some ways, still mimetic, but mimetic of a different structural paradigm, one that 
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 Again, language problems abound, as the hyperreal cannot function within a paradigm of ‘no longer’ as that 
always already does not exist (or has no referent for ‘longer’) but even my own metaphors (‘reflect,’ ‘represent’) 
expose an interesting tension between the theoretical and the practical.  
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reflects the mentality of those critics, theorists, artists and authors that operate in a hyperreal 
realm, one which does not hold fast to roots, or have nostalgic longings for them. While 
Baudrillard sees a possibility in Ballard, which could be further connected to William 
Gibson’s cyberpunk texts (especially those set in a paradoxically dystopian present that are, 
arguably, more troubling than those future dystopias of Neuromancer and the Sprawl series), 
Deleuze considers his rhizomatic pattern to already be present in some literature, as early as 
the 1980s. “American literature, and already English literature, manifest this rhizomatic 
direction to an even greater extent; they know how to move between things, establish a logic 
of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings” 
(Deleuze, Thousand 25). Thus, while looking at, or for, examples of literary postmodernism, 
I would argue that these novels which resemble the world of hyperreality, and which operate 
with a rhizomatic structure, represent the type of literature that is postmodern.  
 
it is nevertheless this structure of consciousness,  
which assumes the universe, the “book of nature,” 
 to be a well-made cosmic drama, that determines the questions  
and thus the expectations and answers 
 (Spanos, ‘The Detective and the Boundary’ 151) 
 
 
A ‘structure of consciousness’ 
In looking at literary history, with a specific focus on postmodernism, I posit three types of 
structures of consciousness, the characteristics of which present three ways of looking at the 
world. Based upon the tripartite historical periodization presented above, as well as analyses 
of the way in which novels from these periods are structured, they reflect the theories of 
Jameson, Eco, Deleuze and Baudrillard. William V. Spanos discusses the term ‘structure of 
consciousness’ in relation to an overarching metanarrative, a “recognition of the ultimately 
‘totalitarian’ implications of the Western structure of consciousness – of the expanding 
analogy that encompasses art, politics, and metaphysics in the name of the security of rational 
order” (Spanos 155). I also use the term as an analogy, but reflecting different understandings 
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of art, politics and metaphysics, related to its underlying structural metaphor. Thus, each 
structure of consciousness – the classical, modernist, and postmodernist – reflects a set of 
characteristics corresponding to the structural paradigms on which they are based, and the 
consequences can then be extrapolated. Basically, I use the labyrinthine metaphors above as a 
model for the structures of the underlying philosophical principles, identity constructions, and 
world constructions of the novels themselves. While not being strictly chronological in 
nature, they do seem to develop in a natural progression. Once each structure has been 
conceived, however, they have historically been equally understood and believed in 
simultaneously. Thus, in the present age, it is possible to find novels which reflect each of the 
three consciousnesses, whereas prior to the modern age, it would have been premature to find 
texts that presumed to understand postmodernism in quite the same way.
18
  
 Thus, classical literature is characterized by a structure of consciousness that can be 
viewed as a skein. The world order found within these texts has specific answers to specific 
questions, represents a one-to-one relationship between fiction and reality, and characters, 
and the worlds they inhabit, are created on essential categories. It is in this world in which 
figures, like Achilles, can be identified with monikers (Peleus’ son) which have specific and 
meaningful referents. Modern(ist) literature can be said to reflect a structure of consciousness 
of the maze, in which the authority governing the universe of classical literature is in doubt. 
Nietzsche’s ‘God is Dead’ philosophy, or Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ reflect the anxiety 
around which this structure of consciousness fluctuates, but rather than a loss of authority this 
structure operates as if the structure had authority and seeks a new means of keeping order. 
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 While there have been texts that seem to operate with a postmodern structure of consciousness prior to the 
current era, those have been identified in retrospect. I argue that it is both the author and the reader that have the 
potential to interact with the text via each of the various structures of consciousness, and thus critics with a 
postmodern mindset might interpret prior texts in this manner. The current era should not be read as the end of a 
teleological path towards enlightenment, but simply a stripping away of prior codified modes of thought, and the 
replacement of those with an open, skeptical, point of view. I do not argue that this is ‘correct’ (from what 
vantage point would one determine accuracy) but seems the best means of describing this literature, and 
arguably the structure of our current era.  
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The metanarratives that operate in this model can be replaced, but are never removed 
altogether, and even in their absence (however temporary) serve to hold the structure of the 
enterprise in place. The postmodern structure of consciousness is that reflected by the 
rhizomatic labyrinth, and operates in the hyperreal realm. Employing the rhizome as the 
metaphor for postmodernism shows that it represents a break from the structure of 
modernism, as the overarching principles which held sway in modernist thinking, even in loss 
or lack, are not important in a postmodern paradigm, as there is no referent by which such 
metanarratives can have authority or been seen as objectively true, operative, or meaningful.  
 While Jameson, Eco and Deleuze each propose a tripartite division, Baudrillard, in his 
stages of the image
19
, also proposes a fourth category. I find this category especially 
intriguing, as it can be used to account for differences in the understanding of the postmodern 
literary canon
20
 between previous approaches to postmodernism and my own. While there 
has been a great debate as to whether postmodernism represents a break or a continuation of 
the Modernist project, the examples used to draw the line have proved troublesome. McHale 
posits a number of texts in Postmodernist Fiction as “limit-modernist” (13) when they didn’t 
fit into his division of modernist and postmodernist poetics (those texts which look both at 
epistemological and ontological issues). He models this concept on Alan Wilde’s notion of 
“late modernism” which reflects for him a middle ground. “Reading appearances correctly is, 
in fact, the project of late modernism, its enemy not a failure to penetrate to some more 
authentic reality but a sort of cultural or psychological dyslexia, which blurs vision itself. 
Sifting appearances rather than plumbing depths: that is the nature of the enterprise” (Wilde 
109). This term is also found in Charles Jencks, in architecture, representing a parallel track 
to postmodern architecture, in which late modernist architecture reflects a continuation or 
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 Baudrillard also uses a tripartite division elsewhere, both in the above mentioned article on science fiction, 
and in his fundamental ‘Orders of Simulacra.’  
20
 By this I mean both the identification of those literary texts as postmodern, but also how texts previously or 
currently understood as postmodern could be understood differently given different approaches (such as my 
own) or given a different structure of consciousness (modernist vs. postmodernist, for example).  
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next generation of the modernist project while postmodernism reflects a break or rejection of 
the tenets of the modernist ‘less is more’ philosophy (Jencks, ‘Postmodern’ 42). He 
furthermore argues neither modernism nor postmodernism is an isolated architectural 
phenomenon, but rather considers them as interdisciplinary concepts, as were the 
Enlightenment and Romantic concepts which preceded them. “Thus, the definition of 
Postmodernism that I have given above holds true for artists and, I believe, such literary 
figures as Umberto Eco, David Lodge, John Barthes, and Jorge Luis Borges, among many 
others” (Jencks, ‘Postmodern’ 42).  
 Thus, I would argue that while there are only three fundamental structures of 
consciousness, there is also something that I would like to call ‘late modernism.’ As it does 
for McHale, Wilde, and Jencks, this category represents an in-between category, but one 
which has more fundamentally in common with modernism than postmodernism, and thus, I 
argue operates with a modernist structure of consciousness. Similar to Baudrillard’s third 
order simulation, which reinforces the modernist order by asserting the unreality of America 
(thus reasserting the existence of ‘reality’ even in its inversion)21, late modernism proposes 
the rhizomatic structure of postmodernism, but only in an effort to ‘deter’ (in Baudrillard’s 
sense) or assert a ‘tipless’ root, with an arborescent structure (to use the Deleuzean 
metaphor). Late modernism, in my conception, simply proposes postmodernism, but 
performs modernism, and thus its own structure, either philosophical or often formally, belies 
the discussions and allusions to a different structural metaphor. As will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters, this is often the case in Umberto Eco and Jorge Luis Borges, who 
Jencks proposes as postmodernists, but whom I identify as late modernist. A similar 
discussion could be had about Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, in which Vladimir and 
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 Baudrillard asserts that Disneyland is a fantastical construction, allowing the populace to understand that 
America itself is real. This is done to mask the fantastic nature of America itself, which is a simulation. I would 
argue that even asserting the simulacra nature of America, identified in contrast to a ‘real’, we are asserting the 
very existence of a ‘real’ against which one can argue America is not.  
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Estragon’s wait seems to present a world without any overarching authority. Yet, they 
operate as if that authority, which is represented by the absent (or non-existent) Godot holds 
sway. The text is slightly at odds, allowing for readings in which their diegetic reaction could 
be seen as ridiculous for the audience, but internally reinforces a structure in which a 
modernist metaphor is operative.  
 
 
The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies.  
I have decided to use the word postmodern to describe that condition.  
(Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiii) 
 
What do the theorists say (and how do they fit)?  
After establishing the need for a definition of postmodernism, and presenting the calls for a 
spatial metaphor, as well as elucidating those spatial constructions of postmodernism from 
which this project derives its understanding, this chapter seeks to present a reductive 
definition of postmodernism, based on the spatial metaphor of the rhizomatic labyrinth, as the 
means to understand the postmodern structure of consciousness. There are, of course, already 
numerous theoretical explanations of postmodernism, which is perhaps one of the most 
discussed terms in the past fifty years. In proposing my own theory, I feel it necessary to 
discuss at least some of the most prominent and taught theories of postmodernism, in order to 
demonstrate how my approach both complements and furthers those well-known modes of 
explanation. To that end, I will take up postmodernism as it is presented by Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, Ihab Hassan, Patricia Waugh, and Linda Hutcheon, each of whom have presented 
influential work within, respectively, philosophy and literary theory, cultural studies, literary 
studies and feminism, and literary postmodernism. This will then be followed by a discussion 
of certain characteristics, typical of postmodern literature, which are often used to define 
postmodernism, specifically metafiction, pastiche, intertextuality, play and irony. Finally, I 
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will present my own definition while discussing Brian McHale’s groundbreaking work in 
Postmodernist Fiction and Constructing Postmodernism, highlighting the differences in our 
approaches and providing a map for the argument to be presented in the rest of the 
dissertation.  
 
Lyotard and The Postmodern Condition 
In his numerous writings on the subject, it could be argued that Lyotard presents two different 
visions of postmodernism, versions that are partially but not completely reconcilable. The 
first version, presented as an appendix to The Postmodern Condition in the short article 
‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?’, argues one side of the well-known 
controversy of whether postmodernism is a continuation of or a break from modernism. In 
this response, Lyotard addresses the notion of the relationship between the two concepts, and 
explains that they are inextricably linked, that the postmodern is “undoubtedly a part of the 
modern” (Lyotard, Postmodern 79). In this articulation, Lyotard presents the postmodern as 
those periods in the development of human thought (which is presented linearly) in which the 
current conceptions of the way things are fall prey to skepticism. The resolutions of those 
periods of doubt are then classified as modern.  
A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of the philosopher: the text he writes, 
the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and they 
cannot be judged according to a determining Judgment, by applying familiar 
categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the work of 
art itself is looking for. (80-81) 
 
The first part of this quotation posits the philosopher similarly to the writer (the reader 
tackling a writerly text) in Roland Barthes conception of the writerly and the readerly. As 
Barthes states, “the writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the 
world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system 
(Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of 
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networks, the infinity of languages” (Barthes 5, original emphasis). Lyotard presents the 
postmodern in the position of the avant-garde, a challenge to the conventions and rules laid 
forth for any age through a wiping away of the rules and starting anew. He considers the 
postmodern, in each of its iterations, as the ‘first’ state, and the modern as the subsequent 
reification of the rules and conventions developed by the postmodern artist. “A work can 
become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not 
modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant” (Lyotard, Postmodern 
79). This places the postmodern in an interesting position. Lyotard posits the relationship 
between the modern and postmodern as nearly opposites, but related in the terms of a 
dialectic, although presented in a manner in which the postmodern (the antithesis) is the 
original state. Eco presents a similar theory in Postscript to The Name of the Rose, in which 
he posits that postmodernism is akin to the Mannerist movement in late Renaissance Italy. 
“We could say that every period has its own postmodernism, just as every period would have 
its own mannerism (and, in fact, I wonder if postmodernism is not that modern name for 
mannerism as a metahistorical category)” (Eco, Postscript 66). Essentially, postmodern 
artists would be the ones pushing beyond accepted norms, into previously uncharted waters.  
There are two paradoxes presented in these arguments. The first is that, in Lyotard’s 
version, the postmodern must necessarily precede the modern. This is paradoxical in 
terminology alone, perhaps, but also seems to point to a teleological end goal of the 
postmodern project. In claiming that the postmodern artist is looking for a set of rules and 
categories, I argue that Lyotard assumes that such a set of rules and categories both exists and 
is discoverable. It further assumes that the modern artists, in contrast, would be those 
working within such set of rules and conventions, and not looking for different answers, or 
answers at all. This dichotomy relates much more to the project of modernism, exemplified 
by figures such as T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, than it does to that of postmodern artists, and 
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seems to take to heart Pound’s call to ‘make it new.’ Similarly, many of the avant-garde 
artistic movements, now encompassed often under the rubric modernist, employed similar 
features, presenting their various contributions as the ‘new’ way to understand aesthetics, 
essentially codifying a new set of rules. Following this line of argumentation, artists creating 
movements like Dada and Surrealism would be considered postmodern, while those carrying 
such movements forth after the codification would become modern artists. Fredric Jameson, 
in his introduction to The Postmodern Condition, has similar concerns, stating: 
This very commitment to the experimental and the new, however, determine an 
aesthetic that is far more closely related to the traditional ideologies of high 
modernism proper than to current postmodernisms, and is indeed – paradoxically 
enough – very closely related to the conception of the revolutionary nature of high 
modernism that Habermas faithfully inherited from the Frankfurt School (xvi). 
 
 The reference to Habermas, in understanding Lyotard’s position, is instructive here. In 
his essay ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’ Habermas contrasts the classical and the modern. 
“With varying content, the term ‘modern’ again and again expresses the consciousness of an 
epoch that relates itself to the past of antiquity, in order to view itself as the result of a 
transition from the old to the new” (Habermas 3). In so arguing, he presents the idea, from the 
Frankfurt School, that the modernist project is one of improving upon the deficiencies seen in 
classical formulations, as new is always seen as improving upon the old. I argue that 
postmodernism, rather than functioning as Lyotard here suggests, works in a different manner 
than one which continues this helical pattern of constant revisiting and revising – essentially 
an extension of the modernist project. Rather, I argue, postmodernism breaks with that 
pattern to develop a different kind of aesthetics based upon a different way of looking at the 
situation. Essentially, while Habermas argues that modernism succeeds classical forms, in a 
cyclical pattern, I argue that postmodernism represents a subsequent break in that pattern, 
superceding the modernist project and presenting a different structure of consciousness by 
which the postmodern artist views the world. In other words, I take the other side of the well-
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known controversy of whether postmodernism is a continuation of or a break from 
modernism, based on its structure. The terminology here is also instructive. While Lyotard’s 
presentation contrasts the postmodern and the modern, Habermas is discussing the classical 
and the modern. All three concepts seem to be in play. While the use of the term ‘nascent’ in 
Lyotard’s conception could be seen as problematic (with the imagery of birth, and the 
association of linear, chronological progress towards death), his description of the 
postmodern is not necessarily. Where Habermas views the classical as the codified rules, and 
modernism as an attempt to alter those rules and find better, more apt ones with which to 
improve upon deficiencies, Lyotard’s postmodern seems to present a blank slate – the 
anarchic state before the rules coalesce into a state of modernism. The constructions of the 
classical, and subsequently the modern, are built upon a foundation of the postmodern, which 
represents the basic ‘real’ state described by Barthes as ‘writerly’ (though here applied to a 
vast array of philosophical, cultural and social categories, as well as writing). By setting up 
the modern as built upon the ‘nascent’ state of the postmodern, Lyotard acknowledges the 
man-made, constructionist nature of the modernist project, and the open rhizomatic nature of 
the postmodern condition. Thus rather than a cyclical, or helical, return to the nascent state, 
the postmodern represents the foundation upon which the artificial constructions of modern 
categories and metanarratives are temporarily (inevitably) constructed and from which they 
are, through time or shift in ideology, removed. That this state has only recently been 
recognized, and discussed in literature, does not diminish this explanation, even if it means 
we are using the clumsy moniker of post- to describe this state.  
This pattern is more consistent with Lyotard’s other articulation of postmodernism. In 
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, first published in French in 1979 and 
subsequently in English in 1984, he develops the idea that postmodernism represents, if not a 
break, at least a reservation of judgments about grand narratives, the overarching means by 
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which we account for knowledge and other political underpinnings to our existence. In two 
oft-cited quotations, Lyotard lays out the basics of this argument. Firstly, he states, “I will use 
the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a 
metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the 
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working 
subject, or the creation of wealth” (Lyotard, Postmodern xxiii). Complementarily, he then, 
“simplifying to the extreme, [defines] postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives” 
(Lyotard, Postmodern xxiv).  
By rejecting metanarratives, essentially Lyotard is removing the narrative basis for the 
legitimation of knowledge as we understand it. His essay places scientific knowledge and 
narrative knowledge in comparison, and concludes that while narrative knowledge provides 
its own justifications – its legitimation comes from the retelling of the tale itself, and doesn’t 
appeal outside of this – scientific knowledge appeals to a larger metanarrative upon which to 
base its legitimacy. Ultimately, Lyotard concludes that such a metanarrative can only be 
justified upon its own terms, and cannot appeal beyond its legitimation narrative 
prescriptively. “Science plays its own game; it is incapable of legitimating the other language 
games. The game of prescription, for example, escapes it. But above all, it is incapable of 
legitimating itself, as speculation assumed it could” (Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 40). 
Essentially, science can identify and explain phenomena on its own terms, but cannot explain 
why one should draw conclusions and act upon the information provided.  
Jameson, in reaction to Lyotard’s move, suggests that rather than the grand narratives 
retreating from the stage, they become the underpinnings of our collective understanding of 
postmodern reality. In discussing the seeming contradiction between Lyotard’s evocation of 
narrative in his argument about the legitimation crisis of science and the narrative crisis that 
postmodernism represents, in its incredulity, Jameson suggests an alternative reading. 
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This seeming contradiction can be resolved, I believe, by taking a further step that 
Lyotard seems unwilling to do in the present text, namely to posit, not the 
disappearance of the great master-narratives, but their passage underground as it were, 
their continuing but now unconscious effectivity as a way of ‘thinking about’ and 
acting in our current situation. This persistence of buried master-narratives in what I 
have elsewhere called our ‘political unconscious.’” (Lyotard, Postmodern xi-xii, 
original emphasis).  
 
I would argue that Jameson here misrepresents the idea of incredulity towards metanarratives. 
While, as he posits, the same metanarratives that supported previous understandings of the 
world order (capitalism, religion, etc.) have not simply ceased to exist, and continue to prove 
influential if not for everyone, at least for the vast majority of the population, that does not 
mean that postmodern thought adheres to this understanding. The fundamental 
misunderstanding is that these narratives operate independent of the people who are to 
believe them, interact with them, support them, and reaffirm them. Jameson assumes that the 
political unconscious belies the loss of the metanarrative at the center of reality. This, I would 
argue, is only true for those that believe that there is such a center, or who choose to operate 
as if there is one (whether or not they have been presented with evidence to the contrary). 
Lyotard’s postulation is for those in the postmodern condition, which I do not contend is 
necessarily a universal condition, but only for those that subscribe to a particular (here 
labeled postmodern) structure of consciousness. Jameson’s assertion seems to place him in 
the realm of the late modern, in which he identifies the loss of metanarrative, but continues to 
seek it elsewhere, essentially reasserting and reaffirming its existence.
22
 
Lyotard also argues that this phenomenon is common, if not fundamental, to our time. 
It may be, but contemporary thought – postpostmodern thought, for lack of a better term – 
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 Jameson’s position here is aligned with Patricia Waugh’s call for political action, found in her numerous 
articulations of postmodernism. While both Waugh and Jameson acknowledge the structure Lyotard advocates 
in The Postmodern Condition, which I call the postmodern structure of consciousness, they also want to assert 
ties to a concrete reality outside of that structure, an underpinning to a ‘real’ world, which this structure doesn’t 
allow for (or knowledge of). Thus, I assert that both theorists unconsciously assert a modernist structure (and 
belie their own modernist structure of consciousness) in advocating this position. Waugh’s position will be 
taken up later in this chapter, and on the whole this will be a discussion that will be returned to in the 
conclusion.  
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seeks to challenge that notion. It is an argument I will return to in the conclusion, but 
essentially there are schools of thought among the New Sincerity movement, and in New 
Materialism, that assert an objective reality outside the bounds of poststructural theory and 
postmodern understandings of reality, which suggest (to me) a different structure of 
consciousness than one found in postmodern artists and theorists. However, Lyotard’s 
skepticism does not devolve into absolute relativism. He leaves open the possibility of 
changing one’s discourse. This becomes possible because the discourse is legitimized through 
its own narration. Essentially, Lyotard argues: 
That is what the postmodern world is all about. Most people have lost the nostalgia 
for the lost narrative. It in no way follows that they are reduced to barbarity. What 
saves them from it is their knowledge that legitimation can only spring from their own 
linguistic practice and communicational interaction. Science ‘smiling into its beard’ at 
every other belief has taught them the harsh austerity of realism. (41) 
 
Rather than an overarching, oppressive, metanarrative we have a series of local, ‘little’ 
narratives, each of which posit a certain truth, but are taken in combination with the whole. 
As each little narrative asserts itself, it becomes ‘true’ locally, as long as it is contained, 
spatially and temporally, and can be disposed of easily should it prove unwieldy.  
A recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language games is a first step in that 
direction. … The second step is the principle that any consensus on the rules defining 
the game and the ‘moves’ playable within it must be local, in other words, agreed to 
by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation. The orientation then favors 
a multiplicity of finite meta-arguments, by which I mean argumentation that concerns 
metaprescriptives and is limited in space and time. (Lyotard 66) 
 
Lyotard furthers the essence of the Nietzschean aphorism that ‘God is dead’ and claims a lack 
of nostalgia for either the lost center or the lost narratives by which we had previously 
structured our understandings. This allows a reevaluation of the narratives by which we 
structure our lives, as the legitimacy for those narratives stems not from an overarching 
system, but from ourselves, adhering to the consensus and limited in scope only to those 
‘finite meta-arguments’ Lyotard suggests. If we provide the legitimacy for those categories, 
boxes, and discourses, then they remain alterable as long as those ‘metaprescriptives,’ as 
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Lyotard describes them, remain transparent, finite and locally conceived. The risk from this 
understanding is not the open-ended nature of the encoding, or relativity, but rather the 
reification of any locally agreed upon rules and the application of those rules to other, or all, 
individuals beyond the context of their legitimacy, what Lyotard earlier called ‘modern’ and 
Habermas had labelled ‘classical.’  
 
Philosophy makes progress not by becoming more rigorous, 
but by becoming more imaginative.  
(Rorty, Truth and Progress Vol.3) 
 
Strong Postmodernism and Political Efficacy 
Richard Rorty, in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, argues that the reevaluation of the 
narratives is precisely the positive outcome of the postmodern condition. He begins with a 
criticism of the bricolage nature of constructing new modes of thought, following upon the 
ideas of Levi-Strauss. The bricoleur’s “universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his 
game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand’, that is to say with a set of tools and 
materials which is always finite” (Levi-Strauss, Savage 17).23 Rorty hopes to push the 
boundaries beyond the items on hand contending that it isn’t possible to create anything new, 
and ultimately provide change, if one works within the constraints and logic of the system as 
is.  
On the view of philosophy which I am offering, philosophers should not be asked for 
arguments against, for example, the correspondence theory of truth or the idea of the 
‘intrinsic nature of reality’. The trouble with arguments against the use of familiar and 
time-honored vocabulary is that they are expected to be phrased in that very 
vocabulary. They are expected to show that central elements in that vocabulary are 
‘inconsistent in their own terms’ or that they ‘deconstruct themselves’. But that can 
never be shown. (Rorty, Contingency 8) 
 
                                                 
23
 Levi-Strauss positions the bricoleur and the engineer on opposite side of position, with the engineer working 
from means to an end, and the bricoleur working with no such purpose, reorganizing existing pieces in a 
random way. Derrida suggests that the engineer is a myth, as there is no evidence that one can create something 
“out of nothing” or “out of whole cloth” (Derrida 285), thus arguing that all discourses borrow from their 
historical counterparts.  
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Rorty argues that the postmodern structure of consciousness, and the recognition of the 
destabilized knowledge legitimation that Lyotard demonstrated, allows for the possibility of 
altering the ways in which metanarratives are perceived, even by those who operate with a 
structure of consciousness in which they maintain value. Rorty’s proposal is that a shift in the 
vocabularies, essentially the words we use within the various language games in operation, 
and the moves made within them, can fundamentally adjust (for Rorty, in a positive way, 
though this is by no means guaranteed) our ways of thinking, reassembling the existing terms 
(like a bricoleur) but purposefully (like the engineer). “The method is to redescribe lots and 
lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will 
tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new 
forms of nonlinguistic behavior, for example, the adoption of new scientific equipment or 
new social institutions” (Rorty, Contingency 9). This argument has the benefit of explaining 
large scale structural changes to society (if humankind has this power, then such changes are 
legitimate and explainable) as well as providing a model for future changes, which gives 
postmodernism a tangible, progressive possibility. 
 Patricia Waugh, in her article ‘Postmodernism and Feminism?’ in Contemporary 
Feminist Theories, argues that the approaches of both Lyotard and Rorty are not practical, 
and thus their efficacy is limited. Waugh posits that there are both strong and weak versions 
of postmodernism, as well as deconstructive and reconstructive modes within these 
theoretical frameworks. Lyotard represents strong deconstructive postmodernism which 
‘exhibits a tendency towards nominalism – refusing the idea that there is ‘a reality’, out in the 
real world, to which ‘concepts’ actually refer, assuming that ‘concepts’ construct and even 
produce the reality they pretend to describe’ (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 182). While this 
description does accurately reflect Lyotard’s position, Waugh seems to already want to 
discredit the position due to is lack of a ‘real-world’ practical implication. She acknowledges 
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the role of this type of postmodernism in exposing, in furtherance of (second wave) feminist 
objectives, ‘the gendered exclusiveness of the so-called ‘universal’ narratives of progressive 
modernity’ (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 182) but doesn’t want to take postmodernism as far as 
leaving feminism with ‘no more legitimacy than any other political language game’ (Waugh 
182-3). This position seems, at best, inconsistent, with the consequence of exposing such 
universal narratives as not universal is to destabilizing the privileging of any one of those 
narratives (feminism in Waugh’s case). For Waugh practical considerations outweigh 
philosophical consistency, but I argue that it is not a tenable position. Once exposed, those 
universals can no longer be asserted with any authority (which authority would be valid, at 
this point?). Waugh goes on to summarize Rorty’s argument, recognizing his position that 
‘there is no truth awaiting our discovery, only ‘truths’ to be invented through the creative 
uses of language’ (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 183). This claim, she argues, won’t stand up to 
the real life disparities in social and economic conditions facing women in contemporary 
society. She states that it is ‘immediately obvious’ that such an argument discounts real world 
problems in favor of ‘strong linguistic determinism’ (Waugh 183), and she further questions 
how either iteration of strong postmodernism ‘could form the basis for any kind of politics, 
ethics or epistemology which assumes the necessity for personal and collective agency and 
responsibility’ (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 188).  
 Waugh, however, doesn’t discount postmodern theory’s contribution to the feminist 
cause wholesale. There are positions in which feminism and postmodernism align, in 
Waugh’s view, as she argues that  
feminists have shown how Enlightenment discourses universalize white, Western, 
middle-class male experience and have thus exposed the buried strategies of 
domination implicit in the ideal of objective knowledge. Feminists as well as 
postmodernists have long recognized the need for a new ethics responsive to 
technological changes and shifts in the understanding between the relations of power 
and knowledge (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 179).  
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Waugh doesn’t see adequate potential in Rorty’s response but other theorists in related fields 
don’t share her skepticism. Feminism, and (later) queer theory, isn’t the only cultural 
discourse which, under the modernist project, has sought to excavate the master narratives 
and demonstrate the domination implicit within them, ethnic studies movements have been 
addressing a similar concern.  
The literary theorist bell hooks (Gloria Watkins) has argued that, similar to feminism, 
the black power movement has its roots in a modernist project, and that “certainly many of 
the ways black folks addressed issues of identity conformed to a modernist universalizing 
agenda” (hooks 25). This movement faces a predicament similar to the one as that Waugh 
identifies in feminism. While postmodern discourse provides the tools for recognizing the 
power structures inherent in the “privileged meta-discourses” (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 
185), feminism as well as categories such as class, race, ethnicity, “can no longer be regarded 
as an essential or even stable category” and thus “it is no longer legitimate to appeal to the 
category ‘women’ [or presumably ‘black’ or ‘subaltern’] to ground a meta-narrative of 
political practice – even in the name of emancipation” (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 185). The 
postmodern response to both the feminist movement and to, as bell hooks describes, the black 
power movement, was the same: a rejection of the newly won claims of legitimacy for 
“decentered, marginalized black subjects who had at least momentarily successfully 
demanded a hearing, who had made it possible for black liberation to be on the national 
political agenda” (hooks 25). Waugh challenges the efficacy of the postmodern project as a 
whole, on this account, whereas bell hooks argues forcefully that there is a place for the 
‘politics of difference’ within postmodern discourse, and that such a position can be 
meaningful.  
Radical postmodernist practice, most powerfully conceptualized as a ‘politics of 
difference,’ should incorporate the voices of displaced, marginalized, exploited, and 
oppressed black people. … If radical postmodernist thinking is to have a 
transformative impact, then a critical break with the notion of ‘authority’ as ‘mastery 
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over’ must not simply be a rhetorical device. It must be reflected in habits of being, 
including styles of writing as well as chosen subject matter. (hooks 25) 
 
Her contention mirrors that of Rorty, so while she, like Waugh, is a strong advocate of a 
position that was both marginalized, offered a degree of hope in the later stages of the 
modernist project, but then seemingly abandoned (according to the critics) by postmodern 
discourse, hooks rather sees a potentiality – a real, political potential – to the transformative 
power of language (Rorty’s vocabularies). Rorty further argues that his position is truly that 
of new, and not reused, vocabularies (and that its very newness is the potent aspect), through 
advocating a philosophical method which “does not argue for this suggestion [new 
vocabularies] on the basis of antecedent criteria common to the old and new language games. 
For just insofar as the new language really is new, there will be no such criteria” (Rorty 9), 
and as such destabilizes the bricoleur effect by demonstrating that the new forms are not 
reliant upon reconceptions of previous logic. 
 Consequently, despite her reservations in the political arena, Waugh does conclude 
that in the aesthetic sphere a stronger variety of postmodern is preferable. “For a feminist 
politics committed to the futures of actual women in the world, the rather more earth-bound 
and situated reason of weak postmodernism may complement the stronger postmodernist 
impulses at work in experimental art and literature’ (Waugh, ‘Postmodernism’ 191-2). Yet, 
while Waugh sees strong postmodernism succeeding primarily in an aesthetic sphere, in 
which it is the language games most uninhibitedly presented, divorced from potential real 
world consequences, Rorty sees aesthetics, and literature in particular, having real world 
consequences, claiming that “novelists can do something which is socially useful – help us 
attend to the springs of cruelty in ourselves, as well as to the fact of its occurrence in areas 
where we had not noticed it” (Rorty, Contingency 95). So, while this project focuses on 
literary postmodernism, I contend that the consequences of a postmodern structure of 
consciousness are not limited to the purely literary or aesthetic. The literary is simply the 
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manifestation of this viewpoint with which the project will seek to elucidate the postmodern 
structure of consciousness and its consequences.  
 
 
The history of the world? 
Just voices echoing in the dark;  
images that burn for a few centuries and then fade; 
stories, old stories that sometimes seem to overlap; 
strange limits, impertinent connections […] 
We make up a story to cover up 
 the facts we don’t know or can’t accept; 
we keep a few true facts and spin a new story around them.  
Our panic and our pain are only eased by soothing fabulation; 
we call it history. 
(Julian Barnes, History of the World in 10 ½ Chapters) 
 
Linda Hutcheon and Historiographic Metafiction 
Moving into the literary sphere, Linda Hutcheon presents more concrete examples of how 
postmodernism can be seen in practice, in literature. Her exemplary version of postmodern 
fiction – historiographic metafiction – represents the postmodern structure of consciousness, 
yet also misrepresents it in various ways. This fiction is defined as “those well-known and 
popular novels which are both intensely self-reflexive and yet paradoxically also lay claim to 
historical events and personages” (Hutcheon, Poetics 5) and which she puts forth as the best 
example of postmodernist fiction.  
This type of fiction does, in her presentation, reflect the postmodern structure of 
consciousness, both in the consideration of the aesthetic as well as historical aspects that are 
the focus of Hutcheon’s analysis. In terms of history, she suggests that such fiction 
destabilizes notions of the reality or factuality of historical knowledge, and presents such 
discourse as just that – a textualized phenomenon of narrative (following Hayden White 
among others). She argues that: 
History is not made obsolete: it is, however, being rethought – as a human construct. 
And in arguing that history does not exist except as text, it does not stupidly and 
‘gleefully’ deny that the past existed, but only that its accessibility to us now is 
entirely conditioned by textuality. We cannot know the past except through its texts: 
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its documents, its evidence, even its eye-witness accounts are texts. (Hutcheon, 
Poetics 16, original emphasis) 
 
This reinforces the notion that there isn’t an objective, outside, appellant to the veracity of 
such historical knowledge. The epistemological limitations, explicitly acknowledged in a 
postmodern structure, prohibit assertions as to the nature of history, limiting the field of 
historiography to the narrative forms similar, if not identical, to those of literature. Yet, as 
Rorty argues, this does not limit the potency of the combination of fictional narratives and 
historiography in a political sphere. Hutcheon argues that 
Works like Ismael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo, Maxine Hong Kingston’s China Men, and 
Gayl Jones’s Corregidora have gone far to expose – very self-reflexively – the myth- 
or illusion-making tendencies of historiography. They have also linked race and/or 
gender difference to questions of discourse and of authority and power that are at the 
heart of the postmodernist enterprise in general and, in particular, of both black theory 
and feminism. (Hutcheon, Poetics 16) 
 
This provides a link between the political efficacy of discourse based criticism, which Waugh 
was skeptical of, and the postmodernist fiction which Hutcheon promotes in historiographic 
metafiction. To the extent that Hutcheon argues that both the (meta)fictional elements and the 
historiographic elements within the fiction are equally shown to be constructions, it provides 
a perfect literary counterpart to the strong postmodern theory of Lyotard and Rorty. 
 However, Hutcheon doesn’t simply argue that historiographic metafiction destabilizes 
the notion of objective truth, and reinforces a multiplicity of truths within its fictional bounds. 
Rather, she argues that historiographic metafiction, and postmodernist fiction in general, 
represent a paradox (or rather a series of paradoxes), which are shared by postmodern 
theorists as well. Hutcheon begins The Poetics of Postmodernism with the following claim: 
“for me, postmodernism is a contradictory phenomenon, one that uses and abuses, installs 
and then subverts, the very concepts it challenges – be it in architecture, literature, painting, 
sculpture, film, video, dance, TV, music, philosophy, aesthetic theory, psychoanalysis, 
linguistics, or historiography’ (Hutcheon, Poetics 3), further arguing that “postmodernism 
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cannot simply be used as a synonym for the contemporary” (Hutcheon, Poetics 4). By 
arguing that postmodernism is defined by certain characteristics, in this case the contradictory 
nature of the phenomenon, it seems to follow that it isn’t a chronological category (as has 
been argued elsewhere). Furthermore, she treats historiographic metafiction as simply one 
version of postmodernist fiction and stresses that the postmodern is not limited to the literary 
sphere. I contend that merely looking at characteristics such as those defining historiographic 
metafiction are too limiting, and represent symptoms (Aristotelian accidents) rather than the 
defining notion of postmodernism. While I agree that many of the examples that Hutcheon 
chooses, specifically many of those she identifies with historiographic metafiction, represent 
examples of postmodern fiction, I also feel that her presentation misrepresents the nature of 
postmodern structure.  
 In response to the idea that “postmodernism is a contradictory phenomenon, one that 
uses and abuses, installs and then subverts, the very concepts it challenges,” (Hutcheon, 
Poetics 3) I would argue that this belies a stance in which Hutcheon maintains the essential 
nature of some of the categories that she argues postmodernist fiction, and historiographic 
metafiction in particular, destabilizes. She does this in two ways. First, one of her arguments 
for historiographic metafiction is that it presents historical facts incorrectly, in order to 
destabilize the historiographic discourse. While arguing that this fiction  
refutes the natural or common-sense methods of distinguishing between historical fact 
and fiction … both by questioning the ground of [the truth] claim in historiography 
and by asserting that both history and fiction are discourses, human constructs, 
signifying systems, and both derive their major claim to truth from that identity 
(Hutcheon, Poetics 93) 
 
she goes on to argue that the means by which history is challenged is through a mixing of true 
and false claims of history. “In novels like Foe, Burning Water, or Famous Last Words, 
certain known historical details are deliberately falsified in order to foreground the possible 
mnemonic failures of recorded history and the constant potential for both deliberate and 
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inadvertent error” (Hutcheon 114). This leads to epistemological problems, for how can a 
critic, or a reader, identify, with any certainty, what is or isn’t ‘historical fact’? This is even 
truer in today’s digital age, where the authority of sources is constantly undermined by the 
vast amount of information that is in circulation, requiring other criteria to determine 
whatever sense of truth-value one wants to describe. While it has perhaps always been the 
case that we have assigned truth-value, however unwittingly, to religious figures, eyewitness 
accounts or an academic elite this becomes even more problematic in texts which, Hutcheon 
argues, seek deliberately to undermine the very authority that such discourse portends. 
Essentially, Hutcheon’s version of historiographic metafiction relies upon recognizable and 
authoritative facts which can then be undermined by deliberately falsifying them within a 
text, destabilizing the reliability of those authoritative sources. However, if one already 
approached those texts with a doubt as to the veracity of all underlying facts (or were simply 
unaware of the potentiality of ‘real world truth claims’ made within any text), then this aspect 
of historiographic metafiction, in Hutcheon’s critical analysis, loses all force. Thus her 
analysis relies upon a (late) modernist understanding of the truth to be undermined.  
 Secondly, she further argues that there is knowledge beyond that of the discourse of 
the texts to which she is referring, a status unsupported by the postmodern structure of the 
discourses she represents in historiographic metafiction. She argues that “postmodern 
discourses both install and then contest our traditional guarantees of knowledge, by revealing 
their gaps or circularities. They suggest no privileged access to reality. The real exists (and 
existed), but our understanding of it is always conditioned by discourses, by our different 
ways of talking about it” (Hutcheon, Poetics 157). I would argue, however, what happens is 
not that postmodern discourses ‘install’ the traditional guarantees of knowledge, but only 
seemingly do so. What these texts do is play upon our pre-existing understanding of how 
literature works, in a metafictional/metacritical way, to undermine those very preconceptions. 
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Postmodernist fiction does not, as she argues, “install and then subvert” (Hutcheon, Poetics 
3), but subverts by the very pretense of installation something which it already assumes has 
no basis for installation. The difference is in whether the author or critic acknowledges, as 
Hutcheon here seems to, that “the real exists (and existed)” (Poetics 157) or whether we only 
assume that it does, and have acted in the past accordingly. Postmodern theory disavows us 
of those previous connotations, those classical and modernist structures, and literary 
postmodernism sets about modelling the postmodern structure of consciousness within the 
texts themselves.  
 Hutcheon also argues that postmodernist fiction reflects a blending not only of 
historical and literary discourses, but of genres and modes of the literary as well. However, 
both of these assertions are problematic, for much the same reason we have just discussed. 
She claims, in relation to historical subject matter that, “what such fiction also does, however, 
is problematize both the nature of the referent and its relation to the real, historical world by 
its paradoxical combination of metafictional self-reflexivity with historical subject matter” 
(Hutcheon, Poetics 19). What such an assertion brings is the codification of historical subject 
matter as accurate and representative of a ‘real, historical world’ without its epistemological 
basis, but further brings into question the nature of referents in postmodernism altogether, 
something we will come back to when discussing intertextuality later in the chapter. She goes 
on to discuss the various aspects of literature into which postmodernist fiction is classified. 
“Historiographic metafiction clearly acknowledges that it is a complex institutional and 
discursive network of élite, official, mass, popular cultures that postmodernism operates in” 
(Hutcheon, Poetics 21). While it does seem that postmodernism works within those 
categories, it does so by destabilizing the categories, not reinforcing them. That is, in fact, the 
largest difference between the modernist and postmodernist paradigm, in that a modernist 
structure of consciousness is seeking those very categories and treating them as actual entities 
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‘out there’, rather than constructed categories to be altered and removed at will. What 
postmodernism does is not to acknowledge the network of various cultures, but to point out 
existing understandings to demonstrate the constructedness of such discourse, not to ‘operate 
in’ but to undermine and deconstruct. Hutcheon further says, “I would argue that, as typically 
postmodernist contradictory texts, novels like these parodically use and abuse the 
conventions of both popular and élite literature, and do so in such a way that they can actually 
use the invasive culture industry to challenge its own commodification processes from 
within” (Hutcheon, Poetics 20, original emphasis). As discussed above with the installation 
to historical ‘fact’, postmodernist fiction does not ‘use and abuse the conventions’ but only 
seems to do so. It activates our desires for closure in detective fiction, or our appeal to 
ontological stability in science fiction, only to render meaningless the very categories we tend 
to rely upon. So, while it does challenge the genres, it does so not through parody, which 
requires a true original to make the parodic viable, but rather renders trivial, and obsolete, 
those very criteria that have been set up, by demonstrating the lack of underpinning of its 
foundation.  
Rorty, Baudrillard, Foucault, Lyotard, and others seem to imply that any knowledge 
cannot escape complicity with some meta-narrative, with the fictions that render 
possible any claims to ‘truth,’ however provisional. What they add, however, is that 
no narrative can be a natural ‘master’ narrative: there are no natural hierarchies; there 
are only those we construct. It is this kind of self-implicating questioning that should 
allow postmodernist theorizing to challenge narratives that do presume to ‘master’ 
status, without necessarily assuming that status for itself. (Hutcheon, Poetics 13) 
 
What postmodern theorists do is similar to the Socratic vantage point, a point of ignorance 
and knowledge at the same time. Socratic knowledge is limited only to the recognition that 
other assertions of knowledge are baseless, and postmodern theorists seek to point out the 
same thing, that the categories, genres, and modes in which we operate are, as far as we can 
tell, constructed by us, and can thus be altered. There is no larger, out there, appellant to the 
truth, no hierarchy, no ‘master’ narrative. Pointing this out does not create another ‘master’ 
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narrative, but rather frees us from both needing to use one, and from seeking out something 
for which there is no evidence. This is represented mimetically throughout postmodernist 
fiction, and often involves metafictional elements, as later chapters will demonstrate.  
 The literature that Hutcheon identifies and discusses as postmodern (examples of 
historiographic metafiction), and even much of her analysis, reinforces this reading of the 
nature of postmodernist fiction, which is not strictly limited to texts which blur history and 
fiction, or ‘fact’ and fiction, but extend to all levels of discourse and seem to mimetically 
present the structure of consciousness of the author, reader and critic simultaneously. In her 
analysis of the nature of history and fiction, she argues that such literature  
refutes the natural or common-sense methods of distinguishing between historical fact 
and fiction. It refuses the view that only history has a truth claim, both by questioning 
the ground of that claim in historiography and by asserting that both history and 
fiction are discourses, human constructs, signifying systems, and both derive their 
major claim to truth from that identity. (Hutcheon, Poetics 93)  
 
In so identifying the fiction, she reinforces that there is no fundamental discourse that has 
primacy or necessary access to ‘truth’, but rather the contingent and consensus driven nature 
of meaning-making in both the historical and fictional fields. What she does not do, is 
suggest that this can be extended to other fields, and thus the example of historiographic 
metafiction is unnecessarily limiting.  
She also identifies the methodology that the authors use which reinforces such a 
demonstration of postmodern structure within the diegetic frame of the novels themselves, 
relating the postmodernist work not only to the realm of the critic/reader but also to the 
structure of the novel as constructed by the author themselves. She argues (again, in a 
paradoxical way), that: 
In many historical novels, the real figures of the past are deployed to validate or 
authenticate the fictional world by their presence, as if to hide the joins between 
fiction and history in a formal and ontological sleight of hand. The metafictional self-
reflexivity of postmodern novels prevents any such subterfuge, and poses that 
ontological join as a problem: how do we know the past? What do (what can) we 
know of it now? (Hutcheon, Poetics 115) 
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The status she identifies here as ontological is what Brian McHale calls the epistemological 
dominant, correlating it with modernist fiction. For McHale, the ontological complement, the 
focus on which world we live in, and how we function within it, represents postmodernist 
poetics (to be discussed further later in the chapter). Hutcheon argues that it isn’t which 
questions that are asked as historiographic metafiction asks both types of questions. 
“Historiographic metafiction asks both epistemological and ontological questions. How do 
we know the past (or the present)? What is the ontological status of the past? Of its 
documents? Of our narratives?” (Hutcheon, Poetics 50). I assert, however, that it is the 
structure of the answers to such questions, and not simply that they are posed, which makes 
the difference.  
 To provide a more concrete example, Hutcheon discusses the means by which 
historical novels, and historiographic metafiction, use historical detail. She presents the idea, 
from Lukács, that historical novels use such details to provide the weight of verifiability and 
thus lend the texts an air of authority, which fiction does not usually contain. She claims that 
historiographic metafiction contests this use in two ways. As we discussed above, she asserts 
that such fiction deliberately provides false information to undercut the sense of authority 
ascribed both to the novel, and to the common sense assertion of authority that history is 
afforded. That this is paradoxical does not completely detract from its use, as one can also 
claim that the air of authority of historical ‘facts’ are equally based on the notion of it being 
‘seemingly’ or ‘well-known to be true’ and that the undermining of its authority also 
undermines the particular historical facts as well (in a Socratic style, disavowing the assertion 
of knowledge by exposing it as groundless). Secondly, she asserts that what these novels, like 
Ondaatje’s Running in the Family, demonstrate is that “historiographic metafiction 
incorporates, but rarely assimilates these data. More often, the process of attempting to 
assimilate is what is foregrounded … As readers, we see both the collecting and the attempts 
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to make narrative order” (Hutcheon, Poetics 114, original emphasis). Hutcheon’s analysis of 
this phenomenon is to assert that such fiction presents a paradox, that both the reality and its 
inaccessibility are presented at once. “Historiographic metafiction acknowledges the paradox 
of the reality of the past but its textualized accessibility to us today” (Hutcheon, Poetics 114, 
original emphasis). However, in so arguing, she is the one presenting such a paradox, for if 
the accessibility of such knowledge is only found through discourse, and textualized 
discourse, then there is no position, structurally, from which to assert the ‘reality of the past.’ 
The novels in question would, of course, present only the attempt to stitch together the reality 
of the situation, as the nature of that past (or even its very ontological status) must remain 
unknown (given the postmodern structure of consciousness). There is no vantage point given, 
diegetically or extradiegetically, from which to assert anything other than the local truths that 
Eco and Lyotard have argued for. So, while Hutcheon often presents historiographic 
metafiction as enacting postmodernism, and serving as a model for the internal structure of 
consciousness, she herself continues to assert access to something outside that structure, 
belying (as mentioned earlier with Jameson and Waugh) ties to a, perhaps unconscious, 
modernist structure driving her analysis.  
 What the concept of historiographic metafiction (and some other works like 
Postmodernist Fiction by Brian McHale) does well is change the discussion fundamentally to 
how postmodernism works, as opposed to when it is manifested, which allows postmodern 
theory and literature to stand on its own merits. That postmodernism is historically 
contextualized is not in doubt, but by so defining the concept, their focus is on what literature 
is (and is doing) as opposed to when (historically, or even, as McHale occasionally argues, 
within the œvre of an author which would imply a teleological component Hutcheon’s 
analysis doesn’t allow). This shift to characteristics is important, but Hutcheon is not the first 
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to focus on the characteristics. Perhaps the most prominent theorist who proposes a list of 
characteristics of postmodernism is Ihab Hassan.  
 
 
This is the Tragic View of Categories. 
Terms like Romanticism, Modernism, and Postmodernism 
are more or less useful and necessary fictions: 
roughly approximate maps,  
more likely to lead us to something like a destination 
 if we don’t confuse them with that they’re meant to be maps of.  
(John Barth, Further Fridays 114) 
 
Characteristically Postmodern 
As mentioned towards the beginning of the introduction, Ihab Hassan attempted to move 
scholarship on postmodernism towards an all-encompassing definition, based on the 
characteristics that one found in the discourse surrounding it and within texts considered 
postmodern. He argues, in ‘Toward a Concept of Postmodernism’, that in some sense we 
already had (in 1982) a working concept of postmodernism, although it was not yet fully 
articulated: “we continually discover ‘antecedents’ of postmodernism … What this really 
indicates is that we have created in our mind a model of postmodernism, a particular typology 
of culture and imagination, and have proceeded to ‘rediscover’ the affinities of various 
authors and different moments with that model” (Hassan 89). Hassan’s project is to “bring us 
closer to [postmodernism’s] historical and theoretical definition” (Hassan 92). He does so 
through providing a rubric, pairs of words in opposition, intended as “certain schematic 
differences from modernism” (Hassan 91) which would provide insight into a more sustained 
definition. The list is as follows:  
Arrow (Up/Down)   Arrow (Left/Right) 
Modernism Postmodernism 
Romanticism/Symbolism Pataphysics/Dadaism 
Form (conjunctive/closed) Antiform (disjunctive/open) 
Purpose Play 
Design Chance 
Hierarchy Anarchy 
Mastery/Logos Exhaustion/Silence 
Art Object/Finished Work Process/Performance/Happening 
Distance Participation 
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Creation/Totalization Decreation/Deconstruction 
Synthesis Antithesis 
Presence Absence 
Centering Dispersal 
Genre/Boundary Text/Intertext 
Semantics Rhetoric 
Paradigm Syntagm 
Hypotaxis Parataxis 
Metaphor Metonymy 
Selection Combination 
Root/Depth Rhizome/Surface 
Interpretation/Reading Against Interpretation/Misreading 
Signified Signifier 
Lisible (Readerly) Scriptible (Writerly) 
Narrative/Grande Histoire Anti-narrative/Petite Histoire 
Master Code Idiolect 
Symptom Desire 
Type Mutant 
Genital/Phallic Polymorphous/Androgynous  
Paranoia Schizophrenia 
Origin/Cause Difference-Difference/Trace 
God the Father The Holy Ghost 
Metaphysics Irony 
Determinacy Indeterminacy 
Transcendence Immanence  (Hassan 91-2) 
  
The modernist list is, to a certain degree, coherent, and harkens back to definitions of 
modernism as a form of literature which attempts to find new rules and ways of mimetically 
representing an existing, yet shifting, world. Modernist writers can be described as those 
authors who have developed and worked with new forms, new styles, which disrupt 
contemporary artistic practiced and discourse. Prominent in descriptions of modernism lies 
the avant-garde, the various movements of which (especially in the early parts of the 
twentieth century) attempted to ‘make it new’ not only with new forms and styles, but also 
exploring untapped subject matter, matter deemed either inappropriate, taboo, or simply 
beneath notions of artistic expression. Modernist experiments are often seen as looking for 
new ways to recover the lost order in the wake of skepticism related to previous grande 
narratives like religion and other cultural myths of the past, but function fundamentally with 
the same structure, one which uses the lack of the narrative as the vantage point to justify its 
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recovery. Hassan’s ‘modernist’ rubric can be explained as a set of related criteria to such a 
central position.  
 The up and down arrow implies hierarchy, as the axis of consideration is one of 
height and depth (visual cues for the reader/scholar). Root/Depth is similarly aligned. A 
hierarchical structure implies a particular viewpoint which is either given or accessible 
(assumable), within the discourse. In religious discourse God the Father is applicable, and in 
other discourses the nature of centering, a focus on the genital/phallic (say in Freudian 
psychoanalysis, as the constrictive social norms on polymorphous desire – even his term 
perversion reinforces a hierarchical structure, even if he passes no judgments on its 
implementation in ethical/moral terms). Transcendence is made possible only with an 
up/down hierarchical structure, as it implies rising above. There would, necessarily, need to 
be two worlds (realms, levels), with one situated ‘above’ the other. Such a vantage point also 
allows for the epistemological underpinning of the nature of a master code, totalization or a 
Narrative/Grande Histoire (though I don’t believe they are synonymous, and contend that 
small n narrative exists for petite histoire as well). The same vantage point functions also for 
Mastery/Logos (again not identically, but both mastery and logos are viable through this 
structure). Logos itself can have many definitions, but in academia it is often used in the 
Greek sense of an argument, and as the root for logic (which is implicitly unified). As such, 
logos is tied to a number of the other concepts on the list, such as metaphor with its notion of 
a distinct implied relationship between the concepts, the nature of signified as tied to a ‘real 
world’ object and a relationship to the truth (again, possible with such a structure). Also 
related are the natures of the Art Object/Finished Work in which the author’s intention is 
realized, through a sense of purpose or design. Such a Form remains closed to a certain 
amount of interpretation/reading(s) as one would expect in Symbolism, which reinforced 
the concepts of Genre/Boundary (boundary serving as a constraint defining the genre itself) 
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and type. This point of view allows for a certain amount of determinacy through concepts 
such as correct interpretations, grounding in the real world, reality, and truth, as deemed 
possible in such a structure, even if they aren’t necessarily present.  
 While the modernist rubric is coherent, the postmodern rubric seems to contain a set 
of characteristics which, while in opposition to specific items on the modernist list, do not 
cohere into a single movement, mode, or school of thought. Brian McHale argues that this is 
typical of the approach of defining postmodernism through lists of characteristics, 
specifically when those are presented in opposition to modernism.  
In all these cases, the oppositions tend to be piecemeal and unintegrated; that is, we 
can see how a particular postmodernist feature stands in opposition to its modernist 
counterpart, but we cannot see how postmodernist poetics as a whole stands in 
opposition to modernist poetics as a whole, since neither of the opposed sets of 
features has been interrogated for its underlying systematicity. (McHale, 
Postmodernist 7) 
 
In interrogating Hassan’s postmodern list, it seems that some of the terms work as McHale 
suggests, as functional opposites to the modernist counterpart, without coalescing into a 
consistent structure with which we can define postmodernism, while others point to an 
underlying pattern that could form such an explanation.
24
 Basically, the terms on the right 
side of Hassan’s rubric do not all point to the same phenomenon and, as I will show below, 
some of them actually reinforce the modernist pattern from the left side of the list. In 
addition, there are a number of terms which could be interpreted as belonging to either side, 
which indicates that those terms themselves are not good indicators of either modernism or 
postmodernism, but rather that the underlying concepts of modernism and postmodernism is 
what drives their inclusion on one or the other of the lists.  
 Firstly, the notion of paradigmatic and syntagmatic semiotics, as one of the dualisms 
that Hassan presents, falls into the camp of being a pair of opposites which do not accurately 
                                                 
24
 I contend that the left side of the list forms a coherent picture of modernism, as understood by Hassan and 
against which he was attempting to define postmodernism (in 1982). While understandings of modernism have 
shifted up to 1982, and continue to do so, especially in terms of new post-millennial scholarship, I argue that 
Hassan’s modernist list stands up to interrogation (though my focus is on postmodernism here).  
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reflect the modernism/postmodernism split. Understood in relation to other terms like 
selection/combination, and signified/signifier, this concept relates two halves of various 
linguistic systems of meanings. While the paradigm and syntagm function on different axes – 
related to the substitution, or selection, of individual linguistic elements, or the combination 
of said linguistic elements – both involve the construction of meaning. That construction can 
happen either with the understanding that there are fixed definitions related to each linguistic 
element, or with the understanding that these elements are endlessly mutable and agreed upon 
arbitrarily. Those perspectives on the underlying sense of meaning-making is not dependent 
upon which axis is considered, but how one understands the relationship between text and 
meaning, on either axis. So, while these perspectives are opposites, they are not on opposite 
sides of the modernism/postmodernism debate. The same could be said for art 
object/finished work and performance/happening as the contingency of the work, and the 
openness to interpretation (and the multiplicity of interpretations), is apart from the seeming 
completeness of the work of art or the seeming spontaneity of a performance or happening 
(which are not necessarily more contingent than a ‘finished’ work).25  
Other elements on the postmodernism rubric seem to similarly represent opposition 
instead of cohesion with a new postmodern definition. Interpretation/reading, which was 
related to concepts like symbolism and form, again seem to relate more to the modernist 
structure (or structure of consciousness) than its opposite. Against 
interpretation/misreading implies an absence and seems to be two concepts elided in their 
opposition. Against interpretation represents a negative, and skepticism, as opposed to 
openness and multiplicity (open and polymorphous are also on the list). Postmodernism 
could as easily be characterized as adopting a myriad of interpretations, rather than being 
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 Crocean aesthetics, for example, works under the assumption that all works of art (finished objects, 
performances, happenings, drafts, etc) function as a starting point in an aesthetic development within the mind 
of the artist, similar to nature itself, and that the product of the artistic endeavor is actually an imperfect 
imitation of the true art object, which remains always solely within the mind of the artist.  
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opposed to interpretation in general. Misreading, however, would imply a modernist 
structure, as it would require knowledge of a ‘correct’ reading to render something a 
‘misreading.’ Wayne Booth invokes that sense in A Rhetoric of Irony, when discussing a 
student who ‘missed’ the irony in Pride and Prejudice.  
“I have here accused my student, who is unfortunately not here to give his own version of 
the incident, of misreading – not of having an interesting alternative hypothesis or of 
merely disagreeing with me or of discovering an eighth type of ambiguity; I have said 
that he made a flat mistake, and I feel a great deal of confidence that everyone who has 
read Pride and Prejudice attentively will agree with me” (Booth 2).  
 
While modernism allows for, and seeks, interpretation and readings, leading eventually to 
unearthed truth (even if hidden, or difficult to uncover), postmodernism is opposed to that not 
in the sense that ‘misreadings’ are appropriate, but in the notion that the evaluation of a 
reading cannot be accurately ascribed to anyone in particular (who has authority to determine 
a proper ‘reading’, and from what structural position?). Booth here insists he has such 
authority (in the face of his student), but then derives that authority from consensus, asserting 
as much that there isn’t an underlying truth, as that we, discerning, attentive readers of Pride 
and Prejudice decide what is appropriate. Presumably, if no one ‘got’ the irony Booth refers 
to, then we would all read the passage in question (and the novel itself) quite differently.
26
 
The notion of misreading is often used as opposed to a generally acceptable reading, thus a 
reading against the grain is characterized as a misreading. However, I contend this use of 
vocabulary reinforces a notion of a correct and incorrect reading which postmodern structure 
disdains. Using a postmodern structure of consciousness, the notion of reading need 
necessarily be contingent, so the label ‘misreading’ would be, well, misleading whereas a 
conventional/unconventional reading, or traditional/untraditional reading label might 
highlight such a contingency, though simply ‘reading’ (one thinks of differance) would be 
more appropriate. Antithesis would similarly reinforce the concept of the dialectic, so while 
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 I will take up irony, and its status vis-à-vis postmodernism, later in the chapter.  
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it is in some sense an opposition to synthesis, in other ways it belongs to the same system, 
with synthesis representing a furthering of the process and antithesis a temporary stalling 
until things can be ‘made new’. Postmodernism is incredulous towards this progressive 
dialectic process. The oppositions of type and mutant and those of genre/boundary and 
text/intertext work similarly. Mutant is simply deviance from type, so a mutant reinforces 
the nature of a type, and not absence of type or the inability to differentiate types (which 
would be a more postmodern opposition). Genre functions similarly to type, but on a 
literary/media plane instead of an ontological one. Text is opposite in terms of being specific 
rather than general, but specificity is not limited to postmodernism. Perhaps Hassan intends 
to relate openness with this specificity, as text is connected to intertext, and Kristeva’s 
definition of intertextuality allows such freedom. We will return to her definition and its 
consequences for our understanding of postmodern structure later in this chapter.  
Another set of concepts relates spatially to the idea of transcendence and hierarchy 
from the first list. Arrow (left-right) and surface are both diametrically opposed to arrow 
(up-down) and depth. However, surface is paired, on the postmodernism list, with rhizome. 
This is a misrepresentation of the spatial metaphor of the rhizome, if understood including 
lines of flight within the Deleuzean framework. In addition to the rhizome being infinitely 
three-dimensional, the notion of a surface/depth dynamic plays upon various preconceptions 
within conventional discourse. Depth is viewed as meaningful and profound, while surface is 
viewed as the lack of depth. Again, they are opposites, but it then characterizes 
postmodernism as meaningless and superficial, which is not consistent with postmodern 
theory. As I argue, rhizome is actually the best spatial metaphor for rendering the postmodern 
structure of consciousness, as it encompasses several of the other concepts within itself as 
well as pointing to the discrepancies between the items on the postmodern rubric and the 
notion of postmodernism. A consequence of the rhizome, and its lack of the vantage point 
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characteristic of the modernist structure, is indeterminacy. This is one of Hassan’s two 
major characteristics (together with immanence), which he extrapolates from the list, in the 
article “Culture, Indeterminacy and Immanence,” introducing his neologism 
‘indetermanence.’ The notion of indeterminacy is also characterized as negative, and perhaps, 
following Rorty, new terms should be utilized. This notion implies an inability to determine, 
an inscrutability of terminology rather than a structural difference. Hassan defines the term 
(using analogies) stating: “indeterminacy fills the space between the will to unmaking 
(dispersal, deconstruction, discontinuity, etc.) and its opposite, the integrative will. Cultural 
indeterminacy, however, reveals itself with greater cunning and valency; choice, pluralism, 
fragmentation, contingency, imagination are only a few of its ambiguous aspects” (Hassan 
65). I use the term uncertainty, instead of Hassan’s term, as a means of reflecting the nature 
of the postmodern project, which allows for limited, contingent assertions as long as they are 
alterable. This is consistent with the notions of participation and the petite histoire (while 
the notion of anti-narrative, as alluded to earlier, reinforces a fixed notion of what a 
narrative should be, rather than allowing for narrative to have an open, contingent definition, 
much as was argued in the critique of Hutcheon earlier). Both of these terms allow for 
contingent knowledge, and a democratic nature of meaning-making (for local concepts), 
presenting the fragmentation (as things are not universalizable) and the notion of pluralism 
(as no one viewpoint has standing to assert its validity over myriad others). Similarly, 
Derridean deconstruction and the notions of difference-differance are also consistent with 
the contingent epistemology of the rhizomatic structure. Barthes description of the scriptable 
includes a spatial metaphor which could also be described as rhizomatic, and is consistent 
with a postmodern structure of consciousness (though his notion is limited to the literary, and 
the postmodern structure is not limited to this particular field, I argue, but is a metaphor 
which is valid for notions of postmodernism in many areas).  
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The notion of immanence, related to the notion of the The Holy Ghost, is also put forth 
as a special case by Hassan. He takes the notion from Charles Altieri, who considers it as a 
foundational concept of postmodern poetics. His claim is that “it is immanence that now 
constitutes the ground of (postmodern) poetics” (Hassan 76). Both of these notions, 
immanence and the Holy Ghost, imply a universal relationship between all points, undeniable 
connections. I would contend, however, that immanence only is conceivable, not actual, 
when understanding the nature of literary postmodernism. While all connections are equally 
valid (there is no reason, even conceptually, to discern between them), that does not imply 
that all connections have been, or necessarily will be, made. The notion is thus the theoretical 
possibility of immanence, not the ubiquity of the Holy Ghost, but a potentially limitless 
intertextuality.  
In sum, Hassan’s ‘postmodern’ list presents three types of terms. It presents terms which 
represent diametric opposition to their paired terms from the modernist list, but which still 
reinforce a modernist framework. It presents terms which could, arguably, belong to either 
list depending on the perspective of the scholar. As such, those terms seem not to get at the 
heart of what postmodernism (or modernism) are, but reveal underlying assumptions about 
that mode based upon the argumentation of the scholar, and thus are not good terms upon 
which to base a definition. Finally, there are some terms, revolving around the term rhizome 
and associated terms, which seem to coalesce around the spatial metaphor I lay out as the 
postmodern structure of consciousness, which forms the basis for my reductive definition of 
postmodernism. Before proceeding to an expanded explanation of my definition, however, I 
will discuss a few of the terms which are taken often as either defining characteristics or 
fundamental to the postmodern condition. These terms – metafiction, parody, intertextuality, 
play, and irony – I will argue fall into the second set of terms here, rather than functioning as 
defining characteristics. It is not these concepts themselves but how they are utilized in a 
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given literary context that determines whether a text is postmodern (or follows a postmodern 
structure of consciousness). How this works for each term will be discussed in detail below.  
 
If Realism called it like it saw it, Metafiction simply called it as it saw itself seeing itself see it.  
(David Foster Wallace, A Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never Do Again: Essays and Arguments) 
Metafiction 
The juxtaposition of the term ‘postmodernism’ with rival terms like ‘surfiction’ (Federman), 
‘anti-realist fiction’ (Guerard 1976), ‘new fiction’ (Stevick 1977) and most prominently 
‘metafiction’ (Scholes 1979, Gass 1980, Waugh 1984, Hutcheon 1984) is a common 
argument about postmodernism, and is one of the reasons that metafiction and 
postmodernism are often seen as synonymous, with metafiction seen as either a type of 
postmodernist fiction or, more often, as the exemplary form of postmodernism.
27
 Neither of 
those is accurate, although there is certainly overlap in those works of literature which can be 
seen as postmodern and examples of metafiction. Mark Currie asserts as much in his 
introduction to Metafiction. “Metafiction is not the only kind of postmodern fiction, and nor 
is it an exclusively postmodern kind of fiction. It is neither the paradigm nor a subset of 
postmodernism” (Currie 15). 
Metafiction is a critical term that gained prevalence in the 1970s, coined originally in 
William Gass’s article ‘Philosophy and the Form of Fiction’, which has come to stand for 
“fictional writing which self-consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an 
artefact in order to pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality” (Waugh 
Metafiction 2).
28
 The notion of literature that discusses its own artifice, and thus presents the 
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 Paul Maltby makes this argument in Dissident Postmodernists, from which learned of and found references to 
both ‘anti-realist fiction’ and ‘new fiction.’ Linda Hutcheon uses the term ‘historiographic metafiction’, which 
we have discussed elsewhere.  
28
 The literary history of the time presents a lot of scholars attempting to define the prevalence of self-reflexive 
fiction in the 1960s. Waugh notes that “similar modes have been variously termed ‘the introverted novel’, ‘the 
anti-novel,’ ‘irrealism,’ ‘surfiction,’ ‘the self-begetting novel,’ ‘fabulation’” (Waugh Metafiction 13-4). 
Raymond Federman, discussed earlier in the chapter, was the proponent of surfiction, which he defines as “that 
kind of fiction that tries to explore the possibilities of fiction; the kind of fiction that challenges the tradition that 
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breakdown of diegetic and extradiegetic worlds is not new, or unique to contemporary 
literature. It is prevalent in ‘postmodern’ texts but also appears in well-known examples such 
as Lawrence Sterne’s The Life and Times of Tristam Shandy (1759) and Miguel de Cervantes’ 
Don Quixote (1605/15). The historical breadth of the term, when confronted with the 
postmodern use of metafiction, causes scholars like Mark Currie trouble when trying to 
define metafiction. Rather than presenting metafiction as simply self-reflexive fiction, he 
argues that “terms like ‘metafiction’ and ‘postmodernism’ are not sustained by any common 
essence among their referents” (Currie 15). In so asserting, he then calls for a different kind 
of definition, “a non-essentialist definition, one which does not name a single common 
essence between metafictions but which designates a kind of problem in the philosophy of 
language, an irreducible difference and a non-identity: not a precise typological configuration 
of the relation of metafiction to postmodernism, but a postmodern definition of metafiction” 
(Currie 15). 
The formulation ‘a postmodern definition of metafiction’ is exactly what is troubling 
about the elision of differences between metafiction and postmodernism. If one can present a 
postmodern definition of a concept, then that concept cannot also be used as a defining 
characteristic of postmodernism. Metafiction, whether defined essentially or non-essentially, 
should be defined independently of the notion of postmodernism, as the historical referents 
for metafiction and postmodernism are not concurrent. There are many examples of 
metafiction which are not consistent with postmodernism. However, Linda Hutcheon is the 
example Currie points to of a scholar who asserts (historiographic) metafiction as the 
exemplary form of postmodernism. She claims, of historiographic metafiction, that “this kind 
of fiction has often been noticed by critics, but its paradigmatic quality has been passed by: it 
is commonly labelled in terms of something else” (Hutcheon, Poetics 5).  
                                                                                                                                                        
governs it; the kind of fiction that constantly renews our faith in man’s imagination and not in man’s distorted 
vision of reality – that reveals man’s irrationality rather than man’s rationality” (Federman 7).  
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Patricia Waugh’s identification of metafiction in her seminal work on the topic, 
Metafiction, also conflates the concepts of postmodernism and metafiction in elements of her 
argument. She argues, as I will later, that there are essentially three periods of literature. The 
first period, which I label classical, presents “forms of fiction derived from a firm belief in a 
commonly experienced, objectively existing world of history” (Waugh, Metafiction 6). This 
period is also consistent with realism. The second, claimed by Waugh specifically as 
modernist, was “written in the earlier part of this century” and “responded to the initial loss 
of belief in such a world” (Metafiction 6). This period contains a series of movements looking 
for a replacement of such a belief, or means to understand the world given this loss of belief. 
The successive avant-garde movements, now all considered part of a larger modernism, 
conform to this definition, and I use the term modernist to describe this structure as well. 
Finally, she evokes “contemporary metafictional writing” as “both a response and a 
contribution to an even more thoroughgoing sense that reality or history are provisional: no 
longer a world of eternal verities but a series of constructions, artifices, impermanent 
structures” (Waugh, Metafiction 6-7). This last description is consistent with postmodern 
definitions of fiction, and descriptions of postmodernity in general. In addition to these three 
eras of fiction, Waugh contends that metafiction is found throughout the history of literature, 
and “that metafiction is a tendency or function inherent in all novels. … By studying 
metafiction, one is, in effect, studying that which gives the novel its identity” (Waugh, 
Metafiction 5). However, she doesn’t want to present all (metafictional) novels as functioning 
in the same way, and later reserves the term metafictional for certain uses of frame-breaking 
and self-reflexivity. In discussing George Eliot’s Adam Bede, she notes that Eliot breaks the 
frame, casting doubt on the traditional notions of realistic literature and challenging the neat 
divisions of diegetic and extradiegetic information. Such frame-breaks, she argues, if 
presented in a limited fashion, don’t serve the purpose of undermining the realism, but rather 
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reinforce it. She argues that although certain nineteenth-century novelists like Eliot often 
‘break the frame’ and 
although the intrusive commentary of nineteenth-century fiction may at times be 
metalingual (referring to the fictional codes themselves), it functions mainly to aid the 
readerly concretization of the world of the book by forming a bridge between the 
historical and the fictional worlds. It suggest that the one is merely a continuation of 
the other, and it is thus not metafictional (Waugh, Metafiction 32). 
 
So, while earlier she uses the term for all self-reflexive fiction, here she separates the 
metalingual and the metafictional. While the notion of a ‘meta’ fiction seems to imply a 
discussion of fiction above the level of the text itself, Waugh wants to use the term to discuss 
not fiction which discusses fiction, or fiction which discusses its own artifice, but fiction 
which moves further to present the breakdown of the boundaries between fiction and reality. 
Rather than the resolution inherent in a novel of realism, in which the frame is broken in 
order to reinforce the hierarchy of fiction and reality, the exception that proves the rule, 
Waugh here argues that “metafiction displays and rejoices in the impossibility of such a 
resolution and thus clearly reveals the basic identity of the novel as genre” (Waugh, 
Metafiction 6).
29
 In so doing, Waugh defines metafiction doubly, both as all texts which 
expose fiction as artifice, in all its ubiquitous forms, and as limited to those texts which revel 
in the lack of resolution to the breakdown of boundaries between fiction and reality. This 
tension is what causes Mark Currie to seek new definitions of metafiction when confronted 
with such postmodernism inspired readings of the term, and I would argue that what Waugh 
is presenting in her latter definition of metafiction is essentially a postmodern metafiction, 
separate from the nineteenth-century variety of metafiction, frame-breaking, which she 
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 She argues that “the principle of a fundamental and sustained opposition: the construction of a fictional 
illusion (as in traditional realism) and the laying bare of that illusion. In other words, the lowest common 
denominator of metafiction is simultaneously to create a fiction and to make a statement about the creation of 
that fiction.” (Waugh, Metafiction 6). She claims that this is present in all fiction, to some degree, as she states 
“this oppositional process is to some extent present in all fiction” (Waugh, Metafiction 6), though she argues 
strongly for the current period (whether that is the late twentieth century, or postmodernism) is unique due to the 
death of the “materialist, positivist, and empiricist world-view” (Waugh, Metafiction 7). Thus metafiction is 
both ubiquitous and fundamental to fiction in general, but particularly prevalent and relevant in the 
contemporary era. The difficulty with that reading is that metafiction, understood that broadly, cannot then be 
used to explain or define the contemporary era, and its new use of metafiction. 
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relabels metalingual. Both Waugh’s double definition and Currie’s call for a non-essentialist 
definition emphasize the already established understanding of postmodernism which runs 
through attempts to define metafiction, casting doubt on any attempts to use this term, 
metafiction, as a defining term of postmodernism. Metafiction, as Waugh and many other 
scholars have asserted, can be found throughout history, and as such is not an essential 
(though oft found) component of postmodernism.  
 
What we need is not great works but playful ones …  
A story is a game someone has played so you can play it too  
 (Ronald Sukenik ‘Death of the Novel’ 56-7) 
 
‘All the world’s a stage’ – Parody, Play and Intertextuality 
 
Linda Hutcheon, in The Politics of Postmodernism, argues that parody, in its terms of 
violating the illusion of the fiction and thus calling into question it fictionality, is an 
exemplary postmodern mode. “Parody is a perfect postmodern form, in some senses, for it 
paradoxically both incorporates and challenges that which it parodies. It also forces a 
reconsideration of the idea of origin or originality that is compatible with other postmodern 
interrogations of liberal humanist assumptions” (Hutcheon, Politics 11). However, it seems 
that parody requires determinations and divisions which are inconsistent with many forms of 
postmodern theory.  
Waugh claims that “parody and inversion are two strategies which operate in this way 
as frame-breaks” and she goes on to argue that the setting up of a frame and subsequently 
shattering such an illusion is part of the “essential deconstructive method of metafiction” 
(Waugh, Metafiction 31). While inversion highlights the artifice in formal structure of the 
literary texts, parody works through a less explicit relationship with the original text, and 
requires two distinct levels of understanding, one serious and the other in terms of ridicule. It 
also requires a mutual understanding of the meaning behind the parody (with both the author 
and reader agreeing upon the tone) for it to work. Abrams defines parody as the form which 
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“imitates the serious manner and characteristic features of a particular literary work, or the 
distinctive style of a particular author … and deflates the original by applying the imitation to 
a lowly or comically inappropriate subject” (Abrams 38). Thus, it works on essentialized 
concepts of both serious and low forms of art, utilizing those fixed norms to provide the 
comic effect of the parody. This reinforces generic categories, and a sense of serious 
literature, which is not interrogated in this development. In fact, Waugh goes on to claim that 
“because parody has been considered mainly as a form of criticism, it has been regarded as a 
sign of generic exhaustion” (Waugh, Metafiction 69), as exposing the norms of a genre to 
ridicule removes their power, and leads to a shifting towards other generic categories. She 
also argues that such a critique is a conscious literary strategy, one often taken up by 
postmodernism (but not exclusively) which “deliberately sets itself up to break norms that 
have become conventionalized” (Waugh, Metafiction 65).  
Hutcheon argues, like Waugh, that parody is a time-honored form of literature. She 
finds it “a dominant mode of much modernist art, especially the writing of T.S. Eliot, Thomas 
Mann, and James Joyce” (Hutcheon, Politics 95). However, modernism and postmodernism 
have different points of view, and as such the use of parody in modernist literature and 
postmodernist literature is reflected differently. The difference “is not that modernism was 
serious and significant and postmodernism is ironic and parodic, as some have claimed; it is 
more that postmodernism’s irony is one that rejects the resolving urge of modernism towards 
closure or at least distance” (Hutcheon, Politics 95). With such a claim, Hutcheon asserts that 
modernist parody and postmodernist parody function differently, or at least have different 
outcomes through their use of parody. Both Hutcheon and Waugh assert a value in the use of 
the term parody, in which the original is both reinforced and subverted through the act of 
appropriation, as a postmodern critique, in the “foregrounding of those very contradictions” 
(Hutcheon, Politics 94). However, in such an assertion, they differentiate a form of parody in 
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postmodernism which differs from other parodic texts, and as such it becomes the adjective, 
postmodern, which is the operative term in how the parody functions, the position the 
(parodic) artist stakes out, and the interpretation both scholars make of such artists value. 
Dominick LaCapra argues that “a certain use of irony and parody may play a role both in the 
critique of ideology and in the anticipation of a polity wherein commitment does not exclude 
but accompanies an ability to achieve critical distance on one’s deepest commitments and 
desires” (LaCapra 128, cited in Hutcheon, Politics 101) to which Hutcheon asserts 
“Postmodernism offers precisely that ‘certain use of irony and parody’” (Hutcheon, Politics 
101). Yet, if postmodernism only uses parody (and irony, to which we will return) in a certain 
way, then it seems that parody cannot be a defining notion of postmodernism itself.  
While in much of her argumentation, Hutcheon asserts a use of parody which concurs 
with Abrams’ definition, she also asserts, in establishing parody’s validity to the discussion, 
that “parody – often called ironic quotation, pastiche, appropriation, or intertextuality – is 
usually considered central to postmodernism, but by its detractors and its defenders” 
(Hutcheon, Politics 93), which conflates the idea of parody with less hierarchical terms like 
appropriation and intertextuality, as well as the notion of quotation, which removes the 
ridicule element, and the sense of pastiche. Fredric Jameson argues, essentially, that 
postmodern parody isn’t the correct term, as parody has distinct motivations, which 
postmodernism does not share.  
In this situation parody finds itself without a vocation; it has lived, and that strange 
new thing pastiche slowly comes to take its place. Pastiche is, like parody, the 
imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, 
speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of 
parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of 
any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, 
some healthy linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue 
with blind eyeballs: it is to parody what that other interesting and historically original 
modern thing, the practice of a kind of blank irony, is to what Wayne Booth calls the 
‘stable ironies’ of the eighteenth century. (Jameson 17) 
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Arguably, while parody retains the dual hierarchical notion of the original and its follower – 
regardless whether one considers the parody as extracting value from a dead genre or as an 
inferior mocking copy of a reinforced potent predecessor – pastiche has no such pretense. 
While Hutcheon critiques Jameson’s position as one of disavowal of contemporary 
possibilities of uniqueness, I would argue that pastiche presents a postmodern variety of 
citation which need not reinforce or sit in supplication of an original, but simply provides an 
interweaving of the already conceived. This aligns with Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality, 
which recognizes the openness of any work. “The theory of intertextuality insists that a text 
… cannot exist as a hermetic system or self-sufficient whole. … Firstly, the writer is a reader 
of texts … before s/he is a creator of texts, and therefore the work of art is inevitably shot 
through with references, quotations and influences of every kind” (Still 1). Keeping in mind 
notions like Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ and the constant invocation of new and intricate 
connections that readers/consumers continue to make, intertextuality, and by proxy pastiche, 
seem to reflect the postmodern structure of consciousness more than the notion of parody. 
Unlike parody, pastiche does not rely upon authorial intention, instead opening up a space for 
the reader as a creator of texts. In essence, it exposes the possibility for both the author and 
reader to engage in the language games openly, and explicitly. 
 The engagement in language games has been termed the ‘play’ of writing. Critics of 
postmodernism often point to its playfulness, and assert, as a consequence, a lack of 
seriousness for the mode. This is implicit in terms of Hassan’s dichotomies, where play 
(associated with immaturity, childishness, pretense and make-believe) is contrasted with 
purpose, and purpose being seen as a fundamental aspect of maturity and sincerity. Play, of 
course, like many of the concepts identified as postmodern characteristics, is not limited to 
postmodern literature, but is a fundamental aspect of all writing, or even aesthetics in 
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general.
30
 Waugh argues that “all art is ‘play’ in its creation of other symbolic worlds” 
(Waugh, Metafiction 34) and more specifically about literature she asserts “not only that 
literary fiction is a form of play (if a very sophisticated form) but that play is an important 
and necessary aspect of human society” (Waugh, Metafiction 34). 
 These games can have consequence, or simply be explorations of the intricacies of 
language, with no discernable ulterior motivation. The interpretation of these games is as 
implicit in their understanding as the juxtaposition of the words themselves, and such 
interpretation is dependent not only on the reader, but also on the context in which works are 
read. When considering metafiction, Waugh states that “Play is facilitated by rules and roles, 
and metafiction operates by exploring fictional rules to discover how we each ‘play’ our own 
realities” (Waugh, Metafiction 35). In so doing, she postulates play as operating within, and 
across, the boundaries set up both socially and in the realm of literature. As we have seen 
with metafiction, the use of play can be seen to reinforce such boundaries, or demonstrate 
their contingency and ultimately expose them as arbitrary and dependent upon consensus to 
operate.  
 Donna Haraway, in her manifesto on the cyborg, presents play as a very serious 
concept, one which has a political dimension. Similar to Rorty, she argues against the notion 
of fixed external language. She claims that  
with no available original dream of a common language or original symbiosis 
promising protection from hostile 'masculine' separation, but written into the play of a 
text that has no finally privileged reading or salvation history, to recognize 'oneself' as 
fully implicated in the world, frees us of the need to root politics in identification, 
vanguard parties, purity, and mothering (Haraway 176) 
 
Here Haraway presents play in a world without a center, organizing principle and as such she 
postulates a freedom to utilize terms more freely, taking advantage of this condition, arguably 
the postmodern condition, to promote a progressive feminist politics.  
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 Johan Huizinga in 1939 even argues for play as a foundational aspect of culture.   
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 Derrida’s notion of play is equally applicable here, as he defines play similarly to 
Waugh, but focuses on the play of substitutions as a language game. Play is then possible in 
two scenarios. It could function in a centered structure, where “the concept of a play based on 
a fundamental ground, a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and 
reassuring certitude, which itself is beyond the reach of play” (Derrida 279). In such a 
structure, the play would be both limited and opened up by the fixity of the structure, but the 
freedom to play would ultimately be limited by the structure. Alternatively, in a structure that 
rejects totalization, play would be allowed to proceed uninhibited. Such a “field of infinite 
substitutions … [has] something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play 
of substitutions” (Derrida 289). Those two alternatives function on opposite sides of what 
Derrida calls the ‘rupture,’ which corresponds to the break between modernism and 
postmodernism, with the centered structure functioning in the ways which I term a modernist 
structure of consciousness, and the nontotalization corresponding to the postmodern, which 
Haraway also describes. Play, however, functions the same way in either structure, it is the 
structural limitations on its free expression which changes. ‘Free play’ or the ability to play 
freely is a sign or symptom of postmodernism, but not the cause of the ‘rupture’, simply an 
identifiable consequence. That is what leads to Haraway’s concerns, and her notions that 
‘play is serious’- it is not that play is serious per se, but rather it is that the consequence of the 
lack of limitations on play allows for progressive politics, in her eye. As such, this use of play 
is not simply our common sense notion of play as an alternative to purpose or work, and 
using those dichotomies fails to capture Haraway’s sense. Due to the Derridean rupture, play 
is found in both modernist and postmodernist structures, and as such cannot define 
postmodernism. It is not play that defines the structure; it is the structure that defines the 
freeness of the play. 
 
Julius: The final irony, I think, is to be found rather in that it seems  
to be becoming impossible for you to talk about irony without being ironic.  
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Lorenzo: I’m afraid that it’s exactly the other way around.  
Where’s the irony, when in bitter earnest one doesn’t know where one’s at?  
And the more I think about it, the more incomprehensible it becomes.  
(Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments) 
 
Isn’t it Ironic? – Postmodern Irony 
As many have done, in her New Critical Idiom volume, Irony, Claire Colebrook asserts that 
“our entire epoch, as postmodern, is ironic” (Colebrook 18).31 Irony has become one of the 
most oft cited defining characteristics of postmodernism. It has, in fact, been taken up as a 
central facet of reactions to postmodernism, to the extent that subsequent movements have 
been labelled ‘postironic’ by Tore Rye Andersen who states that “opgøret med ironien stadig 
udgør et af de helt central projekter for den nye forfattergeneration” [the showdown with 
irony still forms one of the fundamental projects of the new generation of authors] (Andersen, 
Den nye amerikansk roman 63, my translation).
32
  
 How would one define an age as ironic, or post-ironic? In order to do so, we would 
need to know what we mean by irony. Samuel Johnson’s definition is “a mode of speech of 
which the meaning is contrary to the words” (quoted in Enright 4-5), and Kierkegaard notes 
that it is “like a riddle and its solution possessed simultaneously” (quoted in Enright 3). What 
both of these definitions provide is the sense that an ironic statement requires both 
contradiction and truth, an implicit understanding that the words on the page ‘actually mean’ 
something other than what they say. However, another aspect of this mode is that it needs to 
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 Although the argument that postmodernism is/was an age of irony is common, Colebrook’s assertions here to 
have less merit than they seem. The work of Eco cited by Colebrook is an extract (in 
Modernism/Postmodernism) from the Postscript to The Name of the Rose. In that discussion, Eco states that in 
order to revisit the past, one must do so ironically in this postmodern age – which is not the same as stating that 
the age is ironic. Alan Wilde, in his seminal book on irony, claims that irony is typical not of postmodernism, 
but of the twentieth century, and in fact his book breaks down three distinct types of irony (modernist, late 
modernist, postmodernist) which will be discussed later. Even the text by Linda Hutcheon, a renowned scholar 
of the postmodern, does not make this claim about irony in Irony’s Edge, a book which specifically avoids the 
term postmodernism so she can discuss the practical applications of irony itself. The reference to Hassan is to 
the article we have discussed from The Postmodern Turn, which claims irony as one of the characteristics of the 
postmodern (but not the only one). I haven’t examined Sim or Mileur.  
32
 Andersen focuses fundamentally on David Foster Wallace and his contemporaries (and close associates) when 
defining this new generation, including Jonathan Franzen, Rick Moody, A.M. Holmes, Jeffrey Eugenides, Emily 
Barton, Dave Eggers, Nicole Krauss and Zadie Smith.  
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keep open the possibility of (mis)interpretation. D.C. Meucke asserts that “we cannot see a 
situation as ironic unless we believe there are those who do not” (Meucke 100). Irony 
requires a special pact between the ironist and the recipient, in which they both understand 
the world in the same way, in a way other than what seems ‘obvious’ (be that the literal 
interpretation of the words on the page, or the assumed commonsensical interpretation of a 
situation). As such, the assertion of irony is often relative, dependent upon a common context 
between (at least) two people.  
 However, in the postmodern age, other uses of irony have come into fashion. 
Colebrook declares that “our very historical context is ironic because today nothing really 
means what it says. We live in a world of quotation, pastiche, simulation and cynicism: a 
general and all-encompassing irony” (Colebrook 1). In this assertion, she seems to have 
defined irony differently, as the contention is no longer that we (mutually) ‘know’ that a 
given statement has a different referent than it would have if read ‘plainly’, but rather that no 
statements can be read as commonly understood, or as plainly expressed. What lies under this 
claim is the notion that within postmodernism, we cannot know for sure what anything ‘really 
means’, as that would not be in keeping with a postmodern structure of consciousness. 
However, Colebrook’s interpretation of irony does assume an underlying, if simply unknown, 
truth. This is contrary to postmodern theory, which suggests that there is no way of knowing 
if there even is an underlying truth, rather than being ignorant of said ‘truth.’ In a world of 
(unreferentialable) quotation, pastiche and (Baudrillardian) simulation, asserting absolute 
truth values to statements makes little sense. In essence, Colebrook’s interpretation parses the 
definition of irony into an assertion of doubt and an assertion of meaning, and concentrates 
only on the doubt as to the ‘original’ intention (which cannot be asserted in a postmodern 
context) and seemingly ignores the inability to assert an alternative meaning. In arguing that 
‘nothing means what it says’, Colebrook has to both argue that it we do not know what it 
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means (doubt) but also assert that we know it does not mean what it says (such knowledge is 
not available given a postmodern structure of consciousness), essentially a claim of irony is 
not something that can be asserted, as we cannot be sure of what meaning is, should, or could 
be attached to any given statement, in a postmodern context. 
 Alternatively, postmodern irony is presented as a stance, a position from which one 
can interpret the world. Similar, in this vein, to Socratic irony, the postmodern ironist looks at 
the world with detachment, not participating ‘honestly’ in its discourses, in order to be able to 
identify, understand, and deconstruct those positions. This is the position that David Foster 
Wallace describes, when referring to ‘early postmodern’ artists of the sixties and seventies. 
“The great thing about irony is that it splits things apart, gets us up above them so we can see 
the flaws and the hypocrisies and duplicities” (McCaffery 147). The problem with this 
position is the identification of this with postmodernism, in that it allows a stance outside, a 
panopticon position, from with the ironist can judge the statements and positions of others. 
That position is afforded in a modernist framework, but is absent in a postmodernist one. 
Colebrook identifies this position:  
If irony demands some idea or point of view above language, contexts or received 
voices, postmodernity acknowledges that all we have are competing contexts and that 
any implied ‘other’ position would itself be a context. Postmodernity would be a 
society of simulation and immanence with no privileged point from which competing 
voices could be judged. One would have to accept one’s own position as one among 
others, and as thoroughly unoriginal (Colebrook 164). 
 
This, she argues, would require “a radical rejection or redefinition of irony” 
(Colebrook 164). Even so, she goes on to argue that even such a position, a stance from 
within the system, is still a stance, not a non-stance, both of which would be required given a 
postmodern framework. She claims, “neither position is possible, and yet both seem 
inevitable. Postmodern irony in its radical form works with this contradiction” (Colebrook 
165). In this, postmodern irony is presented as a type of negative capability (recalling Keats), 
in which the contradictions of the said and non-said remain in one’s mind at once. While this 
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is true of all irony – both meanings need to be present in the mind, even as one distinguishes 
the correct interpretation – with postmodern irony there is no means by which to distinguish 
the correct interpretation, and no reason to suggest that there is one. 
 Linda Hutcheon, in Irony’s Edge, argues that, in the final analysis, it is the interpreter 
who assigns ironic value to statements or situations, and not the ‘ironist’, although often 
based on assumptions about the ironist’s intent. “The interpreter may – or may not – be the 
intended addressee of the ironist’s utterance, but s/he (by definition) is the one who attributes 
irony and then interprets it: in other words, the one who decides whether the utterance is 
ironic (or not), and then what particular ironic meaning it might have” (Hutcheon, Irony’s 
10-11, original emphasis). This leaves one with the idea that ironic content is relative, 
dependent upon the mindset, context, background, mood, etc. of the interpreter. Whether 
enough people share a context to create a Fishian interpretive community and be able to 
assert, even for themselves, the stable irony that Wayne Booth asserts, can only be 
ascertained by those participating. “Irony, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, and is not 
a quality inherent in any remark, event or situation” (Meucke 14). Furthering this, I would 
argue that one’s interpretation of how irony works (or even if irony exists in a postmodern 
context, which is dubitable if it requires an assertion of ‘truth’) is largely dependent on one’s 
structure of consciousness.  
 While it is true that many have argued that we live in an ironic age, the definition of 
that age has changed greatly. In 1957, Northrop Frye asserted we were living through an 
‘ironic phase’ in Anatomy of Criticism using examples from T.S. Eliot and James Joyce, and 
going as far back as Romanticism. Alan Wilde differentiates between modernist irony, which 
is ‘absolute and equivocal’ and postmodernist irony, which is ‘suspensive’ (Wilde 44), in 
claiming that the twentieth century was largely ironic. Meucke asserts, in 1969, that “irony 
now pervades literature” and claims that “only popular literature is predominantly non-
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ironical” (Meucke 10), though few scholars would assert that all literature in the 1960s was 
postmodern. What seems clear is that irony is a mode that has long been used, and 
postmodern varieties of irony require an interpretation of the term. Postmodern irony is 
specific, and isn’t reducible to irony. What defines postmodern irony is not the irony itself, 
but the postmodern, which through its application to irony has redefined its use. One cannot 
define postmodernism using a postmodern variety of irony, as such a form of definition 
would be circular. It is, again, the adjective postmodern which is the most operative here. 
Furthermore, I would argue that if one cannot discern between the validity of statements, and 
if there is not clear link between given signifiers and signifieds, then one cannot assert irony 
but only metonymy, a replacement of one definition for another with no pretense as to 
‘validity’ or ‘truth.’ Jameson, as discussed earlier, related pastiche to a form of blank parody, 
and made an analogy between that concept and blank irony, which Andersen defines as “en 
retningsløs ironi der ikke forpligter sig på andet end det svedne grin, og som har mistet al 
oppositionel kraft” [an aimless irony that doesn’t commit itself to anything other than a sly 
smile and has lost all its force of opposition] (Andersen, ‘Ned med oprøret’ 14, my 
translation). However, his definition ascribes to irony only its direction, and not its 
assumptions of meaning, which is precisely what must be lost in blank irony. Without the 
potential for (mis)reading, then one cannot truly present a statement or interpret a situation as 
ironic. Such a stance would require the interpretation that things are not ‘really’ as they seem, 
and one does not even have a vantage point from which to assert the falsity of the present, let 
alone underlying truths.  
 
 
Literature consists of heterogeneous phenomena. 
In this respect there is no complete substitution of one literary movement by another. 
This substitution, however, exists in another sense, 
the change between dominating movements, and dominating genres. 
Tynjanov, ‘On Literary Evolution’) 
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The Dominant of Postmodernist Fiction  
As I have shown, the terms irony, parody, play and metafiction, though they are often used as 
means of defining or presented as essential characteristics of postmodernism, all depend on a 
particular postmodern variety of each concept to make that claim valid. As such, those terms 
in and of themselves – absent the postmodern modifier – cannot serve as defining features of 
postmodernism. The essential nature of postmodernism is already assumed in their revised 
definitions. Thus, if we are trying to ascertain an essential nature of postmodernism, or be 
able to describe postmodernism beyond a collection of loosely associated oppositional 
concepts, then we need to produce a reductive definition, one which has the theoretical and 
rhetorical power to explain those features of postmodernism that we already assume, without 
including features or texts we collectively do not want to include.  
Brian McHale attempts to develop just such a conceptual tool in Postmodernist 
Fiction, as a means of identifying the salient features of Douke Fokkema’s modernist and 
postmodernist sociocode.
33
 Fokkema produces a modernist code in his text Literary History, 
Modernism and Postmodernism, which has four main characteristics – a smaller and more 
coherent list than that presented by Hassan. Those characteristics are 1) the incomplete nature 
of the text, 2) epistemological doubt, 3) metalingual scepsis, and 4) respect for the 
idiosyncrasies of the reader (Fokkema 27). McHale then tests those characteristics against a 
quintessential modernist text and argues for their validity. Yet, the characteristics themselves 
are not sufficient as a defining notion of modernism. McHale invokes Roman Jakobson’s 
notion of the dominant, which represents the “focusing component of a work of art” which 
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 McHale uses Fokkema’s term ‘period code’ which is to represent a chronological sequence and a means of 
narrowing down literary history through a series of five codes (linguistic, literary, generic, period or group, 
author’s idiolect), each of which successively narrows down the range of interpretive possibilities. Fokkema, 
later in his text, asserts that we should rather use the term group code or sociocode (as “the code designed by a 
group of writers often belonging to a particular generation, literary movement or current, and acknowledged by 
their contemporary and later readers” (Fokkema 11) rather than period code as the latter “assumes a unilinear 
development of all literature, which is wrong” (Fokkema 11). I use sociocode as I believe the differentiation of 
modernism and postmodernism is not chronologically based (not even locally, let alone globally) and also not 
related to coherent ‘group’ movements, but represents a different means of understanding and representing 
society as a whole, and thus both modes are represented best by the term sociocode.  
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“rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components” and thus “guarantees the 
integrity of the structure” (Jakobson 751). McHale is seeking the single explanatory tool 
which is the key to the literary mode, the one feature by which all other features are 
explained, the element that “dominates the entire structure and thus acts as its mandatory and 
inalienable constituent dominating all the remaining elements and exerting direct influence 
upon them” (Jakobson 751).  
I find McHale’s use of the dominant admirable, and reducing the numbers of 
characteristics to only those upon which the others can be invoked in a coherent fashion 
allows for a useful approach to the literary mode. I find myself in agreement with McHale in 
the need for such a reductive definition.
34
 Where we disagree, fundamentally, is in how to 
identify the dominant. McHale argues that the concept which ‘connects the dots’ of 
Fokkema’s sociocode for modernism is the epistemological, and using his exemplary 
modernist text, Faulkner’s Absalom! Absalom!, and specifically chapter 8 which doesn’t fit 
the pattern he presents, he posits the dominant of postmodernist poetics to be the ontological 
– representing “the shift of dominant from problems of knowing to problems of modes of 
being” (McHale, Postmodernist 10). As stated briefly before, my analysis is that this is not 
the case, and rather both modernist and postmodernist texts can be found that discuss, 
primarily, epistemological and ontological questions. Much of the following two chapters of 
this project are dedicated to exactly that proposition, presenting the means in which texts with 
an epistemological and/or ontological dominant can be classical, modernist, and 
postmodernist. By explicitly presenting texts with an epistemological dominant (in detective 
fiction) which function with a postmodern structure of consciousness, and those with an 
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 McHale backs away from the possibility of a reductive definition in Constructing Postmodernism, reacting to 
criticism of his first text. In so doing, he follows Christopher Norris’ ‘narrative turn’, and presents a series of 
articles and readings which cannot be completely cohered (purposefully McHale asserts in the introduction) into 
a single way of understanding postmodernism, but as a series of constructivist attempts at definitions. He does 
say, however, that he has “by no means abandoned the story of Postmodernist Fiction here, and in fact it is 
retold below not once by several times, in various ways” (McHale, Constructing 9).  
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ontological dominant (in science fiction) which function with a modernist structure of 
consciousness, I refute McHale’s differentiation. As such, similarly to the arguments about 
the characteristics above, I argue that it is not the epistemological or ontological 
foregrounding which is determinant in differentiating modernist and postmodernist poetics, 
but rather the structure of consciousness itself. The differentiation between modernist and 
postmodernist poetics lies not in the type of questions posed, but rather in the means by 
which these questions are answered. The answers (or lack thereof) are determined by the 
spatial metaphor that represents the given structure of consciousness. As Spanos argues, it is 
“this structure of consciousness … that determines the questions and thus the expectations 
and answers -- in language and in action” (Spanos 151). This represents a difference from 
both Jakobson and McHale (in his use of Jakobson) in that I argue that it is not one particular 
dominant feature, but the entire structure of consciousness which is determinant of the types 
of poetics at play. The manifestation of the structure of consciousness is seen in a variety of 
ways, from narrative strategies, to formal conceptions, from diegetic levels to the uses of 
intertextuality (linguistic, generic, and textual).  
 
The Postmodern Structure of Consciousness 
I argue that there are fundamentally three structures of consciousness, which represent 
different, historically understood, mindsets by which we operate and comprehend the world. 
These are reflected and represented in literature, which I treat as at least metaphorically 
mimetic, arguing essentially that when considering both the content and the structure one can 
come to some tentative understanding of the vantage point of the text itself.
35
 This, however, 
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 This notion is found in the oft-cited distinction between postmodernism and postmodernity, with many 
(myself included) holding that postmodernism is the aesthetic presentation of the social phenomenon called 
postmodernity. As such, it seems reasonable to suppose that literary postmodernism reflects, in a mimetic way, 
the ways in which its authors and readers understand postmodernity and the postmodern condition (just as 
modernist writers and readers reflected modernity in their writings).  
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is tempered by the reader’s reaction, as I treat literature as an open process, pushing towards 
the ideal goal of the writerly text.  
These three structures of consciousness, which I term the classical, modernist and 
postmodernist, can be spatially mapped onto the skein, the maze and the rhizomatic labyrinth, 
with each of those spatial metaphors containing consequences and patterns which, I argue, 
guide fundamental understandings within the text. The classical structure of consciousness 
takes concepts as given, and answers as absolute. It is this pattern that is represented in the 
infallibility of God, the dominance of the Church, and the predetermination of the Fates. It is 
here that Oedipus is doomed, following a singular path to a destined outcome. The modernist 
structure of consciousness is exhibited only after such unitary worldviews can be questioned, 
since, when questioned, it is possible, given this structure of consciousness, to admit error of 
judgement and search for better understandings. This structure remains arborescent, however, 
though no longer linear. Thus, there remains truth and error, right and wrong, and thus quest 
and discovery come to the fore. It is with this mindset that Yeats suggests the coming of a 
new era, one set to replace the loss of centre and doubt in the Modernist project. The 
postmodernist structure of consciousness has no such hope, nor a nostalgic look towards 
points ancient or Other. Functioning within the spatial metaphor of the rhizomatic labyrinth, 
the postmodern structure calls into question the calcification of boundaries and constructions, 
by demonstrating their lack of foundation, and examining the concept of foundation itself. By 
opening up this possibility, removing the authority of both the classical Church and its 
replacement(s) within the modernist formation, postmodernism opens up a space of control. 
If it is through consensus, through the acceptance of new ideas (which change at rates 
different and other than those which are found in representative democracy), then change 
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becomes not only possible, but explainable.
36
 If boundaries of gender and identity, nation and 
state, field and discipline are arbitrary, consensus driven notions, then it can become possible 
(given an acceptance of the postmodern framework) to begin a process of destabilizing 
existing categories (whether explicit, or belonging to Jameson’s political unconscious) and 
reconstituting boundaries which represent contemporary (ever shifting) locally understood 
constructions. Such is the argument put forth by theorists such as Donna Haraway and Judith 
Butler in terms of gender, Hayden White in history, Richard Rorty in philosophy and others 
throughout many fields. While the postmodern structure of consciousness remains open, it 
allows for a political agency through the construction of an arbitrary, temporary modernist 
frame with which to operate momentarily, while recognizing this as no more than a 
Baudrillardian simulacra, and not an absolute truth or reality.
37
  
It is the move from the modernist to the postmodernist which is arguably the most 
difficult, the acceptance of the openness and lack of natural boundaries. Essentially, this is 
what Roland Barthes argues in S/Z, when he presents the notion of the readerly and the 
writerly text. If one approaches a writerly text, one in which the reader need necessarily play 
a vital role in meaning-making, then the reader must both accept responsibility and disavow 
the notion of a closed number of interpretations of a literary text (and most specifically a 
single ‘correct’ reading). Barthes states “the systems of meaning can take over this absolutely 
plural text, but their number is never closed, based as it is on the infinity of language” (6). In 
so arguing, he states that this is due not to inherent qualities of the content of the writerly text 
itself, but its structure:  
for as nothing exists outside the text, there is never a whole of the text (which would 
by reversion form an internal order, a reconciliation of complementary parts, under 
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 The change of social ideas has been demonstrated (see Xie, et al.) to occur at a different tipping point (a 
committed ten percent minority) than a democratic consensus (majority).  
37
 This notion of political agency, as well as consideration for literary movements of the contemporary age, 
which argue that they have moved ‘beyond’ or come ‘after’ postmodernism (understood largely 
chronologically) will be taken up in the in the concluding chapter.  
 
85 
the paternal eye of the representative Model): the text must simultaneously be 
distinguished from its exterior and from its totality. All of which comes down to 
saying that for the plural text, there cannot be a narrative structure, a grammar, or a 
logic; thus, if one or another of these are sometimes permitted to come forward, it is 
in proportion (giving this expression its full quantitative value) as we are dealing with 
incompletely plural texts, texts whose plural is more or less parsimonious. (Barthes 6) 
 
Essentially, the writerly text maps onto the same structure of consciousness that I argue is 
postmodern. The consequences, for literature, is both a lack of a fixed narrative structure, and 
distinct narrative closure (the text must remain an ‘open text’ (Eco)), as a consequence of this 
structure. Thus, Barthes’ writerly text, within literature, is an example of the operation of a 
postmodern structure of consciousness. I would further argue that this mindset must 
necessarily be applicable to the author and reader, as the text itself can rule out such a reading 
(if the text is ‘readerly’) or a reader could present a more modernist interpretation (giving a 
closed interpretation of a text that could otherwise be read openly). This position is not easy, 
as literary interpretation has historically, especially in the wake of New Criticism in the 
United States, sought to uncover meaning from the text, and texts and readers have long 
presented a series of alternative, but limited, readings that were acceptable. The notion that 
readings are contingent, and thus limitless, is notoriously difficult. Barthes further argues:  
the interpretation demanded by a specific text, in its plurality, is in no way liberal: it is 
not a question of conceding some meanings, of magnanimously acknowledging that 
each one has its share of truth; it is a question, against all indifference, of asserting the 
very existence of plurality, which is not that of the true, the probable, or even the 
possible. This necessary assertion is difficult, however. (Barthes 6)  
 
This turning away from the seeking of truth, as Rorty previously argued, however, does not 
leave us in a relativistic or solipsistic position, but in a position where the very plurality of 
interpretations allows openness and the possibility of change. This structure, which underlies 
Barthes’ writerly text, presents a means of understanding how cultural transformation takes 
place, as well as a blueprint for further alteration as new notions, vocabularies, and 
understandings take over. These concepts are not fixed, or passed down from above, given a 
postmodern structure, but are erected ad hoc and thus continuously alterable.  
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Mapping the Argument – Where does the dissertation go from here? 
Practically, in terms of literature, what this approach calls for is an assessment of the literary 
devices used in any given text, and an evaluation as to what ends those devices are engaged. 
My analysis takes place in three stages, specifically looking at detective fiction (chapter 2), 
science fiction (chapter 3) and two postmodern novels, which, despite differences in 
approach, both present the postmodern structure of consciousness (chapter 4). The two genres 
chosen are those which best represent epistemology and ontology, specifically to highlight 
that each genre has classical, modernist and postmodernist elements. The two examples in 
Chapter 4 represent the two primary approaches to a postmodern novel. This will require a 
discussion of the specific literary characteristics relevant for the genre under consideration, 
but the fundamental evaluation will be the correspondence of the structure of the primary 
material with that of the models outlined above in discussions of Deleuze and Eco.  
In terms of detective fiction, focus will be on the concepts of genre, narratology and 
closure, as well as considerations of the audience. Distinctions will be made between texts 
that present a structure which is closed and open, those which present resolution to the 
investigation of the detective and those that fail to do so, as well as texts for which no 
resolution is possible. In so doing, discussions of the narration, the reliability and status of the 
narrator, the availability of information to the other characters and to the reader will be 
explored. Specifically in this chapter, the concerns of epistemology will be considered at the 
fore, and how those questions are resolved, questions posed by the generic conventions 
themselves and the application and understanding of those conventions by both the reader 
and author, will lead to analysis as to the structure of the given text. Texts which work on a 
fundamentally deductive model reflect a classical structure of consciousness (Edgar Allan 
Poe, Agatha Christie, Andrea Camilleri), those that rely on induction reflect a modernist 
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structure of consciousness (Raymond Chandler, Sjöwall/Wahlöö, CSI), and those for which 
both deduction and induction fail – and for which there are no more avenues of investigation 
because such answers are ruled out in the text – reflect the postmodern structure of 
consciousness, characterized by the limited perspectives within a rhizomatic labyrinth 
(Pynchon, Auster). We will also discuss those texts that seem to present a failure of either 
deduction or induction (or both), but only for diegetically imbedded characters. In those texts, 
the reader is afforded a position from which answers can be, and usually are, provided, and 
thus those texts ultimately reflect a modernist structure, and I call these intermediate texts, 
which present postmodernism yet perform modernism, late modernist texts (Umberto Eco, 
Borges).  
The chapter on science fiction has a similar approach, with a consideration of primary 
texts which represent a classical, modernist, and postmodernist structure. Science fiction 
often focuses on ontological concerns, questions of being, and my analysis will focus on 
those factors when considering science fiction texts. The chapter will discuss two main 
categories of texts, concerning the ontology of worlds; those which deal with a distinction 
between real and fictional universes, and those in which the attempted differentiation pertains 
to real and virtual worlds, and analyze the means by which these worlds are identifiable, 
permeable or understandable. Furthermore, a consideration of subjectivity, which Donald 
Hall argues is a mix of epistemology and ontology (Hall 4) will be presented. The focus here 
will also be on being, but concerning ontological differences on an individual rather than 
‘world’ level. Through this analysis a number of texts including Doris Lessing’s Canopos in 
Argos series, Isaac Asimov’s Foundation series, short stories by William Gibson and Svend 
Åge Madsen, Ursula Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness, Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (and 
its source text by Philip K. Dick), Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash, The Wachowski’s Matrix 
trilogy, and the relatively recent reimagining of the television series Battlestar Galactica 
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(2004) will be considered and shown to correspond to the various structural paradigms. In 
this chapter, emphasis will not only be placed on the postmodern nature of some of the texts, 
but also on the fundamentally modernist structure of others, specifically refuting the notion 
that texts with an ontological dominant are postmodern. I will further show that the analysis 
of a postmodern structure of consciousness provides a stronger understanding of the mode, 
one consistent with those distinctions made in the considerations of specific literary devices 
and characteristics outlined above.  
The fourth chapter will look at two exemplary novels from 1973, Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow – which is canonically considered postmodern – and Svend Åge Madsen’s 
Tugt og utugt i mellemtiden [Virtue and Vice in the Middle Time]. Those texts will be 
considered for their various metaphysical and philosophical positions, as well as the means of 
narration, their intertextuality and blending of genres to identify the structure of 
consciousness in which they operate, and how, despite using different literary strategies and 
coming from different traditions (American vs European) they assimilate a similar mindset at 
a similar historical point. The focus of the chapter will be on the Danish text, which will be 
compared to the already canonical text by Pynchon to highlight the differences in their 
approach, while concentrating on the various metaphysical and philosophical considerations 
that can be considered. This chapter will present a set of readings of postmodern texts 
highlight its structure of consciousness and its manifestation through various literary devices. 
This, I contend, will ease the inconsistencies of categorizing texts such as Don Quixote and 
works of Shakespeare, as well as the vast array of texts presented in the aftermath of World 
War II down until the present day. This approach will allow critics to distinguish between 
classical, modernist and postmodernist texts in the present day (all of which I argue are still 
written) and how those mindsets are interpreted and presented. This is not an end to analysis 
of given literary texts, but only reveals the fundamental structural basis of each text, and this 
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argument is put forth to resolve the dilemma of whether postmodernism is a continuation of 
or break from modernism.
38
  
Finally, in the conclusion, I will outline the ramifications of my approach. I will 
discuss how a postmodern structure of consciousness affects literature moving ‘forward’ 
chronologically, and evaluate, from the perspective of a postmodern structure, the possibility 
of moving ‘beyond’ or ‘post-’postmodernism. Contemporary movements, like the post-ironic, 
postpostmodernism, New Sincerity, and Neo-Victorianism, will be canvassed. Philosophical 
movements such as New Materialism will also be considered. I will further propose three 
logically possible positions that can be, “not innocently” (Eco, Postscript 67), posited as 
reactions to postmodernist literature.  
To sum up, postmodernism represents a different ‘structure of consciousness’, the 
structure of which can best be understood using the metaphor of the rhizomatic labyrinth. I 
contend that viewing postmodern literature with this in mind incorporates other attempts at 
definitions or explanations of this mode, concepts of the postmodern mode proposed by 
Hassan and Lyotard, as well as theories presented by Baudrillard, Barthes, Waugh and 
Hutcheon.  
Postmodernism represents the uncertainty experienced when faced with both 
epistemological and ontological questions and thus conforms to a structure of consciousness 
in which these questions are not simply left unanswered but such answers are ruled out. There 
is, simply, absolute uncertainty to those philosophical questions in postmodernism, as we 
have no vantage point in the rhizome from which to answer such questions with any 
objectivity. This moves beyond Lyotard’s definition in The Postmodern Condition in that it 
addresses concerns beyond the epistemological. In addition, by using the rhizome as a 
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 As an anecdotal example, at a presentation of my approach with reference to detective fiction one professor of 
Italian posed questions about the ability to consider various political implications of detective novels in an 
Italian context, novels which represented in my model the same structural category (modernist, in this case). As 
I explained, the structure of consciousness provides underlying philosophical and metaphysical codes, but does 
not preclude other considerations (political, aesthetic, ethical) within each structural paradigm. 
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structure of consciousness, I elucidate the characteristics associated with postmodernism and 
postmodern theory (e.g. metafiction, intertextuality), providing an underlying justification of 
why those aspects are so prevalent, while addressing the way in which they are utilized and 
presented differently than in modernist fiction. In subsequent chapters, I will discuss 
epistemology (through detective fiction), ontology (through science fiction) and the 
postmodern novel (specifically in Thomas Pynchon and Svend Åge Madsen). The 
dissertation will conclude with an eye towards present developments in literature, seen 
through the lens of postmodern structure, and a look to where literature might be heading.  
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Whodunit? And how do we know? (or do we?)  
 
 
 
The structure of the epistemological investigation in detective fiction 
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The theories which I have expressed there, and which appear to you to be so chimerical, 
are really rather practical – so practical that I depend upon them for my bread and cheese. 
Sherlock Holmes (A Study in Scarlet) 
 
In The Study in Scarlet, Holmes complains about the lack of crime, as it allows him less opportunity 
to ply his trade. And while crime itself continues to fall, not only in Europe but despite the public 
nature of some crime and protests in our social media world, in the U.S. as well, the fiction of crime 
is ever more popular. Holmes himself has been revived as an action hero in a series of films starring 
Robert Downey Jr., as an elite British ‘consulting detective’ in BBCs new acclaimed series 
Sherlock, and as a rough and tumble, post-rehab police consultant in New York in the series 
Elementary. This only serves to capitalize on the popularity of a genre, which seeks to present 
crime, and most importantly the resolution of crime, which allows us comfort in knowing that the 
security apparatus is there to protect us. These series, all revolving on the iconic Sherlock Holmes 
character created in 1886, focus on observation and deduction, key features in crime solving, police 
detection, but also mystery solving and even reading. Those problems, questions of epistemology, 
those of who knows what, and how they come about that information, have been fascinating us for 
centuries, and are the perfect genre, and venue to explore those questions of knowledge. 
In this chapter, I explore this structure of consciousness in relation to those epistemological 
questions, and have thus chosen to concentrate upon detective fiction, which has as its 
quintessential notion the idea of an epistemological investigation. This type of text involves a 
search for knowledge, which can be understood in a broader context as a reflection of the search for 
truth itself. Thus, using detective fiction as a representative epistemological genre, I seek to 
challenge the idea that such texts are tautologically modernist. I argue that there are texts which 
have an epistemological dominant that correspond to each of the structures of consciousness 
identified earlier – the classical, modernist and postmodernist – and that this structure, manifested in 
the responses to questions of epistemology (and others), is determinate.  
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In Postmodernist Fiction, Brian McHale separates modernist and postmodernist fiction 
using Roman Jakobson’s conceptual tool of the dominant, which refers to the concerns which are 
prioritized, or “forefronted,” in a given text. In his argument, modernist fiction is characterized by 
an epistemological dominant (meaning questions of knowledge are of primary concern) while 
postmodernist fiction is identified by an ontological dominant (in which questions of being and 
identity are of primary focus) (McHale, Postmodernist 9-10). As discussed in the introduction, and 
contrary to McHale, I argue that this is not the case: rather both modernist and postmodernist texts 
can be found that discuss, primarily, epistemological and ontological questions. To recap, the 
differentiation between modernist and postmodernist poetics lies not in the type of questions posed 
(or proposed first, as with McHale’s use of the dominant), but rather in the means by which these 
questions are answered. These means correspond to the structure of consciousness, the underlying 
structural metaphor grounding the understanding of reality with which a given text operates and is 
interpreted.  
The chapter will proceed with a history of the genre, as generally described, and proceed 
with a reclassification according to my understanding of the underlying structure. This is done with 
an eye to integrating postmodern detective fiction more seamlessly into the generic structure, as 
well as explaining its relationship to the genre as a whole.  
 
What is detective fiction? 
Histories of crime fiction often divide the genre into several categories, usually presented in a 
chronological sequence. These histories often start with the categories of classical (Christie, Doyle) 
and hard-boiled detective fiction (Hammett, Chandler), followed by the spy novel (Ian Fleming) 
and police procedural (Ed McBain, Per Wahlöö and Maj Sjöwall), and then sections on gender 
(feminist and LGBT detective fiction) and race (often African-American detective fiction) and 
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finally a short section discussing postmodern detective fiction.
39
 This current division focuses on 
historical trends, and adds the later categories where they have gained critical interest (or for 
political reasons), and thus it doesn’t fully explain the inherent connections within the genre. The 
genre as a whole can be better understood on the basis of the structure of the epistemological 
investigation, the means by which the detective goes about solving the crime, which is particularly 
important in understanding how postmodern detective fiction is connected to the rest of the genre 
(which is my main concern). Although histories often present the way in which the genre has 
developed over time, and thus each, individually, has a different organizing methodology, this 
approach allows the inclusion of the later categories (sections discussing gender, race, and 
postmodern detective fiction) more seamlessly into the presentation of the genre. In this analysis, I 
focus specifically on detective fiction, a limited scope of crime fiction, but contend that other 
aspects of crime fiction could be included in this rubric. To this end, I use the same categories for 
the division of the genre, which are reflected in the discussion of the three structures of 
consciousness. Those categories - classical, modernist and postmodernist - will differently locate 
some subgenres (cosy, police procedural, forensic).
40
 This division more accurately reflects the 
structural similarities found in the various sub-genres of detective fiction, and which will allow for 
an opportunity to explore the structure of the postmodern detective novel. 
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 Benvenuti, Stefano and Gianni Rizzoni. The Whodunit: an informal history of detective fiction. Trans by Anthony 
Eyre. New York: MacMillan, 1979. Horsley, Lee. Twentieth-Century Crime Fiction. Oxford: Oxford U Press, 2005. 
Knight, Stephen. Crime Fiction, 1800-2000. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Thompson, Jon. Fiction, Crime, 
and Empire: Clues to Modernity and Postmodernism. Urbana: U of Illinois Press, 1993. Priestman, Martin. The 
Cambridge Companion to Crime Fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Stephen Knight includes a third section on 
diversity, after the chronological breakdown, which includes chapters on race, gender (feminist, lesbian, and male gay 
detection) and postmodern detection. Horsley, for example, includes sections specifically dealing with sexism and 
racism and redefining the genre when dealing with those socialpolitical issues. Priestman’s collection also includes 
chapters dealing specifically with gender and race.  
40
 This reordering is not intended to cover up important distinctions in the divisions of the genre into various subgenres, 
whether based on themes (i.e. feminism), analytic focus (i.e. forensic), or types of crime or how graphically they are 
displayed (as in the cosy). Each of these subgenres and many others deserve specific attention, especially in histories of 
the genre as a whole, but this division would allow them to be grouped by how the crime is solved, while preserving 
their other foci.  
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Several scholars have already presented a division of the genre of detective fiction into three 
such parts, the classical detective story, the hard-boiled detective novel, and the anti-detective 
novel, primarily in studies explaining or exploring the concept of anti-detective stories/novels. For 
example, Anne Hopzafel in her treatment of Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy, “presents the most 
important criteria and elements of the classical and the hard-boiled detective novel in order to 
obtain a comparative foundation for the discussion of Auster’s novels, … which will then be related 
to the postmodern form, the anti-detective novel” (Hopzafel 9). Stefano Tani, in his book The 
Doomed Detective: The Contribution of the Detective Novel to Postmodern American and Italian 
Fiction, similarly presents the characteristics of the classical and hard-boiled formulations of the 
genre, and later in his discussions of the postmodern variety divides the ‘anti-detective novel’ into 
three distinct categories, the innovative, deconstructive, and metafictional varieties. Although I 
propose to look at the structure of each aspect of the genre, this basic division is a good beginning 
from which to understand the overall pattern, as I argue that these studies, in their brief 
consideration of several representative sub-genres, have basically categorized the genre along 
structural lines. 
The terminology Tani uses is also telling as to where he places the main features of the 
genre. William V. Spanos, in “The Detective and the Boundary”, utilizes the term “anti-detective 
story,” for stories which “evoke the impulse to ‘detect’ … in order to violently frustrate it by 
refusing to solve the crime” (Spanos 154). This term is then further used by Stefano Tani, with the 
same basic emphasis, in ascribing this term to post World War II literary detective novels, claiming 
that “’the anti-detective novel’ [which is] certainly more related to the Poesque tradition than to the 
hard-boiled one, deeply subverted the former and showed a great difference from the latter.” (Tani 
35). He also defines conventional detective narrative in general terms:  
A conventional detective story is a fiction in which an amateur or professional detective tries 
to discover by rational means the solution of a mysterious occurrence – generally a crime, 
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usually a murder. This definition implies the presence of at least three invariable elements: 
the detective, the process of detection, and the solution. (Tani 41)  
 
While there are three essential elements which make up the genre, Tani’s project works under the 
assumption that the solution is the crucial element, which “gives sense to the genre and justifies its 
existence” (Tani 41), and thus postulates that the anti-detective story is one which subverts that 
specific element. Tani’s division of the types of anti-detective novel is dependent upon how the 
various novels he discusses undermine the solution, either through anticipation, partial fulfillment, 
nullification, or simply through parody. Like many scholars, I utilize, and thus want to emphasize, 
Tani’s stretched definition of detective which includes anyone detecting or trying to undergo an 
investigation, amateur and professional.
41
  
Furthermore, I want to suggest that the ‘solution’ is also not strictly necessary. In classical 
and modernist detective fiction a solution is a necessary condition of the structure of the 
investigation. This, however, isn’t the case for postmodern detective fiction. Structurally, even early 
on in the story, one realizes that such a solution is not possible. This realization that there is not a 
traditional solution (i.e. the murder is not solved) is the ‘solution’ to the postmodern detective story, 
and as such is sufficient to satisfy this criterion of a ‘solution.’ This feature brings closure to the 
pursuit outlined at the beginning of the narrative. Both possibilities, a ‘true’ solution and the 
realization that one is not ever going to reach such a conclusion, allow for the construction of a 
narrative relating the events. It is this linear reconstruction of the investigation that Žižek privileges 
as the real end of the detective story.  
There is a certain self-reflexive strain in the detective novel: it is a story of the detective’s 
effort to tell the story, i.e. to reconstitute what ‘really happened’ around and before the 
murder, and the novel is finished not when we get the answer to ‘Whodunit?’ but when the 
detective is finally able to tell ‘the real story’ in the form of a linear narrative. (Žižek 49)  
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 Rob Rushing notes in his discussion of the myriad sub and microgenres of detective fiction that ‘most narratives 
feature a character who wants to find something out,’ and warns against the ‘risk of articulating a hopelessly watered-
down definition of ‘detective fiction’ that would be applicable to almost any text’ as a consequence (Rushing 27). 
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However, the type of investigative strategies both undertaken by the detective and implied by the 
narrative structure of the text determine which kind of conclusion (whether solution or lack thereof) 
is possible and warranted in the text.  
Thus, fundamentally, the investigation is the main focus of the genre, and therefore I base 
the explanation of the genre on this epistemological element. With the perspective that the 
investigation, rather than the solution, is the primary element of detective fiction, the term 
postmodern detective fiction, rather than ‘anti-detective fiction,’ is the term that mostly clearly 
reflects the development of investigative methods and thus more seamlessly integrates this subgenre 
into a larger discussion of both detective fiction and the larger category of crime fiction. This also 
connects postmodern detective fiction to the similar structures found in other postmodern writings, 
allowing an analysis of the structure of postmodernism itself.  
I further argue that there are fundamentally three structures of detective fiction, the classical, 
modernist, and postmodern types of detective fiction. Each of the subgenres and microgenres
42
 
within these broad umbrella categories has its own niche and definition, which makes them unique 
and both imposes variable generic conventions and attracts different audiences. These distinctions 
are both important and interesting, but ultimately the investigative method employed is common 
within this division. The classical structure, as made most famous by Conan Doyle’s Sherlock 
Holmes and Agatha Christie’s detectives Hercule Poirot and Miss Marple, utilizes a deductive 
method of crime-solving. Modernist detective fiction, which includes the previously discussed 
category of the hard-boiled detective story, as well as the police procedural, the forensic, and the 
spy novel (among others), utilizes an inductive approach by which the crime is solved through 
hypothesis and trial and error. Finally, postmodern detective fiction consists of those stories which 
adhere to detective fiction generic tropes and conventions and in which the investigation leads to a 
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 Robert Rushing, in his 2007 work Resisting Arrest: Detective Fiction and Popular Culture, uses this term to refer to 
the ever smaller divisions of crime fiction, into categories so small that it seems ‘whatever one’s taste, there is a 
detective novel to match’ (26). 
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situation in which the questions not only are unanswered, but, as a product of the structure of the 
investigation itself, cannot be answered. This is not simply due to a lack of clues, or a failed effort 
on the part of the detective, but a situation in which there is no possible solution to the crime, which 
the method of detection elucidates structurally. Thus, in this type of detective fiction the ‘solution’ 
is simply that there is (and can be) no traditional solution. This project proposes this division of 
detective fiction specifically to clarify the structure of postmodern detective fiction, and by 
extension of postmodernism, as well as to demonstrate that postmodern texts can have an 
orientation that is principally about knowledge (the epistemological) rather than about being (the 
ontological) as Brian McHale contends in Postmodernist Fiction.  
 
The Classical Model: Logic and Deduction 
 
Edgar Allen Poe’s trilogy of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” “The Mystery of Marie Rogêt,” 
and “The Purloined Letter,” are considered the foundation of the detective genre, and serve a prime 
examples of the classical detective school. The three stories were first presented in a series of 
journals in the 1840s, but were rapidly reprinted and given a wide audience. The protagonist of the 
three stories, C. Auguste Dupin, is often reported to be based upon the memoirs (ghost written, and 
thought to be largely fictitious) of Eugene François Vidocq, who also inspired a number of other 
literary detectives. The stories are all narrated by a third person, a companion of Dupin, who is 
admittedly not of the same intellectual caliber as the detective. In fact, it is this narrator with whom 
the reader identifies rather than the detective himself.  
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue” commences with an opening sequence, apart from the 
main problem of the detective story, in which Dupin demonstrates his intellectual and analytic 
ability, and also demonstrates both to the reader and the narrator, the method he uses to come to his 
conclusions. This section of the story provides the groundwork for all of classical detective fiction, 
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the character of the detective, the investigative methodology, the relationship between the detective, 
investigation and the narrator, and the role and positioning of the reader vis-à-vis the text.  
In this prelude, Dupin demonstrates his ability to retrace the narrator’s thoughts, as it were, 
back to a fruiterer whom the narrator has not consciously noticed. His method, which he claims 
works without fail, is to place himself, intellectually, in the mind of the person whose thoughts he is 
trying to deduce, and thus, through this process, ascertain the truth of a given scenario. “‘I will 
explain,’ he said, ‘and that you may comprehend all clearly, we will, first retrace the course of your 
meditations, from the moment in which I spoke to you until that of the rencontre with the fruiterer 
in question” (Poe 145). This example, in brief, sets up the entire process by which Dupin will 
prosecute each subsequent investigation. By retracing his friend’s thoughts, for which we are given 
the assurance of the accuracy by the narrator himself, Dupin succinctly demonstrates the 
inevitability of his conclusion. 
Here Dupin also demonstrates the character of the classical detective. Slavoj Žižek claims 
that “on the one hand, the figure of the detective is interpreted as ‘bourgeois’ scientific rationalism 
personified; on the other, he is conceived as successor to the romantic clairvoyant, the man 
possessing an irrational, quasisupernatural power to penetrate the mystery of another person’s 
mind” (Žižek 49). Poe, himself, presents Dupin as exactly this figure, who causes the narrator to 
“[dwell] meditatively upon the old philosophy of the Bi-Part soul” (Poe 148). To the narrator, the 
ability that Dupin demonstrates here is nearly that of a clairvoyant, the ability to read his thoughts, 
as the narrator notes: “I do not hesitate to say that I am amazed, and can scarcely credit my senses” 
(Poe 149). Dupin, however, is able to explain the phenomenon rationally, demonstrating that the 
entire process is simply a matter of observation and deduction, even if it could only be 
accomplished by a man with considerably advanced abilities in both. His explanation is presented to 
the narrator, to both demonstrate his ability and explain the phenomenon. Yet, simultaneously, the 
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reader receives the same information, placing a distance between Dupin and the reader and 
reinforcing the identification of the reader and narrator.  
The actual case of the Rue Morgue is solved in a similar manner, with Dupin collecting all 
of the evidence necessary for its solutions through accounts in the paper. Dupin’s astute observation 
of the universal misrecognition of the “gruff voice,” as belonging to an unknown foreigner, 
provides us, and the narrator to whom he recounts the solution, with the crucial piece of information 
by which the crime can be solved. Dupin claims that this evidence is enough to “engender a 
suspicion which should give direction to all further progress in the investigation of the mystery” 
(Poe 156). This suspicion, however, is to be understood clearly as not a possible solution, or one 
option among many. “I said ‘legitimate deductions;’ but my meaning is not thus fully expressed. I 
designed to imply that the deductions are the sole proper ones, and that the suspicion arises 
inevitably from them as the single result” (Poe 156). For Dupin, there is only a single possibility, 
and he uses the term suspicion out of a sense of modesty or decorum, rather than as an indication of 
the possibility of error.
43
 
Thus, Dupin demonstrates the deduction of the unique solution to the problem presented in 
the case, one which only he can identify. The subsequent revelation of the circumstances of the 
murder, and the means by which Dupin verified his already determined and certain conclusion of 
                                                 
43
 This despite the later references to the theories of probability. “Coincidences, in general, are great stumbling-blocks 
in the way of that class of thinkers who have been educated to know nothing of the theory of probabilities – that theory 
to which the most glorious objects of human research are indebted for the most glorious of illustration” (Poe 392). 
These theories, discussed in Ian Hacking’s work The Emergence of Probability and tied to crime fiction by Maurizio 
Ascari, highlight the paradoxical nature of evidence and probability in the world of crime. Poe here, although referring 
to contemporary field of probability, falls more in line with Cesare Beccaria’s contention that “moral certitude, strictly 
speaking, can be no more than a probability – but one of such a kind as to be called a certainty, seeing that every man of 
common sense must acquiesce in it by force of habit which arises from the need to act and which precedes all 
speculation” (Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments 24). [“Ma svanirà il paradosso per chi considera, che rigorosamente 
la certezza moral non è che una probabilità, ma probabilità tale che è chiamata certezza, perché ogni uomo di buon 
senso vi acconsente necessariamente per una consuetudine nata dalla necessità di agire, ed anteriore ad ogni 
speculazione” (Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene 57). Beccaria’s discussion of moral certainty is tantamount to our 
contemporary legal test of reasonable doubt, and which Poe alludes with the separation between the reality of his 
solution and the insistence that there be no preternatural solution to the crime. “It is not too much to say that neither of 
us believe in preternatural events” (Poe 388). By disallowing supernatural solutions, Poe is adding limitations to the 
investigation, which lead closer to a ‘reasonable’ solution rather than an absolute truth.  
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how the murder had been taken place, proceed in a linear fashion, one which allows neither for 
incorrect decisions nor for the possibility of choice. This is demonstrated in the phrases that Dupin 
uses, and specifically in the words the Poe himself chooses to highlight in this portion of the 
narrative. “I proceeded to think thus –a posteriori. The murderers did escape from one of these 
windows. This being so, they could not have re-fastened the sashes from the inside, as they were 
found fastened; … Yet the sashes were fastened. They must, then, have the power of fastening 
themselves” (Poe 157, original emphasis). The subsequent analysis follows in a similar vein, 
demonstrating the inevitable nature of the investigation and the singular character of the solution. It 
is this same method that Dupin uses in each of the three stories.
44
 
The classical detective story, as in Poe’s Dupin stories, uses a deductive method, whereby 
the detective searches for and analyzes clues as a primary method before the overall solution is 
presented, often at the end of the story. This model is very rule-driven, and “the solution and its 
explanation by the detective are the most crucial elements” (Hopzafel 12). The detective, as with 
Dupin, comes upon the single solution of the problem, discounting all other possibilities because 
they fail to account for all available evidence, leading to the final revelation or goal of the detective 
game. In fact, based on S.S. Van Dine’s famous twenty rules, Anne Hopzafel argues that “the 
appeal of the detective novel lies in [the audience’s] chance to solve the puzzle as well, and to 
compare their ability to that of the detective” (12). While Van Dine emphasizes this puzzle-like 
ability, the comparison between the detective and the reader is never complete. The reader feels 
satisfied if he has bested the narrator (or later the sidekick, when they become disassociated, 
especially in film and television) with whom he identifies. However, the explanation comes from 
the detective, the ultimate holder of truth in the text. While it is technically possible to solve the 
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 I limit the discussion of Poe’s Dupin series to “Rue Morgue” both for space considerations as well as simplicity. 
“Marie Roget” is partially based on a true story, and thus has non-generic twists, complicating its use as an example of 
the genre, and “Purloined Letter” implicates Dupin which violates yet to be articulated rules, but more importantly 
compromises the purity of the investigative process and the author/reader dynamic.  
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crime before the detective, if the author has followed the “rules,” it is not a necessary factor for the 
enjoyment of the classical detective novel.  
Žižek argues that this “logic and deduction story” is missing something, however, if it is 
solved in a purely deductive and rational way. “We are immensely disappointed if the denouement 
is brought about by a pure scientific procedure (if, for example, the assassin is identified simply by 
means of a chemical analysis of the stains on the corpse)” (Žižek 49). He argues that the detective, 
in such classical detective stories and novels, is really the personification of two disparate 
motivations, the scientific and the romantic. Poe (and creators of other classical detectives) 
demonstrates that the expert knowledge, which forms the basis of what Žižek argues is the irrational 
intuition, is really just the extraordinary power of observation and deduction presented by the 
detectives themselves, individuals with whom the audience is not meant to identify. The audience, 
as here in Poe, is meant to identify with the “sidekick,” (the narrator in this case), to whom, along 
with the audience, the solution to the case is presented in the narrative form that Žižek argues is the 
basis of the detective story in Looking Awry. Christie argues similarly (through Miss Marple) in the 
Tuesday Club Murders.  
It’s really a matter of practice and experience. An Egyptologist, so I’ve heard, if you show 
him one of those curious little beetles, can tell you by the look and feel of the thing what 
date B.C. it is, or if it’s a Birmingham imitation. And he can’t always give a definite rule for 
doing so. He just knows. His life has been spent handling such things. (Christie, Tuesday 
141) 
 
Her argument, however, provides a rational basis for something which, on its surface, seems 
supernatural but which is actually based upon a great amount of experience, even if not yet (or ever) 
explained to the audience. Žižek goes on to argue that the concern about the pure scientific 
procedure is about how we perceive the deductive process:  
We feel that “there is something missing here,” that “this is not deduction proper.” But it is 
even more disappointing if, at the end, after naming the assassin, the detective claims that 
“he was guided from the very beginning by some unmistakable instinct – here we are clearly 
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deceived, the detective must arrive at the solution on the basis of reasoning, not by mere 
“intuition.” (Žižek 49) 
 
This deductive method is perhaps more clearly demonstrated by referring to one of Christie’s 
detectives, the incomparable Hercule Poirot. Poirot’s method is to gather the clues necessary to 
solve any given crime, then to gather the potential suspects (all involved parties typically), and 
reveal how he has come to a conclusion based on his analysis of the clues. The novel Death on the 
Nile is a typical example, in which the murder takes place on a river cruise in Egypt and thus with 
limited suspects, the locked room scenario (as in “Rue Morgue”). Poirot proceeds quite 
methodically and specifically without any preconceived notions about the crime. “Colonel Race and 
I must interview all the passengers. Until we have got their stories it would be unwise to form 
theories” (Christie, Perilous 327). Only after he has analyzed all of the clues, and deduced the truth 
of the notion, does he gather everyone together to explain how the crime occurred. In this case, it is 
the evidence that demonstrates that the crime was premeditated (the drugging of Poirot, the 
necessity of removing the gun), and that there were in fact two perpetrators (Jacqueline de Bellefort, 
the brains, and Simon Doyle, who was injured to produce a seeming alibi). This evidence leads 
Poirot to his conclusions. His evidence is only sufficient to prove to the audience who perpetrates 
that crime and is not dependent on judicial justice or police procedure. In fact, most often one of the 
suspects ends up confessing to the crime in question, as is the case here where Simon confesses 
when confronted with the evidence. This idea is borne out in the conversation between Jacqueline 
and Poirot at the end of the novel. 
‘All the same,’ said Jacqueline reflectively, ‘I can’t really see that you had much proof. You 
were quite right, of course, but if we’d bluffed you out –’ 
‘In no other way, Mademoiselle, could the thing have happened.’ 
‘That’s proof enough for a logical mind, but I don’t believe it would have convinced a jury. 
Oh, well – it can’t be helped. You sprang it all on Simon, and he went down like a ninepin.’ 
(Christie, Perilous 428) 
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Poirot, of course, is not concerned with the jury, but rather is only interested in getting to the truth. 
He also uses the final resolution scene mainly to demonstrate his superior intellect, and brag about 
it. “I like an audience, I must confess. I am vain, you see. I am puffed up with conceit. I like to say, 
‘See how clever is Hercule Poirot!’” (Christie, Perilous 420). Poirot is the embodiment of Žižek’s 
definition, a detective who is simultaneously “‘bourgeois’ scientific rationalism personified” and “a 
man possessing an irrational, quasisupernatural power to penetrate the mystery of another person’s 
mind” (Žižek 49). While Poirot’s personality and characteristics account for a great deal of his 
appeal, his method testifies to the kind of truth that is of interest in the classical detective story and 
novel. Poirot is certainly interested in the truth, and the way that the crime has occurred, if indeed 
described accurately, must account for all of the evidence presented, even the most minute and 
seemingly insignificant pieces. 
For Poirot, as for all of the classical detectives, it is the evidence that leads to the solution, 
and pieces of the puzzle which do not fit demonstrate the falsity of any possible solution and the 
necessity of continued contemplation until all of the evidence fits completely. The description of the 
classical method is not dependent on the accuracy of the solution (although Poirot’s pride might be 
at stake).
45
 An incorrect solution simply implies that the proposed solution does not account for all 
of the facts and evidence completely (or all of the evidence has yet to be acquired; although this 
possibility is “against the rules” as it implies evidence out of the purview of the audience).46 Thus a 
novel such as The Murder of Roger Ackroyd, in which the narrator is the perpetrator, does not 
negate, but rather maintains and reinforces, the classical structure. This is true even while it creates 
                                                 
45
 There are, of course, other motivations inherent within crime fiction. Neither the criminals nor the detectives act 
dispassionately, and often emotion is a considerable factor both in the impetus for readings as well as the rationale of 
the narrative. This aspect of crime fiction’s history is detailed in Maurizio Ascari’s work A Counter-History of Crime 
Fiction among other places. This study, however, remains focused on the epistemological structure of the detective 
story, and thus does not delve into these other interesting aspects, including those important and necessary for 
elucidating generic and sub-generic boundaries.  
46
 Specifically violating Williard Huntington Wright’s (alias SS Van Dine) “Twenty Rules for Writing Detective 
Stories,” whose first rule states “all clues must be plainly stated and described” (Van Dine 129).  
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doubt as to the accuracy of the solution and controversy as to whether the unreliability of the 
narrator (who commits the crime and simultaneously tells the story) does not undermine the “pact” 
between the author and reader. Even a story like Trent’s Last Case by E.C. Bentley, in which the 
detective is ultimately completely wrong as to the identity of the shooter, leaves the procedure 
intact. For even in this instance, it is simply through a lack of facts that Trent is unable to accurately 
deduce the crime. Furthermore, the method is still valid even when the crime has yet to occur as in 
Towards Zero by Agatha Christie, which builds towards a potential crime at the end of the story, or 
never does occur as in the story “The Affair in the Bungalow,” part of The Tuesday Club Murders, 
in which Jane Helier describes a crime she has planned to commit, and Miss Marple accurately 
deduces both the perpetrator in Jane’s story and the fact that is has yet to happen.  
The main factor in this method of detection is evidence rather than supposition, motive, or 
other factors common in police procedurals. This is particularly evident in contemporary examples 
of the classical detective form, such as the television serial Psych (2006-2014). This show boasts a 
“psychic” detective, Shawn Spencer, who, like Dupin, has an uncanny ability to identify key pieces 
of evidence and deduce the solution to the crime. This again highlights the desire to have a 
descendent to the romantic clairvoyant, but one whose process is explained rationally. Psych uses 
specific filmic techniques to highlight the evidence, allowing the audience to follow along with 
Shawn’s observations even as his sidekick and the police force are unaware of them until later.47 
Each time the detective sees a piece of critical evidence (a marinating steak in the refrigerator, an 
inhaler in the hand of a spelling bee contestant, a missing page in a astronomical logbook), this fact 
is literally highlighted on the screen (with a surrounding color, music, and a zoom into the image) to 
make clear to the audience that this evidence is important. The plot proceeds by Shawn explaining 
his thought processes to his partner, Burton ‘Gus’ Guster, and then they proceed to involve the 
                                                 
47
 Here again, we can see that we are meant to identify with the sidekick rather than the “detective.” In this case the 
audience is carried along through the process, but always after the fact, in the same perspective as Gus, and yet before 
the police are “clued” in to the evidence.  
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seemingly inept police force in solving the crime while maintaining the façade that Shawn is indeed 
psychic (all the evidence is revealed to the detectives in the form of ‘spontaneous’ visions by 
Shawn). While this show maintains the use of the classical detective model, it does not produce the 
same effect as the classical detective novel because the audience is not in the same position to play 
along since the puzzle is often solved quickly and the audience is kept informed throughout the 
story. The pleasure derived from the story is mostly in how the information is then relayed to the 
police, and the eventual capture and confession of the criminal, as well as the maintenance of the 
“psychic” façade.  
This model, however, only works when all of the evidence is possible to attain, and the 
possibility of unascertainable information is when doubt is sown into the process. In the novel Il 
ladro di merendine [The Snack Thief] by Andrea Camilleri, this situation is encountered by 
Inspector Montalbano. Montalbano himself, despite being a police detective, demonstrates that he is 
a classical detective through his motivations.  
‘You know, I happen to have followed an investigation of yours, the one about the ‘terra-
cotta dog.’ In that instance, you abandoned an investigation into some weapon’s trafficking 
to throw yourself heart and soul into tracking a crime from fifty years ago, even though 
solving it wasn’t going to yield any practical results. Do you know why you did it?’ 
‘Out of curiosity?’ Montalbano guessed. 
‘No, my friend. It was a very shrewd, intelligent way for you to keep practicing your 
unpleasant profession, but by escaping from everyday reality. Apparently this everyday 
reality sometimes becomes too much for you to bear, and so you escape.’ (Camilleri 274-5) 
 
Montalbano is not the typical police detective but rather pursues his profession for its parlor game 
like qualities, which parallels the readers of Camilleri’s novels and the genre in general, providing a 
method of escape from the trials and tribulations of everyday life. 
 In attempting to solve a murder on a boat at sea, he is presented with far more evidence, and 
seemingly complicating factors of Middle Eastern gangs infiltrating the southern coast of Sicily for 
drug trafficking and smuggling from Tunisia. He demonstrates, however, that the separation of 
disparate information, even if it seems relevant to the crime, is part of the game of the detective. 
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“Montalbano smiled in satisfaction. The first puzzle had been solved, perfectly, with its specific 
outline. Fahrid, Ahmed, and even Aishe had been left out of it. With them in it, had they been 
properly used, the puzzle’s design would have been entirely different” (Camilleri 224). The idea of 
multiple, perhaps intersecting puzzles complicates the procedure, but Montalbano continues to 
follow a deductive approach to the solution of the crime. The last line, however, “had they properly 
been used” leaves open a bit of doubt that this procedure might not be as simple as either 
Montalbano, or the author, leaves it.  
However, even here in a story that reinforces the deductive methodology and the parlor 
game aspects of the classical detective story, a story with a larger scope is alluded to. The character 
of François, the young boy that Montalbano protects (the snack thief, in fact), when putting together 
a puzzle, decides to cut up the images and fit them together in new ways. Montalbano comments: 
“But that’s just it. François also thinks puzzles are boring, because they have fixed rules. Every 
little piece, he says, is cut so that it will fit with another. Whereas it would be more fun if there were 
a puzzle with many different solutions” (Camilleri 174). It is the very puzzle-like quality that 
originally attracts Montalbano, and inspires the genre as described by Van Dine. However, it can be 
the very limitations of fixed rules and methods which can lead to contrived methods and plots of 
Raymond Chandler’s 1944 critique in the essay ‘A Simple Art of Murder.’ This may be the same 
motivation that inspires authors to more “realistic” approaches, whether the modernist approaches 
of the hard-boiled and police procedural or the multiple solutions of the postmodern.  
 
The Modernist Model: Legwork and Induction 
 
The second category of detective fiction, as usually presented, is the hard-boiled detective novel, 
which presents an American version of the genre. This version is committed to experience and 
manifests itself, typically, in more first-hand accounts in which the reader is drawn into the gritty 
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details of the investigation and follows the libidinal desires of the investigator. Raymond Chandler, 
a prime example of a hard-boiled writer, in his essay “The Simple Art of Murder,” claims that this 
version is more realistic, noting when discussing Dashiell Hammett that: 
Hammett gave murder back to the kind of people who commit it for reasons, not just to 
provide a corpse, and with the means at hand, not hand-wrought dueling pistols, curare and 
tropical fish. He put those people down on paper as they were, and he made them talk and 
think in language they customarily used for these purposes (Hopzafel 18).  
 
The hard-boiled detective novel, as well as related subgenres like the police procedural and 
the forensic, presents the investigation in a different light than the classical, logic and deduction 
story. I call this category modernist detective fiction because it reflects the modernist structure of 
consciousness. In this mode, there are various possibilities but ultimately a single solution to a 
problem, and the possibility of appeal to an outside position by which to verify the claim to truth of 
that solution. Reflected in the epistemological investigation, it uses an inductive approach, full of 
supposition and hunches, which are then proven, or disproven and modified, by the evidence 
brought forth by the investigation. It is a trial and error process which is still designed with a single 
goal in mind, the solution to the crime (again, often a murder). In this way, the reader follows the 
detective along in a more intimate way, rather than looking over the shoulder in an effort to solve 
the puzzle, as with Dupin’s narrator or Dr. Watson to his Sherlock Holmes. “Thus, the readers are 
close to the action from the beginning and become quite often as befuddled as the detective” 
(Hopzafel 21). These stories allow for multiple potential paths and the following of wrong leads, 
not only by the police, but by the detective as well. In the hard-boiled detective novel, “a new type 
of detective operates, who relates to his rational predecessor in the classical detective story only in 
that they both share the task of solving the case” (Hopzafel 19).  
One such example of the hard-boiled detective school is Raymond Chandler’s The Big 
Sleep. In this novel the detective, Philip Marlowe, is hired by General Sternwood supposedly to 
handle, or discover the truth behind, a blackmail scheme. The case quickly escalates to a series of 
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murders, and in the end Marlowe attempts to discover the truth behind the disappearance of 
Sternwood’s once hoped for son-in-law, Regan. Marlowe’s methodology remains constant 
throughout the novel. Marlowe makes guesses, educated by both his previous experiences as well as 
his added knowledge from each lead he follows, and then follows them out to glean what 
information he can in the hopes of both understanding his assignment, which has been purposefully 
muddied, and the solution to the Sternwood’s various dilemmas. This methodological consistency is 
present despite the construction of the novel from two previously written short stories; however the 
disparity between the initial goal and the later investigation into Regan’s disappearance can thus be 
partially explained. 
 The means of analysis is a key difference between the classical and hard-boiled detective 
novels. While Dupin presents the rational, analytic approach, “corresponding to the nineteenth-
century rise of the scientific and optimistic attitude of the positivistic philosophy towards reality and 
human control of reality through the development of technology” (Tani 11), Marlowe represents a 
different epistemological method, which he states in sharp contrast to the classical model. “I’m not 
Sherlock Holmes or Philo Vance. I don’t expect to go over ground the police have covered and pick 
up a broken pen point and build a case from it. If you think there is anybody in the detective 
business making a living doing that sort of thing, you don’t know much about cops” (Chandler 
225). Unlike Dupin, who solved the case of the Rue Morgue by noticing the things that the police 
and others did not notice, an objective outsider’s solution to the problem, Marlowe solves the case 
by becoming intimately familiar with the world of crime, by physically investigating and making 
choices, guessing at solutions that are not always correct.  
 The clearest example of the difference in the two epistemological methods regards the path 
that is taken to the eventual solution. Both stories, “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” and The Big 
Sleep have a final solution, revealed by the detective along with the means and motivation behind 
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the murder. The difference is the path that is taken to reach the conclusion. For Dupin, the path is 
clear, unmistakable, and the only path that one could “reasonably” choose. The Rue Morgue 
murders are presented in the newspaper, and Dupin sets to the task of solving the case. On the other 
hand, The Big Sleep presents a world that has choices, has options that lead to dead ends, that lead 
to other clues, and that lead to points where one has to return to the beginning and take another 
path, another look at the problem, or potentially a look at a different problem altogether. They both 
share, however, a common goal, one which presupposes a final resolution to the investigation. 
While following two different patterns, they both lead to a final solution to the investigation, as a 
consequence of their structure. 
 This methodology is used not only in the hard-boiled detective fiction, by authors such as 
Chandler and Dashiell Hammett, but also in the police procedural subgenre. One can see this in the 
Martin Beck police procedurals by Maj Sjöwall and Per Wahlöö. In one such story, Polismördaren, 
translated as Cop Killer, the title character is captured only by virtue of a hunch by the sidekick 
detective, Lennart Kollberg. Towards the end of the novel, Kollberg, “suddenly thought of 
something” (Sjöwall 262), which turns out to lead to the identity of the final suspect of the novel. 
He then turns to correct police procedure to verify his supposition with evidence, working in an 
inductive way opposite the method used by Dupin and the classical detectives, who gather evidence 
before coming to the conclusions. When discussing the evidence to be verified with the crime lab, 
Kollberg states “in the first place, I’m quite sure it is the right car,” giving no evidentiary 
information as to why this car (despite the false plates) located in Stockholm should be connected to 
the crime committed in Skåne (southern Sweden), yet hoping for the crime lab to provide such an 
evidentiary link.  
 This same methodology is also used in forensic detective stories, such as the contemporary 
television series CSI (and its spin-off series, CSI Miami, CSI New York, and CSI:Cyber as well as 
 111 
shows such as NCIS, NCIS:Los Angeles, NCIS: New Orleans and Numb3rs). Despite their 
concentration on evidence, which is especially noticeable in the CSI series by their pioneering 
filmic technique of tight zoom to forensic details (especially poignant when shown in human body 
parts and wounds), these shows use evidence as a means of supporting hypotheses, or of correcting 
hypotheses which are then used to provide a way to search for more supporting evidence until the 
case is eventually solved. The methodology is probably most appropriately summed up by dialogue 
from one of Ed McBain’s characters, Detective Bush, in Cop Hater, from the 87th Precinct series. In 
discussing his job, and his seeming lack of confidence in being intellectual enough to complete it (a 
complete contrast from the Dupin, Holmes, Poirot legacy), Bush claims:  
Look, this detective tag is a laugh, and you know it as well as I do. All you need to be a 
detective is a strong pair of legs, and a stubborn streak. The legs take you around to all the 
various dumps you have to go to, and the stubborn streak keeps you from quitting. You 
follow each separate trail mechanically, and if you’re lucky, one of the trails pays off. If 
you’re not lucky, it doesn’t. Period. (McBain 18)  
 
This inductive method, where each trail is followed until it bears fruit or grows cold (in which case 
a different path is then taken) is reflected in all modernist detective fiction, from the hard-boiled 
novels, to the police procedural and the forensic, and even to other types of detection, such as in 
television shows House, M.D. and Medical Investigation, which apply this modernist detective 
methodology to medical diagnoses and outbreak prevention respectively.  
 
The Postmodern Detective Novel: Can we know whodunit? 
Jeanne Ewert, in “A Thousand Other Mysteries: Metaphysical Detection, Ontological Quests,” 
refers specifically to Eco’s labyrinthine theory, which she uses in order to show that metaphysical 
detective fiction follows McHale’s argument: it is ultimately about ontological issues, subsisting in 
worlds in which typical rules do not apply. She presents the conclusion of a novel she identifies as a 
metaphysical detective novel, Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds, in which the narrative presents 
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so many contradictory stories that the detective is unable to resolve the conflict. Thus, “nothing is 
resolved at the end of the novel; no history can be shown to supersede its competitors, and the 
witnesses’ testimony builds a rhizomatic net of hypotheses and theories through which the detective 
wanders without coming to a conclusion” (Ewert 188). This description presents the structure that I 
identify as the epistemological structure of the postmodern detective novel, in which the possibility 
of a single conclusion is refuted. Ewert, however, claims that this implies that the main 
preoccupation of such literature, which she calls metaphysical detection, is truly ontological, 
reflecting a difference in the construction of the world in the narrative.  
“The message for the reader of metaphysical detective fiction is clear: she must learn to read 
without relying on the detective’s interpretations; she must also learn to read in a world that 
offers conjectures and structuring systems, but no single overriding structure. She must 
recognize that the labyrinth represents a radically different universe than the one she 
expected.” (Ewert 188)  
 
However, this does not present an inherently different universe simply because the epistemological 
investigation ends in failure, but rather implies a different epistemological structure in which there 
is no absolute knowledge. There are undoubtedly, as she presents later in her article, specific 
ontological questions posited in postmodern detective fiction, but the epistemological structure of 
the investigation can be understood without appealing to the construction of a fundamentally 
different universe and claiming that the epistemological questions are truly a subset of a specifically 
ontological inquiry.
48
 As I argue in a subsequent chapter, there is a parallel structure of ontological 
inquiry which also reflects a classical, modernist, or postmodernist structure of consciousness, 
separate from the means of understanding of epistemological questions. Furthermore, in following 
Jakobson’s use of the term dominant, any ontological questions that arise appear secondary to the 
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 One could certainly discuss the ontological implications of Quinn’s disappearance in City of Glass, Oedipa’s appeals 
to “construct a world” and Leonard Shelby’s own questions of identity. My contention is simply that those are separate 
lines of analysis which need not supersede questions of epistemology in the stories.  
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epistemological concerns, thus maintaining that the epistemological is the dominant set of inquiries 
in this fiction as well.
49
  
Postmodern detective fiction consists of those stories which adhere to detective fiction 
generic tropes and conventions and in which the investigation leads to a situation in which the 
questions not only are unanswered, but, as a product of the structure of the investigation itself, 
cannot be answered. The very structure of the investigation implies this by its construction similar 
to the way that deduction is connected to the classical model of detection and induction is connected 
to the modernist model presented above. In considering the following texts, I will demonstrate that 
the structure of the epistemological investigation that the detectives
50
 undergo follows a rhizomatic 
pattern which eliminates the possibility of finding a solution.  
 
City of Glass 
One such novel is City of Glass, the first novel in the New York Trilogy by Paul Auster. The three 
novels, often contained in a single volume, which were published in three separate editions in 1985 
and 1986, can be read to constitute a loosely connected series of detective stories. The first novel 
presents itself most clearly as a detective novel at the beginning. In this novel Quinn, a detective 
fiction writer who writes under the pen name of William Wilson (taken from a story by Poe), 
accepts a detective assignment by assuming the role of Paul Auster, an apparent detective his new 
employer was trying to reach. This interesting overlapping of roles indicates that we, even from the 
beginning, do not have a true detective, but rather a writer impersonating a detective who draws on 
his own novelistic devices, and those gleaned from his own study of the genre, to project himself 
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 I would argue that the use of detective fiction tropes leads the reader to forefront epistemological concerns in these 
texts, and the ontological concerns that Ewert and McHale describe are subsequent to the failure of what is at least set 
up as the primary concern of the novel in question.  
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 Detective here is understood broadly as the individual who has taken on that role. In my reading, this is also true of 
other types of detection, as neither C. Auguste Dupin nor Miss Marple, for example, is formally a detective. This is also 
true for Quinn in Auster’s City of Glass, Smilla in Peter Høeg’s Smilla’s Sense of Snow, and Oedipa in Thomas 
Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49. 
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into the role that he has assumed. This serves not to detract from the story, but rather to emphasize 
to the reader that they are, in fact, reading a detective story. Quinn is thus established as a detective, 
unconventional and unused to the role, but in that manner no different than the presentation of 
Dupin in “The Murders of the Rue Morgue.” The first person narration that Quinn uses is reflective 
of modernist detection, and thus the reader associates directly with Quinn throughout the novel (or 
at least until the very end, in which we are left to connect with the character of Paul Auster).  
Quinn also takes some comfort in the liberty of not being himself, having assumed the 
identity of the detective Paul Auster. “The effect of being Paul Auster, he had begun to learn, was 
not altogether unpleasant. Although he still had the same body, the same mind, the same thoughts, 
he felt as though he had somehow been taken out of himself, as if he no longer had to walk around 
with the burden of his own consciousness” (Auster 62). He even goes so far as to act as he thought 
the protagonist of his own novels, Max Work, would act in the situations in which he finds himself. 
In that way, as readers we expect Quinn to behave like a “true detective,” like someone who 
conforms closely to the generic conventions that we have come to expect in either the classical or 
modernist forms discussed above. This already represents a departure from Chandler, however, in 
that the expectations, and models, are literary and not, as Chandler aimed, in a realist vein. 
 The story starts conventionally, with an assignment, again reinforcing the detective fiction 
motif. The assignment that Quinn takes is to follow a man named Stillman, who was in jail and was 
supposed to be a danger to his son, Peter, and Peter’s wife Virginia. Quinn, armed with a photo of 
Stillman, goes to find him at the train station, where he is due to arrive, and plans to follow him 
from there. Yet, even as this early stage in the story, there is a fundamental break from the 
traditional detective fiction convention, as there emerges from the train car two gentlemen who 
appear to be Stillman (based upon the old photograph), one wearing a suit, and the other less well-
dressed. Quinn here is forced to choose whom to follow, with no further information, and no way to 
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know which choice is accurate, now or potentially in the future. “There is nothing that he could do 
now that would not be a mistake. Whatever choice he made – and he had to make a choice – would 
be arbitrary, a submission to chance. Uncertainty would haunt him to the end” (Auster 68). There 
remains no outside person to whom he could turn for verification of his choice, as no other 
character presented in the novel has any knowledge of Stillman’s current appearance. Thus, from 
this point to the end of the story, there are multiple paths Quinn could follow, with no seeming way 
to determine which is the ‘true’ path, or the correct person to follow. Structurally, Quinn finds 
himself in a very different pattern than Dupin or Chandler, a rhizomatic pattern in which the idea of 
a solution has been systematically ruled out. 
 Quinn opts to follow one of the Stillmans, and proceeds to collect ‘clues,’ making careful 
notations as where ‘Stillman’ walks, where he went, what he did, and every interesting detail he 
could observe. It resembles a standard stakeout from a police procedural, but with only one man. 
However, “little by little, Quinn began to feel cut off from his original intentions, and he wondered 
now if he had not embarked on a meaningless project” (Auster 73). This doubt, sowed into the story 
from the beginning, makes the reader, along with Quinn, suspect the efficacy of the entire project. 
As the reader associates with Quinn, this doubt is also carried over to the reader as well, forcing a 
consideration of this uncertainty. Quinn, as recompense, tries to constitute order out of the 
seemingly random movements of Stillman, attempting to discover if Peter and Virginia were in 
some level of danger. He argues, with himself that Stillman must know that he was being watched, 
and thus was able to ascribe meaning to his actions.  
This view of the situation comforted Quinn, and he decided to believe in it, even though he 
had no grounds for belief. Either Stillman knew what he was doing or he didn’t. And if he 
didn’t, then Quinn was going nowhere, was wasting his time. How much better it was to 
believe that all his steps were actually to some purpose. If this interpretation required 
knowledge on Stillman’s part, then Quinn would accept this knowledge as an article of faith 
(Auster 74). 
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 The urge to make some sense out of the random movements of Stillman, to create a structure 
to the seemingly random actions, is an overwhelming driving force for Quinn. It simply seems 
impossible to him that the actions could have no ulterior motive, despite his uncertainty of both 
Stillman’s identity and his knowledge of being followed (which could ascribe meaning to his 
actions). “He was ransacking the chaos of Stillman’s movements for some glimmer of cogency” 
(Auster 83). However, despite his intense desire to make sense out of the actions, this seemed to 
contradict the actions themselves. “This implied only one thing: that he continued to disbelieve the 
arbitrariness of Stillman’s actions. He wanted there to be a sense to them, no matter how obscure. 
This, in itself, was unacceptable. For it meant that Quinn was allowing himself to deny the facts, 
and this, as he well knew, was the worst thing a detective could do” (Auster 83). Quinn comes to 
the realization, even if he chooses not to accept it, that his task is structurally impossible.
51
  
 Later, Quinn attempts to view Stillman’s actions from a bird’s eye view, a seemingly outside 
perspective, or tower view, by which it may be possible to understand a greater purpose to 
Stillman’s movements, and the path of his daily excursions away from home. Quinn, using his 
detailed notes, traces the path of Stillman’s steps around New York City. The various paths taken, 
when drawn out in Quinn’s red notebook, form a series of letters that Quinn concludes spells out 
The Tower of Babel. Yet even this take on Stillman’s movements, which then seemingly had some 
sort of meaning, could be brought into doubt as the traces that Stillman followed did not truly exist 
anywhere in the world:  
For Stillman had not left his message anywhere. True, he had created the letters by the 
movement of his steps, but they had not been written down. It was like drawing a picture in 
the air with your finger. The image vanishes as you are making it. There is no result, no 
trace to mark what you have done. And yet, the pictures did exist – not in the streets where 
they have been drawn, but in Quinn’s red notebook (Auster 86) 
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 I will discuss later whether the failure of epistemology leads inevitably to ontological questions, and whether, as 
McHale and Ewert argue, this means that these stories are truly ontological rather than epistemological in nature.  
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The existence of the letters had possible implications for Quinn’s case. It could symbolize a 
continued fascination, for Stillman, with the Tower of Babel, a factor in his originally harming his 
son. However, the very presence of the letters in Quinn’s notebook could be nothing more than 
Quinn’s own imagination, and the letters could have no meaning whatsoever. It is possible that “the 
letters were not letters at all. He had seen them only because he had wanted to see them. And even 
if the diagrams did form letters, it was only a fluke” (Auster 86). There is, essentially no way to 
know for sure what Stillman is thinking or if he knows about Quinn, or any potential watcher, at all. 
Quinn’s attempt to get “outside” of the situation is futile. The bird’s eye perspective he craves to 
verify his assumptions is unattainable in the novel, and a consequence of the structural pattern.  
 It is also necessary to note that the tracing does not contain the entire picture. As Deleuze 
argues, “What the tracing reproduces of the map or rhizome are only the impasses, blockages, 
incipient taproots, or points of structuration” (Deleuze 13). He argues that the “tracing should 
always be put back on the map” (13), which is the rhizome. Thus Quinn’s pattern is something to 
which he is ascribing knowledge only if taken out of context. The context in which he continues to 
operate is that of a complete lack of knowledge as to the motivations, drives, and even the identity 
of Stillman. This makes Quinn’s project more in line with that of a natural scientist than a detective. 
As Žižek notes: “it is true that the ‘objective’ scientist also ‘penetrates through false appearance into 
the hidden reality,’ but this false appearance with which he has to deal lacks the dimension of 
deception” (Žižek 56). This level of deception is inherent in the detective’s project, that which gives 
meaning to seemingly meaningless objects and connections. Yet, here, Quinn has no basis by which 
to assign any meaning to Stillman’s actions, as he no basis to speculate that Stillman is aware of 
Quinn’s presence.  
Finally, at the end of the story, in a situation vastly different from the previous novels, we 
have no solution to the crime, and in fact no evidence of a crime at all. There remains no evidence 
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that Stillman was at all dangerous, simply mentally disturbed (he commits suicide), which Quinn 
learns from a conversation with Paul Auster, who, it turns out, was not a detective but simply a 
writer like himself. His employers, Peter and Virginia, simply disappear, as does Quinn after a 
seeming mental breakdown of his own. There are no answers presented in the story, no real 
conclusion, and even the red notebook, the basis of all of the ‘facts’ of the story, only provides a 
partial answer to the story itself, even if “this story is based entirely on facts, [as] the author feels it 
is his duty not to overstep the bounds of the verifiable, [and] to resist at all costs the perils of 
invention” (Auster 135). Thus, Auster presents us with a detective novel which seemingly alters 
fundamental conventions of the genre. There is, essentially, no crime and no solution. However, as 
audience we are compelled to follow the action, and to try, along with our play-acting writer, to 
solve the various problems with which he is presented, despite the doubts sown into us throughout. 
There is little doubt that this is a detective story, as it uses many of the generic conventions. What 
Auster presents is a narrative, even a narrative in a linear form, which reconstructs a story with a 
vastly different “solution” to the classical and modernist versions of the genre. Essentially, the story 
being reconstructed is the story of the uncertainty of the solution and the uncertainty of knowledge 
itself. At the end, we are left with the impossibility of knowing any of the information, and what is 
being reinforced in the reader, who follows along with Quinn in the same way one follows 
Marlowe, is a world in which there is no epistemological certainty, a world without absolute truth. 
The very act of detection, the structure of the epistemological investigation, leads us to that 
conclusion, which is the basis of the postmodern condition, and this thus reflects the postmodern 
structure of consciousness. 
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The Crying of Lot 49 
The Crying of Lot 49, a 1965 novel by Thomas Pynchon, also uses the detective story generic 
conventions in the same way. Edward Mendelson argues that “criticism has devoted much energy to 
finding detective-story patterns in fiction, and The Crying of Lot 49, with its heroine named after the 
first detective of them all, lends itself admirably to this method” (Mendelson 123). The story 
presents the figure of Oedipa Maas (whose name reflects the ‘first detective,’ referring to 
Sophocles’ Oedipus) as she is named executrix of the will of her recently deceased ex-lover Pierce 
Inverarity, a real estate tycoon (Pynchon 1). Oedipa has the task of learning about his estate, 
reconstituting his business, however, “as things developed, she was to have all manner of 
revelations. Hardly about Pierce Inverarity, or herself; but about what remained yet had somehow, 
before this, stayed away” (Pynchon 10).  
Oedipa, in her effort ostensibly to discover the estate of Inverarity, stumbles upon an ever-
enlarging conspiracy involving underground mail systems, government takeovers, the Mafia, dead 
soldiers in World War II, and a four-hundred-year-old murder plot. She attempts to learn about 
these diverse aspects in a number of ways, using both deduction and induction. Upon reflection, she 
describes her initial attempts as “so like the private eye in any long-ago radio drama, believing all 
you needed was grit, resourcefulness, exemption from hidebound cops’ rules, to solve any great 
mystery” (Pynchon 100). In the same Southern California as Marlowe, in some unidentifiable 
suburb known as San Narciso, Oedipa begins her task much as Raymond Chandler would have, 
following a various set of clues through the streets and difficult underground. The clues themselves 
proliferate to a seemingly unmanageable number, which makes the trial and error, legwork method 
of modernist detection untenable. Later, after the suggestion that everything she has ‘learned’ is a 
hoax, it is proposed that she try a more deductive method, attempting to discern fact from 
supposition. “Really, you ought to think about it. Write down what you can’t deny. Your hard 
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intelligence. But then write down what you’ve only speculated, assumed. See what you’ve got’ 
(Pynchon 138). Neither of those methods seems to work for her. Interestingly, she first uses the 
inductive method and then switches to the deductive method in the opposite manner to that of 
Quinn in Auster’s novel. Yet, for both “detectives” neither method is effective.  
Tony Tanner argues that “the model for the story would seem to be the Californian detective 
story – an established tradition including the works of writers such as Raymond Chandler, Ross 
MacDonald and Eric Stanley Gardner [sic]. But in fact it works in a reverse direction” (Tanner 
56).
52
 Instead of coming to a resolution, a solution to the mystery (or mysteries) that Oedipa is 
presented with (the existence of Tristero seeming to be the main concern), she is presented with an 
abundance of evidence and no way to distinguish between the various possibilities. “There was 
nobody who could help her. Nobody in the world. They were all on something, mad, possible 
enemies, dead” (Pynchon 141). Each of the potential paths are systematically blocked off, either by 
madness (Mucho, Dr. Hilarious), death (Pierce, Driblette), disappearance (Metzger, Zapf’s Book 
Shop, The Anonymous Innamorato), or seeded with doubt (by Bortz, Fallopian). Johnston claims  
Her quest will culminate in four symmetrical possibilities: either she has indeed stumbled 
onto a secret organization having objective, historical existence by which a number of 
America’s alienated and disenfranchised are communicating; or she is hallucinating it by 
projecting a pattern onto various signs only randomly associated; or she is the victim of a 
hoax set up by Inverarity, possibly as a means of perpetuating himself beyond death; or she 
is hallucinating such a hoax, in a semiosis of the second possibility (Johnston 51). 
 
While she only needs to determine which one contains the truth, the problem emerges that there is 
no means by which to determine this, no evidence (or potential evidence) that could provide her 
with such illumination. “What the detective in this story discovers is a way of thinking which 
renders detection irrelevant” (Mendelson 124). While Mendelson argues that detection becomes 
irrelevant here, I argue it is not the process of detection, but the typical conclusions which are no 
longer possible. Oedipa’s detective processes have led to the conclusion of epistemological 
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 The reference to Eric Stanley Gardner seems to be to the author of the Perry Mason series, Erle Stanley Gardner, who 
hails, like Chandler, from Southern California.  
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uncertainty, a conclusion she realizes halfway through the story: “Oedipa wondered whether, at the 
end of this (if it were supposed to end), she too might not be left with only compiled memories of 
clues, announcements, intimations, but never the central truth itself” (Pynchon 76). This parallels 
the doubts expressed by Quinn in Auster’s text.  
 The pattern that Oedipa describes has also been intriguing for critics. Pynchon himself is an 
elusive character, and much has been made of the attempt to find out who he is.
53
 This quest has 
been paralleled to the quests made by the protagonists in and the readers of Pynchon’s works. John 
Dugdale argues that “The novels presuppose the possibility of a detective-reader, active, 
interpretative, alert, reading them as Stencil and Oedipa read their texts” (Dugdale 14) and goes on 
to identify the elements of methods that Oedipa uses that parallel the reader/critic/scholar’s 
experience “where Oedipa’s options in relation to Pierce’s text, the will, correspond to the reader’s 
options in relation to Pynchon’s text, the novel” (Dugdale 15). Thus, just as with the classical and 
modernist detective fiction discussed earlier, the reader is meant to be drawn into the pursuit just as 
Oedipa is. In this way, the narration more closely resembles the hard-boiled pattern of detective 
fiction, in that the reader assumes the same position as Oedipa throughout the text, despite the text 
not being written from a first person perspective. Furthermore, the audience is not given any more 
information than Oedipa and is not afforded any more objective or outside perspective by which to 
judge either her quest or evidence and come to a more certain, better, or more convincing 
conclusion. 
 Because the narrator refuses the reader any view superior to Oedipa’s, many readers will 
assume that Oedipa internalizes to a certain extent their own roles as readers. Thus her quest 
to uncover the reality and meaning of the Tristero dramatizes the reader’s attempt to 
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 Articles such as that of Matthew Winston in Mindful Pleasures, seek to do this. One could argue that Pynchon does 
his best to force critics to read his texts the way Barthes proposes in “The Death of the Author.” “Once the Author is 
removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to 
furnish it with a final signified …. In the multiplicity of writing, everthing is to be disentangled, nothing deciphered; the 
structure can be followed, ‘run’ (like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing 
beneath” (Barthes XXX). 
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decipher and make sense of the various signs that proliferate through the novel. (Johnston 
52). 
 
The reader is then left with the same doubt and uncertainty as Oedipa.  
 As McHale points out, this epistemological dilemma parallels the ending of The Turn of the 
Screw by Henry James. In that story, the reader is also left without the possibility of determining 
whether the tale is true. He states, however, that there is a crucial difference, precisely in the 
positioning of the reader vis-à-vis the narrator. “The difference between The Turn of the Screw and 
Lot 49 – and it is a crucial difference – is, of course, that James’ governess is herself unaware of the 
alternatives, believing in the ‘ghostly’ explanation from the outset; the teetering between 
alternatives goes on ‘above her head,’ a problem for students of literature but not for her” (McHale 
24). Yet, while McHale claims that this text is (late) modernist, and that Oedipa “is an exemplary 
late-modernist heroine” (McHale 24) due to the concentration on epistemological issues in Lot 49, 
he hits on the very distinction between the modernist structure and postmodernist structure that I 
identify in these texts. While James’ tale ends with the answer undiscovered, whether the governess 
is hallucinating or truly seeing ghosts, the tale presupposes that there is an answer, with the 
academic debate concentrating on determining which of the two possibilities is presented in the 
text. In Pynchon’s text, with Oedipa also uncertain as to the possibility of an answer, the reader is 
placed in a different position. Using detective fiction tropes, the reader identifies more closely with 
the protagonist and thus assumes her positioning in relation to the Tristero mystery. Rather than 
having the position of outside “objective” observer as the reader is positioned in James’ tale with 
the role of determining the reliability of the governess’ narrative, in Lot 49 the reader follows 
Oedipa closely and thus becomes embroiled in the insolvability of the dilemma itself. It is this 
positioning, as well as Oedipa’s own lack of conviction, which makes the difference. McHale points 
out that Oedipa was “once a student of literature herself,” so “she understands the ambiguity of her 
situation as clearly as her readers do” (McHale 24) which makes this story have a different degree 
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of epistemological uncertainty than The Turn of the Screw (or other above mentioned tales in which 
there is both an unreliable narrator and an unsolved case). In Lot 49, the structure of the story itself 
insists upon this uncertainty, which makes it a postmodern text.  
In reaction to this ambiguity, Oedipa, however, chooses to follow a different path than 
Quinn, who is confronted with similar uncertainty in his detective role. Where Quinn disintegrates, 
ultimately disappearing from the pages of Auster’s novel, Oedipa takes a wait and see attitude, even 
while admitting the possibility that there is not anything to wait for. She is, seemingly, unwilling to 
follow Quinn’s lead, even if that is what she admits would happen if she finally accepted such a 
level of uncertainty.  
For there either was some Tristero beyond the appearance of the legacy America, or there 
was just America and if there was just America then it seemed the only way she could 
continue, and manage to be at all relevant to it, was as an alien, unfurrowed, assumed full 
circle into some paranoia. (Pynchon 151) 
 
Instead, Oedipa, without any reason to have faith in the process or the revelation of any knowledge 
that could establish the truth between the two possible Americas, simply chooses to wait for that 
next piece of evidence. “Oedipa sat alone, toward the back of the room, looking at the napes of 
necks, trying to guess which one was her target, her enemy, her proof” (Pynchon 152).  
 
Memento 
That constant search for evidence, without apparent hope, is also poignant for  
Leonard Shelby in Christopher Nolan’s 2000 film, Memento, a film which is loosely based on the 
short story, “Memento Mori,” by Jonathan Nolan which was published in Esquire in 2001. This 
film, which is based around Leonard’s search for his late wife’s rapist and murderer, allows us a 
unique perspective on detective fiction. The film is presented in a series of sequences in reverse 
chronological order, which “move backward through time so the first plot event we see is the final 
story event, the second plot event is the next-to-last story event, and so on” (Bordwell 85). In 
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addition, Leonard, the main character, has short-term amnesia. Thus, while he maintains knowledge 
of his own identity and any knowledge and abilities acquired from before his injury, he is unable to 
make new memories. As a former insurance investigator, he is methodical and organized and 
proceeds to track his wife’s killer, a John G., through detailed police work (he has even acquired a 
partial version of the police file), and records his deductions, assumptions, and conclusions on a 
series of notes, Polaroids, maps, and tattoos, which allow him to regain the knowledge after each 
subsequent period of forgetfulness. In this way, although an amateur (like Quinn and Oedipa) 
Leonard demonstrably uses police procedures and logic in attempting to solve the murder.  
In addition to the puzzle presented to Leonard (that of solving the murder), there is a further 
puzzle presented to the audience. Caroline Bainbridge suggests that our, as audience, puzzle is more 
complicated and endures beyond the timeframe of the film. “There are a number of fleeting shots 
and clues embedded in each of these narrative strands to sustain our sense of puzzlement through to 
and beyond the end of the film” (Bainbridge 47). Our puzzle is not wrapped up neatly at the end of 
the film, like an episode of BBC’s Sherlock, but stays with the audience longer, as they consider the 
implications of what they have seen. Furthermore, the audience is not simply identified with the 
position of Leonard but also placed in a position to judge Leonard’s actions and assumptions. In this 
way he is not exactly parallel to the hard-boiled detective or those amateur detectives in Auster or 
Pynchon, even if the audience does identify more with Leonard than with any other character in the 
film. This is true even if, “the character here seems generic, fulfilling a role familiar to us from film 
noir as the disaffected flawed (male) hero struggling to assert justice in some shape or form in a 
muddled and confusing world that seems to thwart all his efforts” (Bainbridge 48). Thus, despite the 
parallels between Leonard and the traditional film noir or hard-boiled detective, the role of the 
audience is slightly altered, allowing a different perspective to be considered.  
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This is true of the way the film is presented as well. The series of sequences, in their 
reversed order, allows us to see the assumptions and information that Leonard later accepts as the 
facts upon which he makes his conclusions and decisions. We also encounter a series of individuals 
who, to varying degrees, have taken advantage of Leonard’s condition by providing him with false 
information. Each of those individuals have, in different ways, altered the information on which 
Leonard has based his facts, bringing all of his recorded notes, polaroids, and ‘facts’ into question. 
Thus, the audience is provided with more doubt about Leonard’s conclusions than he is initially 
presented as having. There is a difference here to Oedipa and Quinn as their doubt and the reader’s 
doubt coincided. Leonard’s doubt throughout the film such that at the end he obtains the same 
perspective as the other postmodern detectives we have considered.  
In addition to the recorded facts, Leonard’s memory is also brought into doubt. Although 
unable to create new memories, Leonard maintains recollections from before being knocked 
unconscious intervening in the rape and murder of his wife. Yet, that memory is also constantly 
brought into question throughout the story. In conversation with Teddy who first suggests that 
Leonard’s notes could be unreliable (Teddy knows that some of the information is false, in any 
case), Leonard himself responds that common police procedure relies more heavily on notes than on 
memories: “Memory is unreliable” (Memento 22:09). This makes the entire story, as told by 
Leonard, unreliable, even as he convinces himself of its veracity. “Leonard is revealed at the end of 
the film as the most unreliable of unreliable narrators. Our dawning realisation of his skewed 
psychological world permits the logic of truth that is perceived in the narrative to become riddled 
with holes and gaps” (Bainbridge 49).  
As we get to the end of the film (or the beginning of the fabula), we come to realize that 
Leonard’s entire investigation has been manipulated (although we don’t know by whom). Teddy 
can provide no more outside evidence (other than his own narrative) than a bloodied Polaroid of 
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Leonard shirtless and happy. The context of the photo is entirely missing, it has no note (which 
have proved unreliable before), and, even provided that it was at the site of a murder by Leonard, 
offers no evidence of who the victim was. Each character has a narrative they can offer, but there is 
no reliable evidence to back up anyone’s story, which is revealed through the reverse nature of the 
presentation as well as the investigative methods Leonard uses and is highlighted throughout the 
film.  
Leonard, faced with the inevitability that he cannot know the truth, decides at that point to 
reconstitute his investigation, giving himself a target. It was suggested earlier in the film that 
Leonard himself might be manipulating himself to keep himself searching by having removed the 
pages of the police file, which would create an unsolvable puzzle. “As spectators, we are plunged at 
the end into a realisation that our identifications have been premised on this lack and that it is the 
structure of the narrative that has made this possible” (Bainbridge 50). While Bainbridge wants to 
argue that this is an example of the film ‘duping’ the audience, purposefully playing with their 
sensibilities to thwart the typical ‘cinematic pleasure,’ I argue that this is the structure of the film 
demonstrating the absence of the possibility of “a sense of mastery over the narrative truth” (50) 
that she believes can be obtained through subsequent viewings and analysis of the film. Absent 
narrative closure presented in the film, multiple readings are presented as valid, and there is little 
information – none presented as reliable – that even points to a particular solution. Furthermore, at 
the end of the film, we see that Leonard has accepted this lack of a determinant narrative. He 
purposefully changes things by acquiring a new car, which he then makes ‘his’ by taking a Polaroid 
and writing it as such, which in turn allows him to assume it as a fact at his next “awakening.” This 
sets in motion an investigation designed to lead to Teddy, whose death at Leonard’s hand we 
witness at the beginning of the film, asserting a type of truth, and mastery over his own narrative. 
This, however, is done at the expense of any sense of absolute truth. In fact, it is done as a sort of 
 127 
acceptance of the lack of that possibility, a reassertion of truth in a world in which truth does not 
have any grounding.  
The end of the film provides an equally muddy picture to that we have at the start. The 
search for John G. is either, if we believe Teddy, already solved, was solved with the killing of 
either Jimmy or Teddy, or remains unsolved. There is no evidence to suggest any one of those 
scenarios is more likely than another. Rather the only certainty provided is of the death of Teddy, 
who is shot through the head, and the identity of his killer. Everything else in the story is either 
memory or narrative, or based upon facts and deductions based on memory or narrative. Leonard’s 
investigation, regardless of his process being deductive or inductive (and he alternates in his 
assumptions and conclusions), cannot possibly reach a true conclusion. He may come to an answer 
(which will work for him at the time), but there is no way to know if it is ‘the’ answer, a ‘correct’ 
answer. This possibility is removed by the unreliability of the evidence, narration, and characters, as 
well as by the faulty memory of Leonard himself (do we even know if his wife was raped and 
murdered, as we only have his memory and tattoos to support this?). The structure of the story itself 
rules out the type of solution Leonard is seeking. 
 
The Late Modernist Detective Fiction: Modernist with a Twist 
 
I have presented a series of postmodern detective stories, but there are a number of other texts 
which are often identified as part of the “postmodern canon.” Stefano Tani, for example, identifies 
eight texts as postmodern texts (in three categories). Stephen Knight, in Crime Fiction since 1800 
identifies Borges, Eco and Pynchon as early postmodernists (230). My division would call for a 
different line, in which one of texts, Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 I have discussed above as 
postmodern, but at least two (Calvino’s Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore and Eco’s Il nome 
della rosa) I would not classify as such, based on the underlying structure of consciousness present 
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in the novels. Through a discussion of their investigative structure, I will identify such novels as 
conforming more closely to modernist detective stories. These texts, however, are specifically 
interesting because they function in a fundamentally modernist structure while they posit the 
postmodern epistemological investigation, either theoretically or through allusion. Thus, rather than 
classifying them as postmodern, as has often been done in the past, by authors such as Knight, 
McHale and Tani, I argue that they are late modern texts, which provide further insight into 
postmodernism.
54
 Such texts include Borges’ “Death and the Compass,” Robbe-Grillet’s Dans le 
labyrinthe, Calvino’s Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore …, Eco’s Il nome della rosa, and Peter 
Høeg’s Frøken Smillas fornemmelse for sne. Due to limits of time and space, this concept will be 
explored here first with Jorge Luis Borges’ “Death and the Compass” and then followed by an 
exploration of Umberto Eco’s Il nome della rosa.  
Borges’ short story is not presented as a detective story as such, but still uses the detective 
story conventions, as it is a story about a detective story. The text presents a third person account, 
from a removed perspective, of the story of the death of Erik Lönnrot, a detective. Lönnrot is set up 
as a detective in the tradition of Dupin, an analytical reasoner with a reputation for solving difficult 
crimes. “Lönnrot se creía un puro razonador, un Auguste Dupin” (Borges, Ficciones 155) [“Lönnrot 
believed himself a pure reasoner, an Auguste Dupin” (Borges, Labyrinths 76)]. The perspective of 
the story presents us the facts of the case after they have occurred which puts us almost in the 
position of Dupin himself as we try to discern what happens while following the progression of Erik 
Lönnrot. This changes the reader/narrator dynamic, making the reader take on the role of detective 
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 Tani’s distinction lies in considering Eco’s novel as an ‘innovative anti-detective novel’ primarily because “its author 
is self-consciously aware of his place in the postmodern trend” (Tani 74). However, Tani admits that Eco’s answer 
presents a solution to the detective plot, and classifies it as ‘anti-detective’ because it is literary, in that “once read, [it] 
is not yet consumed, forgotten as is the conventional detective novel” (Tani 74). Knight argues that the texts of Borges 
and Eco “showed how crime fiction can, by being less determinate in its puzzles and less simply resolved in its 
processes and outcomes, become a medium to question certainties about the self, the mind and the ambient world” 
(Knight 205). Using some definitions of postmodernism, Knight’s classification makes sense, but it does not conform to 
my distinctions in terms of structure of consciousness, as any resolution in process or outcome would demonstrate the 
modernist pattern that I contend best represents both Eco and Borges’ texts, and thus these are fundamentally (late) 
modernist examples.  
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more directly than in classical or modernist detection, when that task is an identification with 
characters in the story. Here the reader is given that role more directly.  
Three murders take place on the third (or fourth) day of subsequent months. After the arrival 
of a crucial piece of evidence, a map demonstrating the locations of the three murders, Lönnrot 
seems assured of having solved the crime, having deducted the true nature of the pattern. He gives 
his assurances to his colleague with the following exchange: 
“Gracias por ese triángolo equilátero que usted anoche me mandó. Me ha permitido resolver 
el problema. Mañana viernes los criminales estarán en la cárcel; podemos estar muy 
tranquilos.  
“Entonces ¿no planean un cuarto crimen? 
“Precisamente porque planean un cuarto crimen, podemos estar muy tranquilos.”  
(Borges, Ficciones 164) 
 
[“Thank you for the equilateral triangle you sent me last night. It has enabled me to solve the 
problem. This Friday the criminals will be in jail, we may rest assured.” 
“Then they are not planning a fourth murder?” 
“Precisely because they are planning a fourth murder we can rest assured” (Borges, 
Labyrinths 82)]. 
 
This exchange provides a crucial insight into the story. In sending on the map, Treviranus, 
Lönnrot’s colleague, was confident that the sequence of murders would end at three, as they were 
plotted as an equilateral triangle on the map and indicating that each murder occurred on the third 
day of the preceding three months. Lönnrot, rather, based on further evidence he believed he had 
understood related to the Kabbalah, had deduced that there would be a fourth murder, and that the 
pattern was truly a rhomboid, and that the preceding three murders in fact were found on the fourth 
day (morning) of each month. Both detectives, with their varied collection of evidence, used a 
deductive method, the classical method of detection, to ‘solve’ the crime.  
Misreadings of the evidence, by less able detectives, are not unfamiliar, such as in the case 
of the Rue Morgue. Here, however, the evidence is less clear than either detective believes. Further 
revelations of the story, specifically the ending in the conversation between the villain, Red 
Scharlach, and Lönnrot, immediately before the detective’s demise, lead us to understand that there 
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were, in fact, multiple interpretations of the evidence.
55
 Thus, the detective’s progression could take 
multiple paths, even if there was ultimately only one true conclusion, which follows the pattern of 
modernist detection. This is demonstrable in the discussion of whether there are truly three or four 
crimes being committed. Treviranus is confident, based on faulty evidence provided by the 
murderer himself, that there are three crimes.
56
 This is despite his original reservations about the 
validity of the third murder, when he speculates, “¿Y si la historia de esta noche fuera simulacro?” 
(Borges, Ficciones, 163) [“And what if all this business tonight were just a mock rehearsal?” 
(Borges, Labyrinths, 81)]. Lönnrot, convinced of that crime’s validity and that there will be four 
crimes, thus proceeds to the proposed location of the fourth crime, leading to his demise on that 
very spot, as he is the proposed victim. In actuality we learn that the “third” crime, the 
disappearance and apparent murder of Gryphius-Ginzberg-Ginsberg, does not take place at all. “El 
tercer ‘crimen’ se produjo el 3 de febrero. Fue, como Treviranus adivinó, un mero simulacro. 
Gryphius-Ginzberg-Ginsberg soy yo” (Borges, Ficciones, 169) [“The third murder was produced on 
the third of February. It was, as Treviranus guessed, a mere sham. I am Gryphius-Ginzberg-
Ginsberg” (Borges, Labyrinths, 86)]. Thus, despite their different conclusions – Treviranus that 
there were to be three crimes while having doubt about the third (sham) murder, and Lönnrot being 
convinced that there would be four crimes and that the third did indeed occur – both have a theory 
that would propose to solve the crime. Lönnrot, based upon his rhomboid theory, goes to the very 
spot where the third crime is to occur. Treviranus, despite being thrown off by Scharlach’s map, is 
indeed correct that there will be three crimes, and they do follow the equilateral triangle pattern, 
even if the points that are valid are different than those given. In either case, there remains a single 
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 These characters are also linguistically linked, as John Irwin notes, with Lönnrot containing an element of the 
German term for red (rot), and a Swedish prefix which indicates hidden. Thus Lönnrot is the “hidden red,” while Red 
Scharlach is “doubly red,” as his name translates to scarlet red. Scharlach can also be interpreted as an allusion to 
Sherlock, thus making them both detective like (or at least analytically minded) (Irwin 30). 
56
 Note also that Treviranus is linguistically linked to the concept of three, with his name containing the term “tre,” 
close to the Spanish number three, while “viranus” could be considered as a derivative of “veritas,” thus making him 
something akin to “three is the truth,” or could be connected to the latin root ‘vir’ meaning man, making Treviranus 
‘three man.’  
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conclusion: Lönnrot is murdered by Scharlach. There was a solution to the puzzle, yet we, as reader, 
are as misled by both detectives.  
The story is complicated, however, by this final subversion of the conclusion. While there 
are conflicting interpretations of the evidence, leading both investigators to reach a conclusion, 
neither is able to solve the crime. Despite the fact that Lönnrot arrives at the ‘correct’ destination for 
the final enactment of the crime, he fails to discover the true nature of the plot, the identity of the 
murderer, or discover the victim of the final act. Thus, the epistemological quest that the detectives 
embark on at the beginning is wholly ineffectual, and leads only to the demise of the detective, 
despite his careful observations and reasoning skills. In fact, it is the following of those procedures 
that ultimately leads to his demise. This presents us with two problems related to the 
epistemological structure. Firstly, in the course of the story, the investigations of the detectives lead 
them to two different conclusions, which seem to them inevitable based upon the evidence, but 
which are wholly wrong. This leads to the notion that close observation of the evidence is not 
sufficient to reach an accurate conclusion, and thus brings into question, although not overtly, the 
validity of the classical structure itself. Secondly, from the perspective of the reader, we are 
affirmed of the notion that there is, in fact, a solution to the dilemma that we have been following. 
We are afforded the perspective to identify the murderer correctly, and understand the plot, and thus 
our notion of the classical structure is reaffirmed, despite the inability of the detectives to arrive at 
that understanding, at least until it is too late. In the end, the notion of an absolute truth is reaffirmed 
here with an acknowledgement that there in fact exists a position from which knowledge is 
sufficient to solve the crime or understand the situation, despite the detective’s inability to arrive at 
that position. This changes the dynamic between the author, reader, and detective and which 
principles are reinforced, yet, what remains unchanged is the epistemological structure of the story. 
The reader becomes the only one capable of reconstructing the events accurately, taking away the 
 132 
authority previously embodied in the figure of the detective, and by extension society. This 
certainly changes the political implications of this form of literature in consciously not reinforcing 
the idea that ‘society’ will always enforce its moral codes (set down in a series of laws and 
protected by the police force (police procedural, forensic) or government (spy novel), as is generally 
the case in modernist detective fiction. Here the implication is more democratic, for although the 
authorities are bested the notion that there is an answer, and that with careful observation and even 
the benefit of seeing others fail, you, the reader, can understand the solution. Thus the solution is, 
ultimately, available to everyman.  
Umberto Eco, in his novel Il nome della rosa, presents a similar structure. His novel 
commences with the arrival of the character of William of Baskerville, a medieval detective of 
sorts. An anecdote, similar to that of the Dupin and the fruiterer in Poe’s first story, establishes 
William as an excellent observer of information and human behavior, establishing him as a classical 
detective. Upon arrival at the abbey, he is presented with a single crime, the apparent murder of a 
monk, Adelmo, who has been found at the base of the library tower.  
The idea of a classical detective progression, however, is quickly subverted in William’s 
conception of the first murder. After several conversations he comes to the conclusion that there 
was no murder after all. “Delitto? Più ci penso e più mi convinco che Adelmo si è ucciso.” (Eco, 
Nome, 98) [“Crime. The more I think about it, the more I am convinced that Adelmo killed himself” 
(Eco, Name, 102)]. William does not explain this suspicion as based upon a logical deduction 
derived from all known evidence, with the surety that he identified the horse Brunellus in the 
opening scene, but rather as an appeal to Occam’s razor, the philosophical concept (from the 
historical era in which the novel is set), by which the simplest of two or more possibilities is 
deemed the correct one. He explains this with reference to the case of Adelmo. 
“Non occorre moltiplicare le spiegazioni e le cause senza che se ne abbia una stretta 
necessità. Se Adelmo è caduto dal torrione orientale bisogna che sia penetrato in biblioteca, 
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che qualcuno lo abbia colpito prima perché non opponesse resistenza, che abbia trovato il 
modo di salire con un corpo esanime sulle spalle sino alla finestra, che l’abbia aperta e abbia 
precipitato giù lo sciagurato. Con la mia ipotesi ci bastano invece Adelmo, la sua voluntà, e 
una frana. Tutto si spiega utilizzando un minor numero di cause” (Eco, Nome, 99) 
 
[“one should not multiply explanations and causes unless it is strictly necessary. If Adelmo 
fell from the east tower, he must have got into the library, someone must have first struck 
him so he would offer no resistance, and then this person must have found a way of 
climbing up to the window with a lifeless body on his back, opening it, and pitching the 
hapless monk down. But with my hypothesis we need only Adelmo, his decision, and a shift 
of some land. Everything is explained, using a smaller number of causes” (Eco, Name 103).] 
 
Faced with resistance to the gathering of evidence, and presented with two distinct, and plausible, 
possibilities, this presumably classical type detective admits already that there could be more than 
one possible solution. In this, with the more simple deductive model hindered, William switches to 
a more inductive model of investigation, in which he poses a hypothesis (here the more rational of 
the two, by virtue of Occam’s razor) and tries to discover whether his theory holds when faced with 
further evidence. This parallels the Auster and Pynchon texts, in which they switch methodology in 
order to continue their investigation.  
 The investigation is complicated by a series of subsequent, apparently related murders, 
which divert the inquiry from that of the death of a single monk, to the solving of a series of 
murders. The inquest follows, like Marlowe in The Big Sleep, shifting explanations in the face of 
each subsequent body, even as all seem to lead William into the labyrinth of the library itself. The 
conclusion, however, follows the path of Borges’ short story, in that William of Baskerville, 
although arriving in the correct location at the end, ultimately fails to understand the workings of 
the case at all.  
 At the end, the ultimate cause of the series of murders is Jorge de Burgos, the blind librarian 
of the abbey, whose physical characteristics can be taken as a reference to Borges. Borges, a great 
literary influence on Eco, was also blind and once served as the director of the Argentinean 
National Library. Borges’s short story, “La biblioteca de Babel,” serves as an obvious model for the 
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library at the abbey. Burgos, like Red Scharlach, counts on the astuteness of his detective adversary 
to find and arrive at the ultimate location. “Sin dal primo giorno ho capito che tu avresti capito. … 
Eri meglio degli altri, ci saresti giunto comunque. Sai, basta pensare e ricostituire nella propria 
mente i pensieri dell’altro.” (Eco, Nome, 469) [“From the first day I realized you would understand. 
… You were better than the others: you would have arrived at the solution no matter what. You 
know that it suffices to think and to reconstruct in one’s mind the thoughts of the other” (Eco, 
Name, 565)]. William, however much he resembles Poe’s protagonist in cleverness or technique, 
fails to arrive at the final solution accurately. Instead, he arrives in the library purely by chance, 
after having incorrectly ascribed the murders to a sequence related to the seven trumpets of the 
Apocalypse. As Burgos admits, “[ha] fabbricato uno schema falso per interpretare le mosse del 
colpevole e il colpevole vi si è adeguato (Eco, Nome 473) [“[he] conceived a false pattern to 
interpret the moves of the guilty man, and the guilty man fell in with it” (Eco, Name, 573)]. Burgos 
himself did not commit each murder, but set the wheels in motion, thus being ultimately 
responsible. In the final conversation with Burgos we find out that all of the murders were 
committed to maintain the secrecy of a single book, Aristotle’s treatise on Comedy. William 
ultimately discovers this solution, thus learning the truth behind the sequence of murders (as does 
the reader), despite the detection process being a failure and our knowledge of the situation coming 
through a more or less unsolicited confession.  
Both Borges’s story and Eco’s novel end with the detective learning the solution to the 
crime, while also realizing that his own detection failed to produce a satisfactory result. Despite 
their personal failure, both arrive at the knowledge of the correct solution, demonstrating that the 
trial and error process they had been using was still valid. They had simply made incorrect 
judgments. Yes, despite the detective’s failures, the reinforcing qualities of modernist detective 
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fiction and the concept that there is, ultimately, an accurate solution and absolute truth, is 
maintained.  
Thus, because there ultimately is a solution, we see that both Borges’ and Eco’s stories 
conform not to the postmodern structure of consciousness associated with anti-detective fiction, but 
rather to the modernist structure of consciousness. Here we have root structure, even if we are 
unable to see the root – the modernist structure guides the reading. Yet, the political and 
psychological implications of the distancing of the reader from the detective, and the failure of the 
detective to arrive at a solution that only the reader is in a position to understand (or have 
explained), creates a different dynamic than more traditional modernist detection, something which 
pushes the epistemological envelope and allows one to consider the type of structure that is found in 
postmodern detection. Thus, like McHale and others, I propose these stories represent late 
modernist detection. The term is important as the emphasis on structure warrants the inclusion of 
this type of detection under the modernist heading, making it another sub-genre like the police 
procedural, forensic, spy novel, each of which have their own specific traits and social, cultural and 
political implications. Yet, it seems that this type of detective fiction, generally, develops or 
becomes more widespread after modernist detection is already well-known (it, in fact, plays with 
the conventions of both classical and modernist detection), and thus the assignation of late 
modernist has some logical force behind it.
57
 
Alan Wilde uses the term late modernism to talk about a transitional period between 
modernism (early modernism) and postmodernism. The distinction for him is a different means of 
dealing with epistemological assumptions. “The early modernist tendency to connect truth with 
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 This term is of course already in use. Charles Jencks uses it (in architecture) to distinguish a type of modernist 
architecture after High Modernism has run its course, but which continues to follow the same basic logic, and 
contrasting it with Postmodern architecture, which rejects the modernist logic. “The Late Modernists have, for the most 
part, taken the theories and style of their precursors to an extreme and in so doing produced an elaborated or mannered 
Modernism. By contrast Post-Modernists have modified the previous style, while building upon it, but in addition also 
rejected the theories almost completely” (Jencks 43).  
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depth, and at times to sacrifice the phenomenal for the reality that is presumed to underlie it, gives 
way to a counterassertion that truth inheres in the visible. …. Reading appearances correctly is, in 
fact, the project of late modernism, its enemy not a failure to penetrate to some more authentic 
reality but a sort of cultural or psychological dyslexia, which blurs vision itself” (Wilde 108-9). As 
the quote indicates, both early modernism and late modernism are concerned with a revelation of 
the truth, but differ in how it is obscured or how it can be clarified. Postmodernism breaks with 
these two linked phenomenon in asserting that truth cannot be revealed (there is no position from 
which to determine the truth-value of any given claim). I argue that the structure of consciousness, 
makes this distinction more clear, and consequently makes the terms of late modernism meaningful 
as it highlights the continuity from one modernist form to another. Brian McHale uses Wilde’s 
categorization of late modernism being a transitionary period between (early) modernism and 
postmodernism, although prefers a different term and identifies the characteristics of the transition 
differently. My use of the term follows the transitionary aspect, but redefines the boundaries of the 
various categories considered.  
 
Verisimilitude and Realism 
I want to further address how one can argue that detective fiction (if not all fiction to some degree) 
reflects and reinforces a particular understanding of reality, and how this is expressed as such in its 
verisimilitude. This understanding of reality changes depending upon the type of detective fiction 
presented, as expressed in the structure of the investigation and in the relationship of the reader, 
author, and detective. S.S. Van Dine, in the September 1928 edition of American Magazine, 
presented a series of rules for the detective fiction genre. The rules are designed to give a semblance 
of order, and to purge the popular form of writing from overused motifs and preserve it for a new 
generation of fans. Van Dine’s rules are specific to the classical detective fiction form, which is 
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presented as a type of intellectual game, written so that “The reader must have equal opportunity 
with the detective for solving the mystery” (Van Dine 129). His rules, which he claims “every 
respectable and self-respecting concocter of literary mysteries lives up to” (Van Dine 128), are set 
up not only to maintain the pact between reader and author, by which the reader has a “fair” chance 
to solve the puzzle-game along with the detective, but also to present a world which reflects the 
world the reader inhabits. To that end, “there must be a sufficient descriptiveness and character 
delineation to give the novel verisimilitude” (Van Dine 130). This characteristic, combined with 
other rules which rule out supernatural explanations and pure chance, establish a relationship 
between the fictional and the world of the reader in as much as they have the same set of rational 
guidelines. Thus the world of detective fiction, according to Van Dine, is designed to resemble the 
world that the reader inhabits. By extension, the mode of detection inherent in the detective novel is 
set up as valid and ordinary in the world of the reader, reinforcing that form of detection.  
Later, Raymond Chandler, one of the foremost writers of the hard-boiled variety of detective 
fiction, presents a similar notion with regards to this subgenre. The opening line of his essay, “The 
Simple Art of Murder,” states that “fiction in any form has always intended to be realistic” 
(Chandler Simple 1). His essay, however, goes on to juxtapose the classic deductive form of 
detective fiction, with such proponents as Agatha Christie, S.S. Van Dine, and Dorothy Sayers, with 
that of Dashiell Hammett. He claims that the classical form was simply a parlor game, with little 
connection to reality, whereas Hammett “was one of a group … who wrote or tried to write realistic 
mystery fiction” (Chandler Simple 15). In discussing Sayers’ claim that detective fiction is simply a 
“literature of escape” rather than a “literature of expression,” Chandler goes on to argue that this is 
due to the unreality of the characters and situations necessary for the classic detective story.  
I think what was really gnawing at Miss Sayers’ mind was the slow realization that her kind 
of detective story was an arid formula which could not satisfy its own implications … If it 
started out to be about real people, they must soon do unreal things in order to form the 
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artificial pattern required by the plot. When they did unreal things, they ceased to be real 
themselves. (Chandler, Simple 14) 
 
What is interesting in this contradistinction is that both Van Dine, when presenting his rules of 
detective fiction, and Chandler in his promotion of Hammett’s hard-boiled style at the expense of 
the classical detective story, each present his version of the genre as based on a form of realism or 
verisimilitude. A major critique of the stories that violate the rules of detective fiction is their lack 
of credibility due to the supernatural or unrealistic elements of the text. This is the very criticism 
that Chandler levels at the entirety of the classical detective story.  
Scholars studying postmodern detective fiction also discuss realism and verisimilitude. 
Anne Hopzafel claims that the postmodern detective novel,
58
 like the other two classifications, is 
based on the historical circumstances from which they arise. 
While belief in rationality was central to the motifs of the classical detective novel, and the 
incorporation of the 20
th
 century urban American reality the main concern of the hard-boiled 
novel, the anti-detective novel finds its points of reference in a fragmented, postmodern 
society that is marked by political and cultural disorientation and insecurity. (Hopzafel 22) 
 
This historicization of the subgenre of the postmodern detective novel addresses the inability of an 
individual to gain the perspective necessary, in such a fragmented and decentered society, to present 
the type of certainty and knowledge claims that particularly characterize the ending of the classical 
and hard-boiled detective novels. The postmodern detective novel, in its own way, actually presents 
a more complex understanding of reality reflecting, as Hopzafel claims, a differing social order and 
means of understanding one’s relation to, and ability to understand, the society in which one lives 
and operates.  
Each of the forms herein presented reflects a certain understanding of the society in which 
they are written. The classical form seeks to present in the text the idea that, through careful 
observation, the detective (and, through the process of the intellectual game, the reader) can come to 
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 She uses the term anti-detective novel.  
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a complete understanding of the truth of any inquiry. Developed after Romanticism, this is a type of 
nostalgic throwback to the theories of the Enlightenment, and the structure of the classical detective 
story is designed, in part, to reinforce that ideal (whether or not, as Chandler claims, it is 
unrealistic).  
Similarly, the modernist detective novel, whether depicted in the American hard-boiled 
variety of the urban squalor of Los Angeles or San Francisco, or the police procedural of later 
generations, reinforces a societal mentality that through hard work and determination crimes will be 
solved. Perhaps stemming from a time of rampant violence in the cities (such as the Valentine’s 
Day Massacre of gangsters in Chicago) or widespread disregard for the law (during the time of 
prohibition), the genre reinforces both a sense of societal justice through the private 
investigator/police detective, as well as a faith in the moral compass of such a hero. Chandler 
describes him as such: “He is a relatively poor man, or he would not be a detective at all. He is a 
common man or he could not go among common people. He has a sense of character, or he would 
not know his job;” and furthermore, “he is the best man in his world and a good enough man for 
any world” (Chandler 20). This hero is represented as an ordinary individual, no smarter or better 
off than the stereotypical common man, and as such presents a reflection of the hopes of a typical 
man off the street.  
Finally, postmodern detective fiction is, in a certain sense, mimetic of the reality of the 
contemporary age.  
Postmodernist fiction, if critics such as John Gardner, Gerald Graff, and Charles Newman 
are to be believed, is morally bad art, and tends to corrupt its readers. It does so by denying 
external, objective reality. There was a time when denying the reality of the outside world 
could be seen as a bold gesture of resistance, a refusal to acquiesce in a coercive 
“bourgeois” order of things. But that time has passed, and nowadays everything in our 
culture tends to deny reality and promote unreality. (McHale 219) 
 
McHale presents the status of contemporary culture (citing Graff) as unreality, yet maintains 
that postmodernist fiction remains mimetic, reflecting just that level of unreality which the world 
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demonstrates. I disagree with the notion that contemporary society exists as a “kind of unreal reality 
that modern reality has become” (Graff 180), contending instead that we have simply come to a 
new understanding of reality (I would argue anti-reality and unreality are simply negative terms 
used to denigrate the concept in advance, preserving a positive term for a preexisting notion of 
‘reality’ that the critic wishes to preserve). The contemporary world has, rather, become understood 
in a new way, which is based on the structure that is reflected in postmodern literature in general 
and specifically here in the postmodern detective novel. The critics’ argument is truly not against 
the nature of the literature, which they agree is mimetic, but rather against the culture and social 
structure itself, which is understood in a way that they do not accept. Culture and society no longer 
function according to strict rules, preordained or passed down by tradition, but rather social choices 
are undertaken via a myriad of criteria and moral codes, with no reference to a higher, absolute 
ideal. It is this nature that is reflected in the postmodern detective novel.  
Ewert’s article also deals with the problems in determining the proper term for this category 
of detective fiction, which I call postmodern. There have been a number of terms posited to explain 
the differences in this type of detective fiction from the more traditional classical and hard-boiled 
forms. Ewert uses the term ‘metaphysical detective fiction.’ Patricia Merivale and Susan Sweeney 
also use this term in their compilation of essays, Detecting Texts: The Metaphysical Detective Story 
from Poe to Postmodernism, and define the subgenre as follows:  
A metaphysical detective story is a text that parodies or subverts traditional detective-story 
conventions – such as narrative closure and the detective’s role as surrogate reader – with 
the intention, or at least the effect, of asking questions about mysteries of being and 
knowing which transcend the mere machinations of the mystery plot. (Merivale 2) 
 
This category, however, addresses the concept of the detective story not by the way in which the 
detective goes about the investigation, nor the solution to the problem, but is rather concerned with 
which kind of questions are posited in the first place. Thus, Elana Gomel’s term “ontological 
detective story” could be paired with a term “epistemological detective story” to include those texts 
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that Merivale and Sweeney contend are “tales that focus explicitly on epistemology” (Merivale 4), 
under their heading of metaphysical detective fiction, regardless of method or outcome. In this way 
they would encompass “such writers [as those who] have used Poe’s ratiocinative process to 
address unfathomable epistemological and ontological questions” (Merivale 4), and are thus 
“concerned with metaphysics” (Merivale 4). While interesting, the question of what is being 
detected – whether it be actual crime, medical investigation (as many popular TV shows such as 
House, M.D. exemplify), or metaphysical concerns – does not aid one in understanding the basic 
assumptions presumed by the method of detection, and thus the category of metaphysical detective 
fiction is fundamentally different than any division of classical, modernist, or postmodernist 
methodology could encompass.  
The term postmodern is also problematic, as I discussed in the introduction. One specific 
notion I would like to dispel is the idea that this concept is limited by a chronological sequence, in 
which postmodern detective fiction must be identified as superseding modernist detective fiction, or 
that, as Tani hopes to understand, one can identify periods as specifically modern or postmodern 
(Tani 38). Although I certainly recognize the historical development of the genre, and argue above 
that each form of detective fiction reflects a differing understanding of reality, in my presentation of 
detective fiction I separate these texts strictly on the basis of their epistemological structure. Thus it 
is possible for texts written using classical, modernist, and postmodernist structure to all be written 
at historically the same time (as is the case, in fact, with Andrea Camilleri, Dan Turéll, and Paul 
Auster all writing in the mid-eighties using structurally different methods). I would further note that 
in order to argue that postmodern detective fiction has supplanted modern or other forms of 
detective fiction (which a strictly historical argument would need to contend),
59
 it would be 
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 David Harvey, in The Condition of Postmodernity, makes such an historical argument about postmodernity in 
general, attributing the shift to postmodernism to “the crisis of overaccumulation that began in the late 1960s and which 
came to a head in 1973” (Harvey 328). I am still not sure this socio-cultural change can be pinned down so neatly, or 
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necessary to show that postmodern fiction is more popular or prevalent. This does not seem to be 
the case, but rather it seems that postmodern detective fiction (like postmodern fiction in general) 
has a rather limited appeal, where modernist detective fiction (thinking just of American television 
there are an abundance of police procedurals and forensics, topping all ratings charts) and even 
classical detective fiction (again with shows like Monk and Pysch and even the Law and Order 
series producing a classical detective character in Criminal Intent, as well as the creation of several 
Sherlock Holmes franchises) remaining extraordinarily popular.
60
 So while it is possible to argue 
that postmodern detective fiction developed more recently (since perhaps the 1960s, if we start with 
Pynchon’s novel discussed here), it has not replaced earlier forms of fiction, just as the 
understanding of reality associated with that fiction has not supplanted other understandings of 
reality (those associated with modernist detective fiction, for example). On the contrary, I would 
argue (and will do so later) that those forms of reality are far more common than any vision 
associated with the postmodern.  
 
Conclusion 
The three types of detective novel presented here, the classical, as represented by Poe, Christie, and 
others, the modernist, as represented by the hard-boiled Chandler, as well as police procedurals and 
the late modernist contributions of Borges and Eco, and the postmodern approach employed by 
Auster, Pychon and Nolan, reflect the three structures of consciousness discussed in the 
introduction. There is the positivistic model of the classical story along with the twisting and 
turning modernist approach, as presented by Chandler among others, both of which ultimately 
resolve in a solution. There is a middle ground, represented by Borges and Eco, which continue in a 
modernist conception, while alluding to a worldview in which absolute truth may not exist. Finally 
                                                                                                                                                                  
whether the aesthetic changes, which he argues reflect such a change, overlap with his proposed timeline. In any case, it 
would require a more broadly defined cultural study than my literary analysis would allow.  
60
 This is perhaps even more true in British and Scandinavian television markets, for example.  
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there is the net pattern presented by the stories by Auster, Pynchon and Nolan, in which both the 
scope of the investigation, the means by which it is conducted, the very connections made, and the 
final non-solution all lead to a complete questioning of the possibility of any absolute basis of 
knowledge. These epistemological structures are both characteristic of the subgenres of detective 
fiction here presented, but are also related to the philosophical structures and historical times from 
which they sprung. In the following chapter, I will demonstrate how this pattern of structures works 
not only in the epistemological investigations foregrounded in detective fiction, but also in 
ontological quests which are brought to the fore in science fiction. 
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What world is this? Who am I (in it?)?  
 
 
The structure of the ontological formation in Science Fiction 
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Science fiction is trying to find alternative ways of looking at realities. 
Iain Banks 
 
Pondering our place in the universe is a time-honored tradition, and the theme for a great number of 
novels, films and aesthetic output of all kinds. Science fiction, in particular, offers a unique vantage 
point on such discussions, and through that lens we will consider a number of literary and filmic 
texts which deal specifically with concerns about ontology and subjectivity. While the previous 
chapter focused on detective fiction, and laid out how texts of that epistemological genre conform to 
classical, modernist and postmodernist structures of consciousness, this chapter will discuss how 
science fiction, while focusing on other metaphysical concerns, can be seen to use the same three 
structures. Relatively recent films, like Men in Black II, Independence Day, and Inception 
exemplify these particular mindsets, the classical, modernist, and postmodernist. In Barry 
Sonnenfield’s 2002 film, Men in Black II, the revelation that Laura (Rosario Dawson) is the key to 
freeing Earth from destruction, is not the result of anything she does or becomes in life; rather, it is 
a consequence of who she is. Her innate identity, as The Light of Zartha, is revealed, and through 
this discovery (the anagnorisis of the Aristotelian tradition) that she is able to act to save her planet 
(and Earth). In so doing she reflects a classical understanding of subjectivity. In Roland Emmerich’s 
1996 blockbuster, Independence Day, the end of the film shows the US President (Bill Pullman) 
proclaiming that July 4
th
 will no longer, in future, be known only as an American holiday, but the 
Independence Day of the World, as the invasion is repelled through the concurrent assault on the 
alien space ships, combined with cybernetic hacking which defeats the alien mothership. Only 
through an encounter with otherness, and a reassessment of themselves in the process (now 
considering their common humanity over individual national identities), do the heroes defeat the 
enemy, thus revealing the film’s modernist structure. Christopher Nolan’s 2010 foray into science 
fiction, Inception, offers a consideration of the manifold levels of dreams and perceived reality, and 
the closing scene famously leaves viewers to wonder whether there is a wavering of the spinning 
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top (signifying a return to reality) or not (signifying a continued dream state). By leaving the answer 
open, Nolan blurs the line between dream and reality, making it impossible for the viewer to 
determine the stability of the ontological levels of the film. But as he claimed in a 2015 Princeton 
graduation speech, that is precisely the point: “The way the end of that film worked, Leonardo 
DiCaprio’s character Cobb — he was off with his kids, he was in his own subjective reality," he 
said. "He didn’t really care any more, and that makes a statement: perhaps all levels of reality are 
valid. The camera moves over the spinning top just before it appears to be wobbling, it was cut to 
black” (Lee). The ending thus reveals a postmodernist structure of consciousness (even as audience 
demands to know whether the top is wavering or not reveal their modernist mindset).  
As we have demonstrated in a previous chapter, it is possible for texts with an 
epistemological dominant to be postmodern. As a corollary to that, one must explore whether texts 
with an ontological dominant can be modernist.  Thus, we will now take up the second half of Brian 
McHale’s main thesis from Postmodernist Fiction, in which he argues that those texts identified by 
an ontological dominant (in which questions of being and identity are of primary focus) are 
postmodernist. “The dominant of postmodernist fiction is ontological. That is, postmodernist fiction 
deploys strategies which engage and foreground questions like the ones Dick Higgins calls ‘post-
cognitive’: “Which world is this? What is to be done in it? Which of my selves is to do it?” 
(McHale 10). Again, contrary to McHale, I argue that this is not the case. Both modernist and 
postmodernist texts can be found that discuss, primarily, epistemological and ontological questions. 
The differentiation between modernist and postmodernist poetics lies not in the type of questions 
posed (or proposed first, as with McHale’s use of the dominant), but rather in the means by which 
these questions are answered. These means correspond to the structure of consciousness, the 
underlying structural metaphor grounding the understanding of reality with which a given text 
operates and is interpreted.  
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In this chapter, I explore this structure of consciousness in relation to ontological questions 
(which McHale argues are postmodernist by definition), and have therefore chosen to concentrate 
upon science fiction. This type of text involves an exploration of being and subjectivity, which can 
be understood in a broader context as a reflection of the search for identity itself. Thus, using 
science fiction as a representative ontological genre, I seek to challenge the idea that such texts are 
tautologically postmodernist. Parallel to the argument put forth in the previous chapter, there are 
science fiction texts which have an ontological dominant that correspond to each of the structures of 
consciousness identified earlier – the classical, modernist and postmodernist – and it is this 
structure, manifested in the responses to questions of ontology and subjectivity which is 
determinate.  
The chapter will proceed with a brief history of the science fiction genre, following which 
representative texts will be discussed to highlight their respective relationships to the three 
structures of consciousness. These texts were chosen for several reasons. They are all well known, 
canonical texts in science fiction, as well as representative of various chronological and thematic 
developments within the genre. They are also some of clearest examples of each of their respective 
structures of consciousness, and finally, as a collective, they demonstrate firstly that there are 
classical and modernist as well as postmodernist science fiction texts, and secondly, the means by 
which such texts can be interpreted as modernist or postmodernist based on the interstice of the text 
and the reader’s own structure of consciousness.61  
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 As I do with other types of texts earlier, I assert that the texts do provide evidence, often clear evidence, of the 
structure of consciousness at work. However, I also contend that the reader has a stake in the interpretation, and thus 
one can make a modernist reading of a postmodern work (as McHale provides in Constructing Postmodernism) or a 
postmodern reading of a modernist work.  
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Rethinking Science Fiction and Postmodernism 
Histories of science fiction, like those of detective fiction, divide the genre into distinct 
chronological and typological categories. The start date and founding authors of science fiction 
have often been debated – from the Epic of Gilgamesh to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein to HG Wells 
and Jules Verne – but it is certain that this type of imaginative fiction was not considered as a 
coherent independent genre until the 1920s. Adam Roberts notes that some critics “insist on 
searching out ‘fantastic’ or ‘science-fictional’ elements in literature as ancient as literature is itself” 
(Roberts 47). But the importance of such a parallel, is “the metaphorical basis of an encounter with 
difference” (Roberts 49). It is the reasoning behind science fiction, rather than the chronological 
origins, where science fiction draws its critical potency, with the common tropes functioning as 
metaphors for the encounter with otherness, often represented by alien worlds and speculative 
identities. This chapter deals specifically with these interstices, the representations of both ontology 
and subjectivity within science fiction, with the constant aim to elucidate the postmodern.  
As a consolidated genre from the 1920s onward, science fiction is often discussed in a 
number of traditional categories, from the pulp science fiction of Hugo Gernsback, to the Golden 
Age (with authors like Asimov and Heinlein), to the New Wave (JG Ballard, Philip K Dick, Samuel 
Delany, Philip José Farmer), followed by discussions of gender (feminist science fiction), and race. 
The 1980s brings a discussion of the rise of cyberpunk, which is either discussed as a subsequent 
movement or in relation to its use of technology (in a section similar to those of gender and race).
62
 
There have also been numerous descendants of cyberpunk: steampunk, biopunk, splatterpunk, 
punkpunk, but the main one of interest to this study, due to its mimetic features and correspondence 
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 This is roughly the approach of The Cambridge Companion to Science Fiction, in which science fiction is broken 
down chronologically, while race and gender (and other categories) are treated later as sub-genres. It is also the 
fundamental structure that Bruce Sterling alludes to in his definition of cyberpunk in the preface to the Mirrorshades 
anthology. See also: Roberts 2000, Aldiss 1986, and Seed 2005. 
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to cyberpunk, is postcyberpunk which we will consider in the case of Snow Crash.
63
 While there are 
different strategies which inform the various categorizations of science fiction, for the purposes of 
this study of postmodernism, I will only discuss some common characteristics of the genre.  I will 
specifically consider the way subjectivity and the ontology of worlds are depicted, and how these 
concepts are rendered differently in various forms of science fiction. I contend that there is, with 
regards to ontological concerns, a development from a classical model, through a modernist 
approach, to a more postmodern structural pattern, parallel to the approach described in the previous 
chapter with regards to epistemological patterns in detective fiction.  
McHale argues that all science fiction is, perhaps necessarily, a postmodern concept. 
Reiterating his parallel definition, from Postmodernist Fiction, to that of detective fiction in the 
previous chapter, he claims: “Science fiction, we might say, is to postmodernism what detective 
fiction was to modernism: it is the ontological genre par excellence (as the detective story is the 
epistemological genre par excellence)” (McHale, Postmodernist 16). He continues to maintain the 
distinction in his later work, Constructing Postmodernism, despite its focus on the constructedness 
of postmodernism. The ontological dominant, and its ties to SF and postmodernism, continues to be 
a key position in McHale’s definition.  
Both science fiction and mainstream postmodernist fiction possess repertoires of 
strategies and motifs designed to raise and explore ontological issues. SF, that is, 
like postmodernist fiction, is governed by an ontological dominant, by contrast with 
modernist fiction or, among the genres of “genre” fiction, detective fiction, both of 
which raise and explore issues of epistemology and thus are governed by an 
epistemological dominant. (McHale, Constructing, 247)  
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 Postcyberpunk represents, like postmodernism, a chronological bind whose boundary with cyberpunk is not always 
clear. Most often it is marked by its chronology, after the Bruce Sterling-defined cyberpunk period ended, or by its 
optimistic look towards the future as opposed to the more bleak perspective found in traditional cyberpunk. 
“Postcyberpunk uses the same immersive world-building technique [as cyberpunk], but features different characters, 
settings, and, most importantly, makes fundamentally different assumptions about the future. Far from being alienated 
loners, postcyberpunk characters are frequently integral members of society (i.e., they have jobs). They live in futures 
that are not necessarily dystopic (indeed, they are often suffused with an optimism that ranges from cautious to 
exuberant), but their everyday lives are still impacted by rapid technological change and an omnipresent computerized 
infrastructure” (Person, Lawrence, Notes Toward a Postcyberpunk Manifesto). 
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Although I agree that, in the realm of genre fiction, detective fiction forefronts epistemological 
questions and science fiction forefronts ontological questions, I disagree that this shift is strictly 
characteristic of mainstream postmodern fiction. Just as the texts of detective fiction, with their 
various responses to epistemological questions, present classical, modernist, and postmodernist 
patterns, I contend that not all science fiction works are elements of postmodernist poetics, even if 
they do forefront ontological issues. Instead, the ontological constructs are a touchstone by which to 
determine the type of poetics (classical, modernist, postmodernist) that is at work within science 
fiction texts. To reiterate, the difference between modernist and postmodernist poetics lies not in the 
type of questions asked (epistemological, ontological, etc.) but rather in the answer provided: 
Modernist poetics suggests an answer to metaphysical concerns, while postmodernist poetics 
demonstrates the impossibility of such an answer.  
As with detective fiction, I don’t intend this to be an overarching means of defining the 
genre. There are many methods (literary technique, trope, theme, authorship, national origin, 
gender, race, chronological sequence) that are useful for differentiating the various texts of the 
genre. I have chosen this particular method (the tripartite division of classical, modernist, and 
postmodernist ontology and subjectivity) in order to reach a definition of postmodern science 
fiction and further an understanding of postmodernism in literature in general. I do not intend to call 
into question the means by which science fiction is often classified chronologically. I believe such 
histories are vital in understanding the genre, especially in tracing the changes in the speculative 
nova that appear in connection to advances in science and technology. My intention here is simply 
to provide a way to view the ontological issues that are often present in science fiction works, - an 
approach which, if these issues are highlighted in a given set of science fiction texts, can be applied 
as a system of classification. One could also classify SF thematically, as many literary historians of 
the genre do, compartmentalizing themes like alien encounters, advance robots, artificial 
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intelligence, virtual reality, utopian/dystopian societies, etc. as a means of organizing the vast 
amounts of literature. The division I have chosen is however meant to highlight the structural 
pattern of ontological concerns and that pattern’s changes within the genre.  
Darko Suvin, in Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, defines science fiction as a version of 
estranged fiction and opposed to that of naturalistic fiction. As such, science fiction doesn’t have a 
“straightforward relationship to the ‘zero world’ of empirically verifiable properties around the 
author” (Suvin 18) as much mainstream literature does. Rather, “through concentrating on the 
cognitively plausible futures and their spatial equivalents, [science fiction] can deal with the present 
and the past as special cases of a possible historical sequence seen from an estranged point of view 
– since any empirical historical point or flow can be thought of as one realization among practically 
innumerable possibilities” (Suvin 21). Using this definition, we can see how the concept of 
otherness functions as a dominant device in science fiction, through the positing of innumerable 
‘other’ possibilities which can be contrasted both with the protagonist (or his/her world) and with 
the reader/audience (or his/her world).
64
 A difference from the world of the reader is one of the 
defining characteristics of science fiction, as outlined in Suvin’s theory of the novum65, and is of 
particular importance, as I shall demonstrate, for understanding the postmodern structure of 
consciousness as it is expressed in science fiction. It is therefore necessary to consider both the 
world within the narrative as well as the relationship between that world and the world of the reader 
when considering the ontological constructs found within each text.  
Otherness, and its various uses within the texts, will be one of several means of highlighting 
the structures of consciousness revealed in the case studies below. These texts will be presented in a 
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 I will use reader as a convention for both the reader (for fiction) and audience (for film), simply for the sake of 
convenience. My approach to film in this study will be to treat film as text and focus more on the narrative than on the 
filmic elements at work.  
65
 Darko Suvin, in Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, defines a novum as “a totalizing phenomenon of relationship 
deviating from the author’s and implied reader’s norm of reality” and contends it is a (if not the) defining characteristic 
of science fiction.  
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similar pattern to the previous chapter, with classical structures being discussed first in Doris 
Lessing’s The Marriages Between Zones Three, Four and Five and Isaac Asimov’s Foundation 
series, which consider individuals and larger social structures in similar ways. This will be followed 
by a look at modernist structures, which will be presented first with a discussion of Robert Heinlein 
and hard sf, and subsequently with examples of late modernism. Here we will see how texts which 
presume to show indeterminability regarding which world one occupies, and who one is in such a 
world, are revealed in analysis to only suggest the postmodern condition, while in effect reinforcing 
a modernist framework. In this section, William Gibson’s short story ‘The Gernsback Continuum’ 
and Svend Åge Madsen’s ‘Stig’ will be employed in discussing ontological questions, while Ursula 
Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness and the film Blade Runner will be used to discuss 
subjectivity. These texts are critical in demonstrating that science fiction is not a predominantly, or 
even mainly, a postmodern genre, since even some texts that allude to postmodernist discourses in 
fact operate within a modernist structure of consciousness, again in contradiction to the assertions 
by McHale. Finally, we will turn to a selection of texts which I construe as presenting a 
postmodernist structure of consciousness. These texts – the Matrix trilogy, Neal Stephenson’s Snow 
Crash, and the 2004 television series Battlestar Galactica – present situations in which the 
demarcation lines between worlds, or the definitions which allow us to differentiate ourselves from 
aliens or artificial intelligences, are elided to such a degree that there is no difference, and in 
essence the categories, both human and non-human, real and virtual, cease to be meaningful. This 
exemplifies the postmodern condition, and represents what I argue is the space necessary for 
meaningful change, which these texts, and those like them, allow for.  
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 I am ... what I am at the moment I am that. 
Doris Lessing, The Marriages Between Zones Three, Four and Five 
 
Ontological Certainty or Predestination: The Classical Approach 
The Marriages Between Zones Three, Four and Five 
Doris Lessing’s The Marriages Between Zones Three, Four and Five offers a classical approach 
with regards to subjectivity, in which there is a confrontation with the other, and a consideration of 
one’s own identity, and yet the innate identity of the characters is reinforced. These characters are 
defined based on characteristics and assumptions that are within themselves. In encounters between 
these characters, the relationship with the other doesn’t force a re-evaluation of the individual’s 
identity, but rather reinforces their own subjectivity. This can be seen as parallel to Aristotle’s 
classical theory of anagnorisis, which is first described in relation to Oedipus Rex, and highlights 
the point at which the recognition of Oedipus’s scar allows for the revelation of his true identity.  
Lessing’s text provides the fable-like story of Al Ith, the queen of Zone Three. Through the 
intervention of an unnamed, alien force, this independent, self-sufficient woman, living in a type of 
feminist utopia, travels to the neighboring (and inferior) Zone Four and enters into a marriage with 
their King, Ben Ata. This interaction regenerates an internal spiritual movement towards 
enlightenment, while simultaneously reinforcing the identities of both partners in the marriage, 
despite their differences. Most scholarship focuses on this regeneration, reading the two cultures as 
part of a whole (a native race manipulated by the Canopeans to achieve a spiritual harmony akin to 
Sufism).
66
 However, I will focus specifically on the identities of the two protagonists and their 
encounter, through which the formation of their identities is highlighted.  
Both Al Ith and Ben Ata have well defined cultural contexts, which also define their roles in 
society and their individual identities. “If they were nothing else, these two, they were 
representatives and embodiments of their respective countries. Concern for their realms was what 
                                                 
66
 “Lessing’s Marriages … has been recognized as thinly veiled allegory by nearly all the reviewers” (Draine 144-5). 
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they were” (Lessing, Marriages 45). As they are representative, the individual encounter that 
Lessing describes functions as a stand in for a larger cultural exchange, a product of the ripple effect 
of their leader’s experience. This is part of Lessing’s overall project, throughout the Canopos in 
Argos series.  
Science fiction writers are concerned with those conditions of existence which transcend, 
while determining, the individual case. Their task is a difficult one – to expand the reader’s 
consciousness so that it can grasp events from the alien perspective of huge vistas of time and 
space. (Here we see surfacing Lessing’s consistent theme, the attempt to transcend the limits 
placed on consciousness by the thought conventions of a particular historical moment and 
situation). (Draine 152)  
 
Thus, while focusing on the individual experience, and the localized transcultural site, the 
effects in the novel are greater than just those upon Al Ith and Ben Ata. In the novel, they represent 
a change throughout the zones, and in the larger project, this particular encounter is representative 
of the entire spiritual harmony of the Universe.  
The site of their encounter is in Zone Four, which although presented as culturally inferior to 
Zone Three (not least due to the numbering system, but also due to the reactions of the other 
occupants of the respective Zones) still represents a neutral location. The presence of Al Ith so 
disrupts Ben Ata’s customary dominance as to displace him from his cultural context. Al Ith is both 
physically and emotionally removed from her contextual space. “In this novel, Al·Ith, the queen of 
Zone Three, is the unwilling pilgrim from one spiritual state to another” (Draine 164). Thus, their 
marriage bed, which neither of them chose, becomes the site of this encounter with otherness.  
Although they both change through the product of their marriage, their identities do not 
change in reaction to each other’s differences, but rather develop in a linear fashion. They come to a 
greater understanding of who they already are through this interaction with someone else, yet do not 
define themselves in contrast to the other. They enter into the situation with both skepticism and 
reluctance, yet with a sense of duty to a higher power. ”They looked at each other with a frank 
exchange of complicity: two prisoners who had nothing in common but their incarceration. This 
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first, and frail, moment of tolerance, did not last” (Lessing, Marriages 29). Initially, they approach 
the experience with tolerance, a positive outlook on an anxious and undesired encounter. The 
experience, consummated in a series of more and more tolerant and productive sexual encounters, 
proves meaningful, as both individuals strive for understanding and acceptance of each other’s 
otherness. They entered as disparate individuals, representative of nearly antagonistic worlds, into 
an experience where both attempt to come to an understanding beyond their own conception.  
Their people were what they were, their thoughts were. Their lives could be nothing 
else, or less ... yet now both were aware, and deeply, so that they were shocked and 
stirred to their depths, that all this concern and this duty of theirs had not prevented 
them from going very wrong ... They were looking at each other, not shrinking from 
each other’s gaze at all, but both trying to enter in behind the sober, thoughtfulness of 
his grey eyes, the soft gleam of her black eyes, so that they could reach something 
deeper, and other. (Lessing, Marriages 45) (emphasis in original) 
 
This encounter allowed both Al Ith and Ben Ata, especially upon later reflection, to recognize that 
their respective cultures were stagnant, that they had ‘gone wrong’. The encounter provided a 
needed reflection and stimulus to set out on the path of enlightenment that is built into their 
cultures. This encounter, though, remains fleeting, and although it allowed each of them, 
individually, space for reflection, they remain culturally distinct. After their union they return to 
their respective situations, seemingly unaltered in relation to each other.  
For looking at each other now, returned to their absolute separateness, their otherness, 
these two denizens of their different realms could not believe what they had won 
together during their hours of submersion in each other. She was to him, again, a foreign 
woman, everything about her alien, though dear now in a way that estranged him more 
than bound him. (Lessing, Marriages 70) 
 
The nature of their understanding seems to exist only in the moment, and their encounter serves to 
reinforce, rather than mediate, their cultural differences. The moment recalls John McLeod’s 
transcultural threshold, where the tension between conversation and silence, and engagement and 
displacement reacts to produce a positive effect. Although Al Ith and Ben Ata meet across the 
threshold, it is through a process of estrangement and recognition of difference, the maintenance of 
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which punctuates their encounters. As they return to the marriage bed, their encounters become 
increasingly focused on difference, rather than understanding (although still with mutual respect). 
“The two entered their room from opposite arches, and stood examining each other. As usual it was 
their difference that had to strike them first: both, matching the long days of questioning and 
wanting and longing, with the reality of this stubbornly self-contained individual, felt only a sort of 
exhaustion” (Lessing, Marriages 125). The realms function as distinct cultures within a 
multicultural society, tolerant and accepting of each other, even while cultural markers and 
boundaries remain intact. There is no blurring of the boundaries between the zones, but the hostility 
and distrust have been removed through the encounter between Al Ith and Ben Ata, and the 
common path to enlightenment reinstated.  
This pattern follows a religious principle. The idea of the story is for the characters to 
recognize “the importance of self-knowledge” (Marchino 252), characteristic of Lessing’s novels in 
general. Lessing uses themes from Sufism, a form of mystical belief that she studied from the early 
1970s, to connect a search for self-identity (an identity which one already possesses and yet does 
not yet fully understand) to one’s role within society. Both concepts, self-identity and social role, 
are interconnected,  and despite their mutual lack of self-consciousness, Al Ith’s and Ben Ata’s 
identities are equally predetermined. Although there is change throughout the text – Al Ith and Ben 
Ata both have character arcs and, at least in the case of Al Ith, move upwards joining those in the 
‘next’ Zone (Zone Two) – the movement always develops linearly. This movement is made 
possible through the encounter, yet their differences do not change their identities in a dialectical 
fashion. They come to a greater understanding of who they already are, yet do not define 
themselves in contrast to the other.
67
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 If one considers this novel as part of the Canopos in Argos series as a whole (this is the second volume of that series) 
rather than as a stand-alone novel, and considers that each of the texts in Canopos presents the story from a different 
perspective, taken as a whole they constitute a vastly different approach, ontologically. For example, the first novel, 
Shikasta, offers multiple races co-existing on a single world, caught in a Manichean struggle between good (Canopos) 
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Foundation 
Just as Lessing provides an example of a classical ontological model for individual identity in 
science fiction, Isaac Asimov, stalwart of the Golden Age, provides an example of the classical 
ontological model for the construction of the universe. In his perhaps best known work, the 
Foundation series, he initially creates a scenario in which mathematician Hari Seldon, through the 
application of ‘psychohistory’, puts the galaxy on a course (the so-called ‘Seldon Plan’) to regain 
the status of  empire in only 1000 years, rather than the tens of thousands of years that would be 
required absent intervention. The fictional science of psychohistory is defined as 
that branch of mathematics which deals with the reactions of human conglomerates to fixed 
social and economic stimuli … implicit in all these definitions is the assumption that the 
human conglomerate being dealt with is sufficiently large for valid statistical treatment … 
[and] a further necessary assumption is that the human conglomerate be itself unaware of 
psychohistoric analysis in order that its reactions are truly random. (Asimov 16)  
 
The Seldon Plan itself is the example of the linear ontological construct.  
Throughout the series of the first four short stories, as originally published,
68
 which make up 
the volume Foundation the plan is portrayed as inevitable. Based on his advanced knowledge of the 
science of psycho-history, the galaxy is led on a (seemingly) inevitable course to the reconstruction 
of a Galactic Empire. Asimov takes us through a series of crises, each predicted by Hari Seldon, 
whose image appears in a holographic projection to either give guidance or congratulate the future 
citizens on their successful resolution of each crisis, which had no other possible conclusion. “To 
that end we have placed you on such a planet and at such a time that in 50 years you were 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and evil (Sirius). Shikasta plays with multiple perspectives, which provides a strict contrast to the linearity of 
Marriages. “If Shikasta triumphs through a pluralism of styles and attitudes, its sequel, The Marriages Between Zones 
Three, Four and Five (1980), succeeds on an altogether different basis. Where Shikasta is all turmoil and variation, 
Marriages is all calm and unity” (Draine 144). Thus, the classical approach can only be considered if reading the 
narrative alone, and absent the broader picture associated with the Canopos series or the author/reader relationship. 
68
 The stories often collected in the three volumes of the Foundation trilogy were originally published in Astounding 
Science Fiction starting in 1941. The first story published in the collected edition, however, was not written until the 
other stories were completed. It was, in fact, written “at the request of Martin Greenberg of Gnome Press who was the 
original publisher of the Trilogy” (Patrouch 63). Thus, for the sake of this study, the first story, “The Psychohistorians” 
will be considered at the time of its creation (1950), rather than where it fits chronologically in the narrative (first in the 
series). 
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maneuvered to the point where you no longer have the freedom of action. From now on, and into 
the centuries, the path you must take is inevitable” (Asimov 64). 
 The linearity of the narrative, like that of the individuals in Lessing’s novel, is, in a way, 
artificial. The classical ontological construct only appears linear and can only be seen if the scope of 
one’s perspective is limited greatly, such limitation also being a tenet of psychohistory. In this case, 
within the narrative, Seldon has deliberatively removed information from the citizens of Terminus 
to force their actions along a particular path, creating a quasi-religion to do so. The individuals in 
Asimov’s narrative retain their free will, as there is no inevitability with regard to individual 
actions. Furthermore, as Asimov progresses with his series of stories, he removes the limitations 
and complicates the picture, perhaps inevitably, as the classical construction fails once its 
boundaries are considered.  
 The trilogy itself is loosely based on past history. Asimov himself, in his 1953 essay ‘Social 
Science Fiction’ cites Arnold Toynbee as inspiration, although the use of past history to determine a 
future course is something that Toynbee argued against.
69
 Charles Elkins finds that the linear 
structure also fails literarily, arguing that, “it is a fetter on the imaginative possibilities of the 
speculative novel. Instead of events growing out of the inner logic and premises of the narrative 
situation, the plot and characters are forced to conform to a predetermined template” (Elkins 99). 
Yet, despite Elkins’ objections, Asimov’s story does allow the reader to reflect on the possibility of 
a positivist approach to history in comparison to those argued for by Hegel, among others. Through 
the use of the fall of an Empire, comparable to that of Rome as we understand it today, the parallels 
between Western Civilization and Asimov’s Galactic Empire become explicit. Thus, within the 
constraints of a given narrative, and in the genre of science fiction which has arguably the clearest 
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 Charles Elkins notes, in Science Fiction Studies, that Asimov refers to the first six books of Toynbee’s A Study of 
History.  
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presentation of ontological concerns, one can certainly find representations of a classical approach 
to ontology.  
 
"If you find this world bad, you should see some of the others." 
Philip K. Dick (1977) 
 
Ontological Uncertainty: The Modernist Approach  
Dialectics and Hard SF 
Travels to foreign lands, used as a foil to discuss one’s own land (and often the troubles or problems 
therein) is by no means a new concept or limited to science fiction (although it is a very common 
trope within SF). Even within the field, depending on how broadly it is defined, travel to other 
worlds, or one’s own world in another time, is a well-worn tale. Texts such as Dante’s Divina 
Commedia, Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and Mark Twain’s Connecticut Yankee in King 
Arthur’s Court all offer some version of this idea. The creation of a different ontological plane, 
whether born of fantasy, religious inspiration, or legends of a distant past, allows for a redefinition 
of one’s own assumptions about the world one inhabits. This theme has evolved into a common 
trope depicting interaction between planets, with varying degrees of distance, beginning with trips 
to the Moon in early works like Ludovico Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso and Kepler’s Somnium, 
entering the science fiction genre per se with H.G. Wells‘s 1901 First Men in the Moon. This trope 
allows for the creation of estrangement, to return to Darko Suvin’s definition, and presenting the 
reader with a world different from his or her own is vital to understanding science fiction. It 
occupies the bulk of ‘Golden Age’ SF, at least in the popular imagination, and Robert Heinlein, a 
mainstay of SF’s Golden Age, explored this theme in his Future History series, a collection of short 
series which, as a whole, present an alternative timeline to humanity’s development on Earth. Yet, it 
is not the concept of space travel that is essential to these approaches to science fiction but the 
encounter with difference itself. The recognition that what one is encountering is Other – whether 
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an alien life form or the landscape of another planet -  forces a reconsideration of who we are, or 
where we are from. Many of our most iconic science fiction texts, such as H.G. Wells War of the 
Worlds, Heinlein’s Stranger in a Strange Land and Starship Troopers, Kubrick’s 2001: A Space 
Odyssey, and Stanislaw Lem’s Solaris explore the issue, each with a very different approach. What 
remains constant is the encounter with Otherness and the exploration of the ways in which we 
differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them.’ 
Thus, the concept of Otherness plays heavily in the modernist approach. Basically, one’s 
identity is formed, in this model, in response to an outside force. As briefly described above with 
reference to Independence Day, the common trope of first contact (including alien invasion) 
highlights this. In that example, in response to the outside threat, the national/supranational subject 
is formed. As Lincoln Geraghty explains:  
Between 1990 and 2001 alien invasion narratives focused on the alien swarm, rather than 
the individual, as threat. …In many alien invasion films the invading collective is all that 
humans encounter. The entire species is characterised as a pestilential entity, focused on 
invasion, destruction and consumption of our own planetary resources. All attempts at trying 
to interact with these aliens as individuals – as achieved with E.T. and the benevolent aliens 
of the 1980s – is futile since they have no concept of personal relationships or individuality. 
For Americans to defeat the oncoming swarm, they must assume their own sense of 
collective responsibility and join together. Paranoia and xenophobic distrust of national 
differences have to be put aside to successfully combat the alien hive mentality. … 
Typically, once threatened with such an alien attack, humanity is shown to unite and form a 
global village to protect its citizens from the onslaught. (Geraghty 89)  
 
In these films the confrontation with an alien force, set on the destruction and conquering of Earth, 
coalesces humanity into a single unit, dispelling national, class, racial and other differences while 
confronted with this new and unique global threat.
70
 This revised collective identity is opposed to 
the innate identity which one finds in the classical approach described earlier. While the classical 
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 In the case of Starship Troopers the intentions of the aliens are obscured by the propaganda nature of the narrative, 
which, through parallels to typical wartime propaganda (specifically that of Nazi Germany) makes one question the 
reality of the information presented. As Geraghty notes, “Starship Troopers’ view of otherness is a priori evil; its 
fascistic and imperialistic overtones position the alien as inferior in contrast to the humans, who are enlightened and 
therefore justified in colonising the aliens’ homeworld. … However, the film satirises the explicit notion that the 
monstrous aliens can be exterminated only when humanity unites with the implicit suggestion that humanity itself has 
become on such aggressor.” (Geraghty 90) 
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mindset doesn’t allow for alteration of one’s identity, the modernist construction is under constant 
revision, searching for the true nature of one’s identity. Thus, each encounter with otherness helps 
to shape and redefine who one is. This is also true in coming to an understanding of one’s own 
reality, which we will see in William Gibson’s short story ‘The Gernsback Continuum’ and later in 
the Matrix case study.  
In this section, I will consider different scenarios in which either the ontology (the world 
building) or subjectivity are at the fore, demonstrating how the case studies presented exhibit the 
strategies at stake in the modernist structure of consciousness. In this, I will be following Donald 
Hall’s formulation of the distinction between identity and subjectivity.  
For our purposes, one’s identity can be thought of as that particular set of traits, beliefs, and 
allegiances what, in short- and long-term ways, gives on a consistent personality and mode of 
social being, while subjectivity implies always a degree of thought and self-consciousness 
about identity, at the same time allowing myriad of limitations and often unknowable, 
unavoidable constraints on our ability to fully comprehend identity. Subjectivity as a critical 
concept invites us to consider the question of how and from where identity arises, to what 
extent it is understandable, and to what degree it is something over which we have any 
measure of influence or control. (Hall 3-4) 
 
In using Hall’s definition, I will explore how in the cases of individual subjectivities, in a modernist 
construct, are formed in relief, molded in reaction to the assertion of the Other. 
This modernist structure of consciousness informs on both an individual, world, and even a 
meta level. Perhaps the best example of the use of the modernist mindset in science fiction, even as 
it forms the foundation for standard interpretations of the genre as a whole, is the ongoing 
discussion about ‘hard science fiction.’ In The Ascent of Wonder, David Hartwell asserts that: “Hard 
sf is about the beauty of truth. … about the emotional experience of describing and confronting 
what is scientifically true” (Hartwell 30-1). This seems to get at the core of what hard sf proclaims 
to be, the combination of a focus on scientific accuracy in the presentation of its technology, 
combined with a certain positivistic attitude towards the future which is exemplified in the (strongly 
held) belief that science will be the impetus for the solution of the world’s problems. This attitude is 
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illustrated in Heinlein’s Future History series, as well as in many stories by Isaac Asimov, though 
both authors have, in more recent years and in the minds of some, been excluded from the hard sf 
canon by virtue of their focus on social issues.  
The term ‘hard sf’ itself emerges in 195771, and does not denote a specific trend or turn in 
science fiction. Prior to the introduction of the term, those stories which we would nowadays 
categorize as hard were simply considered sf. It was only following a change in direction among 
some prominent science fiction writers, altering social conventions, and the emergence of other 
voices writing sf (generally seen as the effects of the 1960s and 70s counter-culture movements), 
that the need for a return to traditional forms of science fiction (as seen by proponents of what 
would become hard sf) emerged. Kathryn Cramer argues that “the term ‘hard sf’ is used similarly to 
‘Golden Age sf’ and has always been nostalgic, referring to a lost era of ‘real sf’” (Cramer 189), 
and that the evolution of the use of the term, and the notorious infighting among fans and 
practitioners of the subgenre, demonstrate that the definition of hard sf is a product of constant 
reevaluation, reconsideration, and repeated attempts at finding the correct or true definition. 
Interestingly, one of sf’s break-off movements, that of cyberpunk, also evolves out of a struggle to 
properly define science fiction. Bruce Sterling’s call for a new movement in Cheap Truth is a 
condensation of the call by British Interzone for a new ‘radical hard SF story’ that would harken  
back to traditional approaches (Heinlein’s focus on technology) and concentrate on current science 
(Cramer 194). This can both be seen in what Paul McAuley labels ‘radical hard sf,’ defined as “SF 
rooted in the core traditions of SF but also surfing the wave of the present,” (quoted in Cramer 195) 
as well as the movement which Sterling’s call helps spark, that of cyberpunk, best exemplified by 
William Gibson. Whether one can ever define ‘real sf’ or even ‘hard sf’ remains determined by the 
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 The term originates as an essay in Astounding by P.Schuyler in November 1957, as noted in The Cambridge 
Companion to Science Fiction (Cramer 196).  
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mindset of the reader, with those who ascribe to this debate, which is at the heart of the definition of 
‘hard sf’ at all, following a modernist outlook. 
 
"The 'Net' is a waste of time, and that's exactly what's right about it." 
William Gibson, New York Times Magazine 
 
‘The Gernsback Continuum’ 
“The Gernsback Continuum” by William Gibson first published in Universe 11 in 1981, and then 
later anthologized in the Mirrorshades collection, exemplifies the position in which ontological 
uncertainty is presented, but then reinscribing it in a modernist frame, what I term late modernism. 
Gibson’s short story, in which two mutually exclusive worlds are placed literally on top of one 
another, is a germinal, perhaps even foundational, text in the cyberpunk movement. The 
protagonist/narrator, a photojournalist, is sent to the southwest United States to photograph 
futuristic buildings from the 1930s, a “kind of alternate America: a 1980s that never happened” 
(Gibson, “Gernsback” 5). In the course of the assignment, he starts to see visions of 1930s objects, 
such as a twelve-engined plane, as “actually” present in his reality, interacting with contemporary 
space. The narrator is unsure what to make of these ever more frequent occurrences, whether they 
are actually happening, or whether he is hallucinating and has gone insane. 
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, in “Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism,” argues that, “cyberpunk is 
part of a trend in science fiction dealing increasingly with madness, more precisely with the most 
philosophically interesting phenomenon of madness: hallucination (derangement)” (Csicsery-Ronay 
189). In my opinion this is because cyberpunk, as much of science fiction (and fantastic literature 
more generally), uses a process of metaphor literalization to act out the concepts that other genres 
express via conceit or allusion. Cyberpunk, in dealing with the questioning of reality, in face of the 
ever-more real idea of virtuality, makes “reality” literally into a hallucination or take the form of a 
collective dream-like state.  
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This becomes clearer when considering the protagonists encounter with a young couple near 
their 1930s futuristic automobile. “Sanity had ceased to be an issue; I knew, somehow that the city 
behind me was Tuscon – a dream Tuscon thrown up out of the collective yearning of the era. That it 
was real, entirely real. But the couple in front of me lived in it, and that frightened me” (Gibson, 
‘Gernsback’ 9). Gibson presents the idea of a hallucination in a different light. He demonstrates 
that, in a certain sense, all things are a form of a hallucination. The protagonist consults a friend on 
the issue, who assures him that he isn’t, in fact, crazy. “Of course not. It wasn’t like that at all; it 
was ‘in a setting of clear reality,’ right? Everything normal, and then there’s the monster, the 
mandala, the neon cigar. In your case, a giant Tom Swift plane. It happens all the time. You’re not 
even crazy. You know that, don’t you?” (Gibson, ‘Gernsback’ 6). Gibson subverts the idea that 
hallucinations, in the contemporary world, are a function of insanity, and rather presents them as a 
normal occurrence.  
The world that of the young couple represents the “80s-that-wasn’t,” a world, “that knew 
nothing of pollution, the finite bounds of fossil fuels, of foreign wars it was possible to lose” 
(Gibson, ‘Gernsback’ 9). To the protagonist it represented a (bad) dream world, with “all the 
sinister fruitiness of Hitler Youth propaganda” (Gibson, ‘Gernsback’ 9), a world which invaded his 
own, but which could be distinguished from it ontologically. There was even a cure, to prevent one 
from seeing the invasion of reality by this dream state: really bad media (such as Nazi Love Motel, 
really bad Nazi themed pornography).  
Scholarly criticism of Gibson tends to focus on his rejection of a utopian vision in favor of a 
more realistic, fragmented future scenario (characteristic of his later works). Veronica Hollinger 
states that, “Gibson’s story is not simply an ironization of naïve utopianism; it also, I think, warns 
against the limitations, both humorous and dangerous, inherent in any vision of the future based 
upon narrowly defined ideological systems that take it upon themselves to speak ‘universally,’ or 
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which conceive of themselves as ‘natural’ or ‘absolute’” (Hollinger 214-5). While I agree that this 
story rejects concepts of natural and absolute values (at least those easily recognizable in the dream 
scenario), I contend that the story maintains the idea of a fundamental reality, perhaps not “perfect” 
(which Gibson sets up as a concept to be avoided) but at least “real” and recognizable.  
The dream state is distinguishable from one’s own reality, and with the help of television, 
one can return to a simpler state of experience. Thus, while the text presents the notion of a merging 
of realities in which there is a lack of reference for an absolute truth, and even of the reality of one’s 
own world, ultimately the realities are separated. The text asserts a single, ‘correct’ reality, and 
undermines the idea that both worlds are equally real. There is, at the end of the narrative, an 
assertion that the worlds, although seeming to overlap and coexist, are distinct. The narrator is able 
to distinguish the dream state from his own, contemporary, reality. This ultimately presents a notion 
of a late modernist approach to the ontological concerns of which world we inhabit. In this 
approach, the narrative presents doubt as to the reality of the narrative world and there is the seed of 
ontological uncertainty, yet, ultimately, that doubt is resolved, both within the narrative and for the 
reader, within the confines of the text. The narrator, despite his doubts, is able to determine his 
ontological state accurately, and the reader is given no reason to doubt its accuracy.  
 
‘The Good Ring’ 
The modernist ontological structure is further complicated in Svend Åge Madsen’s short story, 
“Den gode ring” [“The Good Ring”], originally published in the volume Maskeballet [The 
Masquerade] a collection of connected short stories narrated by three people caught in a castle by 
an explosion. The collection belongs to a second phase of Madsen’s œvre, characterized by the 
“revelation … that the complete deconstruction of meaning in fact results in a hopeful condition for 
mankind: fundamental relativism sets the individual free” (Andersen 270). ‘Den gode ring,’ which 
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allows for that conclusion on certain levels, represents a situation in which a particular reality is 
identifiable as the correct option, thus, I argue, reinforcing a (late) modernist ideal.  
The story depicts a poor farmer, Stig, who is given the opportunity, via a ‘magic’ ring, to 
confront the entities, the Brains, that have created his world (as a type of petri dish experiment for 
historical/anthropological research, attempting to determine their own past). He is then offered the 
chance to choose which world on which he would like to continue his existence. At first Stig doubts 
the story of the Brain (and his colleagues), stating “Min verden kan ikke være uvirkelig” (83) [“My 
world can’t be unreal” (72)]. Then, after the Brains have explained that they have a number of 
worlds in a similar state to Stig’s own, he asks if he can see the others, in order to determine their 
reality. “’Jeg vil se nogle af jeres andre verdener før jeg tror på jer. Hvis I ikke vil vise mig andre 
planeter ved jeg at min er den eneste rigtige verden,’ udbryder Stig beslutsomt” (85) [“’Before I 
believe you I’d like to see some of your other worlds. If you won’t show me other planets I’ll know 
that mine is the only real world,’ Stig exclaims with firmness” (74)].  
After visiting the three other worlds (simultaneously, although he experiences them, and 
they are presented to the reader in the narrative, one at a time), Stig is told that he must choose 
which world to return to, in order to live out the rest of his existence. The three worlds each present 
a different version of reality. The first presents a happy version of his own world, in which he and 
his wife, Karen, have created the world exactly as they want it to be, and are thus happy as a 
consequence. In the second world, which is more technologically advanced, in which Stig can 
create duplicates of himself, or Karen, as well as alter their sizes. The final version presents a 
collective consciousness in which all people are interconnected, “De er sig selv, og de er sammen, 
og de er gruppen” (91) [“They are themselves, they are the same person, they are the group” (79)].  
 Stig remains, after all of his visits and his conversation with the Brains, firmly focused on 
the idea of authenticity. He tries to ascertain which of the four versions (his own included) is the 
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one that leads to the Brains’ evolution. “Hvilken af de fire verdener er den rigtige model” (92) 
[“Which of the four worlds is the authentic one?” (79)]. Despite the Brain’s assurance that this is an 
inadequate question, and that there is “ikke kun én sandhed,” (92) [“not simply one truth” (80)], 
Stig claims that “lige meget hvilken jeg vælger vil jeg hele tiden spekulere på om jeg har valgt 
rigtigt” (93) [“regardless of how I choose, I’ll always be wondering whether I made the right 
choice” (80)]. Despite this uncertainty, Stig does finally make a decision to return to the original, 
seemingly quite unhappy, existence to which he was born. The story implies, through this ending, 
that the other worlds presented a reality so far removed from his own world that it was only proper, 
for Stig, to remain in his own, leading to the conclusion that this is the “real” world for him. This 
still leaves the possibility, or perhaps quite more explicitly a probability, of a “fundamental 
relativism” as Andersen states. However, Madsen presents us with a situation in which an 
ontological determination can, indeed, be made. Although the epistemological questions, on which 
Stig remains focused, are ultimately unresolved, the worlds remain ontologically distinct and 
decipherable, despite the suggestion that they are, in fact, overlapping in some sense. Thus, while 
the epistemological question remains unanswered (and unanswerable, not even the Brains have an 
answer to the question of which is the authentic world), the ontological distinction is clear and 
distinct. The reader, at the end of the story, is left with the knowledge that Stig has returned to his 
“own” reality. This is based, both within the narrative and with regards to the reader/narrative 
relationship, on the basis that this reality most closely resembles their own.  
It is, in fact, the reader who has the greatest role to play here in determining the ontological 
approach at work in the text. The reader identifies with Stig, as the protagonist of the story. Thus, 
by extension, the assertion of the world resembling the reader’s own also reinforces the reader’s 
world as the ‘real’ world. This world is then defined in contrast to the other worlds presented. 
Consequently, although these alternative worlds exist simultaneously, and the Brains offer no 
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privileging of one world over the other, there is an assertion that for Stig, and thus for the reader, 
they are Other worlds, by which the original world can be defined as the real one. Similar to the 
idea of multiple planets, or the idea of time travel, the idea of parallel universes allows an almost 
philosophical approach to the positive and negative consequences of various worlds, without 
making any judgments or attempting to present a ‘better’ alternative. Madsen here seems only to 
want to sow doubt about the inevitability of the reality in which Stig (and through comparison, the 
reader) exists. Thus, while an ontological doubt is presented, as with the overlapping worlds of 
Gibson’s story, and the epistemological issues remain unsolved, in the ontological sphere Madsen’s 
story also remains a late modernist text.  
Late modernism, in which the doubt often associated with postmodernism is presented and 
yet not performed, has been presented here in the consideration of texts in which we have analyzed 
the ontological status of their worlds. The next section will continue to look at late modernist texts, 
which focus their ontological considerations on the status, not of worlds, but of individuals: Ursula 
Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness and Ridley Scott’s film (based on the Philip K. Dick novel) 
Blade Runner.  
 
“We all know interspecies romance is weird.”  
Tim Burton  
 
The Left Hand of Darkness 
Ursula Le Guin’s 1969 novel, The Left Hand of Darkness, deals with a contrast between planets, 
specifically between Gethen (translated within the narrative to Winter) and the rest of the worlds of 
the Ekumen, a federation of planets which is developed throughout her Hainish cycle. However, 
while there exists this multiworld scenario behind the structure of the novel, the narrative focuses 
on the individual experience. The protagonist, Genly Ai, is the sole representative of the Ekumen on 
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the planet, in their attempt to make an alliance and have Gethen join the federation. Thus, all 
interaction between the cultures occurs on an individual, rather than world, level.  
Generally classified as a soft SF writer, Le Guin tends to focus on speculative societies, 
typically involving issues concerning gender and religion, rather than on technological 
developments typically associated with hard SF. Although The Left Hand of Darkness does feature 
travel to distant worlds and some technological developments (the ansible for communication, 
cryostasis allowing travel of many light years at sub-light speed), this does not remain the focus of 
her novel. She also uses her texts as thought experiments, purposefully playing with ideas in order 
to highlight certain differences. For Le Guin, “The purpose of a thought experiment … is not to 
predict the future … but to describe reality, the present world” (Le Guin, xii). In this case, she 
focuses mainly on the intercommunication (and miscommunication) of the various characters in her 
story. One of the largest barriers to communication between Genly, the male envoy of the Ekumen, 
and the inhabitants of Gethen, is that the Gethenians are a race of androgynes.  
Through their interaction, Le Guin discusses the possibility that gender need not necessarily 
exist in the strict predetermined duality that it is often portrayed in our culture (and that of Genly, 
with whom the audience tends to identify throughout the text). The majority of the time, the 
Gethenians are not at all sexual (akin to the periods of time many animals are not in heat) and in 
those periods they do not exhibit either masculine or feminine sexual organs or features. It is only 
during specific periods (approximately once a month) that the Gethenians become gendered. The 
gender of each Gethenian is undetermined until kemmer, this sexual period, is entered. “Normal 
individuals have no predisposition to either sexual role in kemmer; they do not know whether they 
will be the male or the female, and have no say in the matter” (Le Guin 91). In fact, the process 
itself determines which gender role an individual will take, because it occurs in reaction to the 
potential partner’s gender role. “When the individual finds a partner in kemmer, hormonal secretion 
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is further stimulated (most importantly by touch – secretion? Scent?) until in one partner either a 
male or female hormonal dominance is established. The genitals engorge or shrink accordingly, 
foreplay intensifies, and the partner, triggered by the change, takes on the other sexual role” (Le 
Guin 90). It is only through reaction to the other in the relationship that gender roles are asserted.  
This trait, according to the narrative, eliminates a great deal of friction that is inherent in our 
society. As any individual can take on either masculine or feminine roles – both biologically and 
socioculturally (and often do, both siring and giving birth to future generations) much of the 
aggressive behavior (war, rape) is eliminated on Gethen. In that way, it is an interesting experiment 
in feminism, a way for SF to explore feminist ideals by providing a platform for describing gender 
roles differently. The narrative itself discusses this explicitly: “There is no division of humanity into 
strong and weak halves, protective/protected, dominant/submissive, owner/chattel, active/passive. 
In fact the whole tendency to dualism that pervades human thinking may be found to be lessened, or 
changed, in Winter” (Le Guin 94). Yet, even by providing an alternative gender, or way of 
describing gender, Le Guin doesn’t fundamentally alter the way we look at gender as an ontological 
construct. Even her description of the mating process of the Gethenians reinforces the idea of a 
duality. She does, however, present the idea that the binaries that we use to construct identity are 
not fixed or static, but can be altered with new ways of thinking. It is the presentation of the concept 
of fluid identity formation found in a postmodern structure of consciousness, but without a 
commitment to that structure itself. This is mainly due to the position of Genly as outside the 
androgyne construct. The reader, through Genly’s point of view, still experiences the androgyne as 
Other in relation to himself.  
This process that Le Guin describes with gender can be further extrapolated to other 
dualities as well. It forms the basis of how individual identity is constructed, reacting to an Other, 
and setting a boundary by which one is defined as belonging to the category that inhabits the 
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opposite position to that assigned the Other. Individually in their sexual process, Gethenians 
experience this in each period of kemmer, a revolving and ever changing occurrence. Other science 
fiction texts use this same binary notion applied to different categories of Otherness to construct 
various parts of our own individual (and in some cases collective national or human) identity. This 
common SF theme can be found in numerous texts using the first contact scenario, either on an 
individual basis (like here with Genly Ai, or with the buddy cop relationship of Alien Nation, or the 
interactions between Wikus Van De Merwe and the ‘prawns’ in District 9) or on a more collective 
basis, as discussed earlier.  
Le Guin’s novel also broadens the concept of identity beyond that of exclusively gender. By 
placing Genly Ai as the sole character that resembles the reader, it forces the reader to identify with 
his experience. This is reinforced by having the majority of the story, ten of the twenty chapters, 
narrated in the first person by Genly himself. The remaining chapters are either narrated directly by 
others (five chapters) or are presented in the third person (five chapters), but it is important to note 
that the entire text is chosen and presented by Genly. As Spivack notes, “His is the overall 
structuring consciousness of the book” (Spivack 45). Genly’s story is also the story of the 
construction of his identity. Through a series of negotiations, he learns to see himself in relation to 
the Gethenians. The Gethenians, individually and in their commonality represent the Other for 
Genly. This concept is not absent for the Gethenians, however, and they also recognize the 
necessity of otherness for the construction of one’s identity. “As Estraven points out, duality is not 
unknown to the androgyne, for there is always the Other. Recognition of the Other is a lesson from 
childhood and maturity alike, and we need this recognition for our psychological growth. Le Guin’s 
idea of androgyny leads toward a meeting of strangers and of the sexes, not away from it” (Bucknell 
76). What Le Guin has done has simply changed the focus away from a typical male/female 
dichotomy to that of a male/androgyne differentiation, or simply a human/alien distinction.  
 172 
As androgyny is not the norm for Genly (with the reader in a similar position), it takes a 
long time for him to come to terms with this new form of subjectivity. The entire text is a working 
out of how to communicate and negotiate with a new type of identity, both the foreignness of the 
Gethenian society and sexuality, but also how that redefines the way that Genly views the world. 
This is ultimately accomplished through a close personal relationship with Estraven, which 
develops while they are isolated together having been exiled from the two main nation-states on 
Gethen. Genly ultimately has to recognize, and accept, that Estraven contains both masculine and 
feminine parts, and it is only when the feminine side of Estraven becomes apparent, during kemmer, 
that Genly is finally able to see Estraven as he/she really is. Bittner claims that for Genly, in their 
isolation, “the categories (e.g., male-female, and all other dualisms) he has used to see Estraven 
vanish, and he can, when he is otherwise blind, perceive Estraven as he-she really is. Genly Ai 
experiences the ‘shift of identity’ Frye speaks of when the ways in which he sees, which are his 
identity, shift” (Bittner 15). While Genly does go through an identity shift of his own, demonstrable 
in his description of his ‘own’ kind at the end of the novel, the duality that he uses to come to terms 
with Estraven remains. It is not exclusively the male/female duality, but it is still a duality, that of 
oneself and other that codifies both his own role and identity and the position of Estraven (and by 
extension the reader) relative to Genly.  
The reader must also come to terms with the androgyne construct that Le Guin has created. 
There has been some criticism that Estraven’s feminine side was not made more explicit, perhaps 
by discussing his giving birth or taking on a more traditional maternal role, which may have further 
highlighted Estraven’s androgyne characteristics for Genly and have allowed a quicker positioning 
of Estraven as other. However, as mentioned, it is only through Genly’s narration that Estraven is 
clearly seen, and so his perspective colors and guides the understanding of the reader as well. “In 
The Left Hand of Darkness Genly Ai’s point of view develops slowly, so that his discovery of the 
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feminine nature of Estraven does not come close to the end of the novel, and the reader has no basis 
for getting ahead of the narrator” (Spivack 58). Thus, while Le Guin here does provide a scenario in 
which gender classifications are fluid and interchangeable, thus rendering the concept of gender, 
outside of the specific sexual situation, ill-suited to identification, this scenario is only described as 
a singular case, that of the planet Gethen, within the story. The story as a whole doesn’t simply 
present this aspect, but rather uses that as a foil by which to define Genly, and by extension the 
reader. It is through this ‘outside’ perspective that we are able to understand the androgyne as other, 
and thus redefine humanity. We do so, however, by the same modernist approach as in previously 
discusses human/alien encounters. This suggestion of ontological indeterminability (the postmodern 
approach), while the larger structural elements of the story do not support that reading, and in fact 
reinforce the modernist structure, is what I call late modernist, as it continues to follow the 
modernist dialectical approach.  
 
“More human than human" is our motto.” 
Blade Runner 
 Blade Runner 
The 1982 film Blade Runner offers us yet another perspective. In this film, based on Philip 
K. Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, the protagonist, Rick Deckard, is a bounty 
hunter sent to exterminate escaped replicants, a sophisticated type of android. The narrative focuses 
on Deckard, who is working a case, reminiscent of a hard-boiled detective story, involving the 
identification and elimination of a specific group of fugitive replicants. There are rules that state 
that replicants are not allowed to be on Earth. They were designed for the colonies (Mars 
specifically) and are legally bound to live there, as the virtual slaves of their human owners. Joseph 
Francavilla attributes this displacement to a fear that the replicants, who are arguably more 
advanced at this Nexus 6 stage than humans, will replace the humans in their own realm.  
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Initially, there is often competition or rivalry between doubles for the same space or 
location, the same position or rank, the same right to existence. (To prevent this competition, 
the humans in Blade Runner have forbidden the replicants, under penalty of death, to return 
to Earth.) This competition further implies the threat of displacement: the original self may 
lose its uniqueness and its identity to the other self which replaces the original. (Francavilla 
7)  
 
A further hindrance to the replicants is their built-in 4 year life span, designed prevent the replicants 
from acquiring too much experience, especially the capacity to form emotions.  
 The narrative sets up a difference, ontologically, between the humans and replicants as a 
premise to the story. Deckard’s mission, characteristic of the detective genre which the film 
emulates, is an epistemological quest. He uses a polygraph-like device, the Voigt-Kampff test, to 
gauge emotional response to sets of questions, thus reinforcing both to himself and to the audience 
that not only is there a specific difference (true emotion versus programmed emotional response) 
between humans and replicants, but that this difference makes it possible to distinguish between 
them with a degree of certainty. Morally, this is important, as Deckard is charged not only with 
locating and identifying the rogue replicants but ‘retiring’ them as well, since they must be 
destroyed if discovered on Earth; thus being able to distinguish between the replicants (replaceable 
machines) and humans is vital. The preferred term, ‘retirement,’ also reinforces the emphasis on 
making a distinction between the replicants and humans.  
 The text, however, proceeds to question many of these premises, casting doubt both on the 
reliability of the Voight-Kampff test as well as the identity and humanity of the characters 
themselves. This is done both in the source novel as well as in the film, although in somewhat 
different ways. Dick’s novel introduces the character of J.R. Isidore early on. Isidore is one of the 
few humans remaining on Earth, partly through apathy but mainly because he has not been able to 
qualify for off-planet emigration. “Worse still, he had failed to pass the minimum mental faculties 
test, which made him in popular parlance a chickenhead” (Dick 19). Isidore’s character, especially 
in juxtaposition to the android character Rachael, with whom he comes to share a living space, begs 
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the question of what criteria are used in determining who is human and who is not. Isidore, based on 
a mental test, does not qualify to join the rest of the humans on the colonies. In contrast, the Nexus 
6 androids are considerably more intelligent than Isidore, yet are not given the same rights. It is 
clear that intelligence alone is not the distinguishing factor.  
 The Voigt-Kampff test that Deckard administers measures the subject’s responses to 
affective stimuli, suggesting that one’s emotional response is the determining factor. The text also 
suggests that this factor is not completely determinate. One of the concerns presented is that 
“schizoid and schizophrenic human patients …those, specifically, which reveal what’s called a 
‘flattening of affect’” (Dick 37) would fail to pass the test. However, the text doesn’t concentrate on 
the ontological difference here, leaving any hints of doubt obscured and instead focusing on the 
detective’s ability to ascertain the difference. “If you can’t pick out all the humanoid robots, then 
we have no reliable analytical tool” (Dick 38). By focusing solely on the epistemological concerns, 
the text relies on the premise that there is an ontological difference, assuring both Deckard 
 and the reader that the androids are different than humans, and with the appropriate test he can 
reasonably and justifiably ‘retire’ the rebellious replicants.  
 The film also takes up the question of ontology by inviting the audience to speculate about 
Deckard: Is it possible that Deckard himself is a replicant, even if he would then be unaware of his 
status? “He is figuratively, if not literally, a sophisticated replicant. The film even suggests that 
Deckard may be a replicant himself without knowing it, secretly created by Tyrell or by someone 
else. The viewer is encouraged to speculate about Deckard’s identity because of Rachael’s 
questions and because of the fact that Deckard never takes the Voight-Kampff test” (Francavilla 
12). Much of this speculation can be read into the novel as well, although it is less explicit. 
Francavilla argues that even absent any evidence that Deckard is a replicant, he switches roles with 
Roy Batty, the leader of the rebellious replicants, with Batty taking on human characteristics while 
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Deckard remains cold, methodical, and even absent any emotional attachment in the process of 
‘retiring’ beings that are virtually identical to humans. Dick’s novel, however, doesn’t ascribe any 
emotional content to the androids, as the film does, and thus, even if the novel does posit questions 
about the defining characteristics of humanity, the use of emotions as a defining line remains (at 
least for ‘normal’ humans). The film changes this by giving Batty human emotions (especially 
evident in his confrontation with Tyrell and later with Deckard), making the only discernable 
difference the built-in lifespan of the replicants and the audience’s that they are, in fact, androids – 
synthetic organisms manufactured to appear humanoid. 
 It is, again, this last fact that truly differentiates this film, which uses a late modernist 
approach, and from postmodern texts. The audience is afforded a position by which one can 
determine the ontological status of the characters. Scott Bukatman argues that Blade Runner goes as 
far a possible in this regard, especially with the character of Deckard. “Blade Runner is a film that, 
possibly, pushes the idea of the posthuman as far as a mainstream movie can; after all, we can never 
be certain of Deckard’s ontological status” (Bukatman ‘Who Programs You’ 198). This is further 
developed with the Director’s Cut of the film (from 1992), in which the much discussed unicorn 
scene is added. The scene, a dream sequence in which Deckard sees a unicorn running through a 
meadow, is coupled with Graf, one of the other policemen, leaving an origami figure of a unicorn 
for Deckard at the end of the film. This implies, to some critics
72, that Deckard’s vision of the 
unicorn is an implanted memory indicating that he is a replicant, since Graf knows about Deckard’s 
memory. Slavoj Žižek, in Tarrying with the Negative, argues that Deckard needs to be a replicant 
for the film to have its most potent implications. It would then, especially as the audience, 
reluctantly
73
, identifies with Deckard, be possible for us to confront our own humanity. “It is only 
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 It convinced Paul Sammon, author of Future Noir: The Making of Blade Runner. “The only logical conclusion is an 
inescapable one: in the Director’s Cut, Rick Deckard is a replicant” (364). 
73
 Francavilla argues that it is Deckard’s replicant characteristics (even if he is human) that make him difficult to 
immediately identify with, even if he is the clear protagonist of the film. “One of the reasons audiences may have found 
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when … I assume my replicant-status that ‘I become a truly human subject’” (Žižek 15).74 In fact, 
Ridley Scott has come out and clearly stated, in an interview with Digital Spy in 2014, that Deckard 
is a replicant. 
Yet, despite these arguments, it doesn’t seem that the answer to whether Deckard is a 
replicant or not has been definitively answered. Terry Rawlings, the film’s editor, claims “Ridley 
himself may have definitely felt that Deckard was a replicant, but still, by the end of the picture, he 
intended to leave it up to the viewer to decide whether Deckard was one” (Sammon 364). Scott 
Bukatman, in his monograph on the film goes further, stating that answering the question actually 
takes away from the impact of the film. “The Deckard debate is, in some ways, a denial of what the 
film really does offer, which is a double reading: undecidability” (Bukatman, Blade Runner 81-2). 
However, even as there is doubt as to Deckard’s ontological status, it remains clear that in principle, 
the truth could be determined – he either is or is not a replicant – regardless of whether or not this 
information is accessible to us. Furthermore, as mentioned, there is no blurring of the line between 
android and human in the film. It is a clear premise that there is a distinction between the two, with 
the focus both of the film and of the internet-based discussion being on the epistemological problem 
of how to determine his status, rather than on any problems with the ontological question itself 
(what is human?, for example).
75
 We are left in doubt only because we are not provided with the 
right information, not because we question whether there is a distinction between the replicants and 
the humans. There is no melding of the idea of human and Other, in the film. Thus, while the film 
alludes to the ontological problems dealt with in a postmodern approach, it maintains a modernist 
                                                                                                                                                                  
it hard to identify with the character of Deckard is first, that he is a cold-blooded killer, and second, that he is initially 
and throughout most of the film a dull, dreary, mechanical, unemotional man” (Francavilla 12). 
74
 Bukatman also points out that he makes a similar point about virtual reality, strengthening the importance that both 
modernist visions we have discussed have to the psychoanalytical process. “Žižek makes an identical point about virtual 
reality: ‘true, the computer-generated ‘virtual reality’ is a semblance, it does foreclose the Real; but what we experience 
as the ‘true, hard external reality’ is based upon exactly the same exclusion. The ultimate lesson of ‘virtual reality’ is the 
virtualization of the very ‘true’ reality: by the mirage of ‘virtual reality,’ the ‘true’ reality itself is posited a semblance of 
itself, as a pure symbolic edifice’ (Žižek 44)” (Bukatman 1997 89-90). 
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 This is not to say that it doesn’t spark the ontological question, just that this is not what is presented in the film. The 
focus for Deckard is solving the crimes, not determining whether he is, or is not, human.  
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approach to ontological considerations. The only questions within the film that are truly 
indeterminable are epistemological, and answers to those questions are not ruled out logically, but 
are only unanswered by virtue of missing information.
76
 This is different than in texts like Thomas 
Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 and Christopher Nolan’s film Memento (discussed in a previous 
chapter) in which those epistemological questions were left not just unanswered but unanswerable.  
  
"We are an impossibility in an impossible universe." 
Ray Bradbury  
 
Ontological Indeterminability: The Postmodernist Approach  
In contrast to both the classical and modernist approach, the postmodern approach leads to a 
blurring of the ontological lines between two worlds (nominally real and virtual), individuals, or 
classes of individuals (human/alien, human/android), to the point where there is no discernable 
difference. It therefore allows characters to transcend boundaries that otherwise seem distinct, and 
in a science fiction context, presents boundaries and connections that have so far only been 
conceived allowing readers to consider the consequences thereof.  Hollinger discusses how the 
William Gibson’s seminal 1984 cyberpunk novel, Neuromancer, presents this phenomenon.  
Along with the “other” space of cyberspace, Neuromancer offers alternatives to 
conventional modalities of human existence as well: computer hackers have direct mental 
access to cyberspace, artificial intelligences live and function within it, digitalized constructs 
are based on the subjectivities of humans whose “personalities” have been downloaded into 
computer memory, and human bodies are routinely cloned. (Hollinger 207) 
 
Each of those features allows the exploration of boundaries that don’t map onto our current reality, 
which opens up a space, through technology, not only for a description of an estranged future, but 
of the possibility of transcending existing boundaries and binaries.  
This section will present three cases of the postmodernist approach to ontology and 
subjectivity. Though I agree with McHale that science fiction is an ontological genre, we differ on 
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 This then becomes a Deluezean radicle or tipless root, driving the structure of consciousness of Blade Runner. There 
are answers here, so we are operating in a structure with hierarchy and perspective. 
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its affinity with postmodernism. I claim that there can be both modernist and postmodernist science 
fiction texts. I presented texts which represent a modernist structure of consciousness in previous 
sections, which demonstrated how texts by Gibson, Madsen, Le Guin and Dick (including the 
acclaimed adaptation of his novel) allow the reader to ascertain the truth of ontological distinction 
or individual subjectivity. In this section, we will discuss the Matrix trilogy, Neal Stephenson’s 
postcyberpunk text Snow Crash, and the re-imagined version of the television series Battlestar 
Galactica, each of which provide a depiction of the postmodern structure of consciousness with 
respect to ontology and subjectivity, showing the distinction between the two mindsets. The section 
will be progressively more introspective, moving from the large (world-building) to the small 
(individual encounters). The discussion of the Matrix will focus on the differentiation between the 
virtual and the real. Stephenson’s text will do so likewise, but with a focus on the individual, and 
the blurring of the lines between computer virus and human virus, and between modern and ancient 
technology. Finally, we will discuss Battlestar Galactica in which the difference between computer 
and human on an individual level, and all lines of what defines human (and what defines 
android/robot) are systematically erased, bringing both sides of the Otherness equation into 
question. What Francavilla argues Blade Runner attempted, namely that “the metaphoricity of 
androids can be seen in their resemblance to human beings; at a certain point, as in Blade Runner, 
they are, or soon could be, virtually indistinguishable from humans” (8), becomes, in these 
postmodern texts, a reality rather than a potential. The consequence is that “this allows the android 
to substitute for humans and to infiltrate human society. Eventually all the boundaries are blurred 
between master and slave, hunter and hunted, hero and villain, the inanimate and the animate, the 
human and the nonhuman” (Francavilla 8). 
 Deep in the human unconscious is a pervasive need for a logical universe that 
makes sense. But the real universe is always one step beyond logic."  
Frank Herbert, Dune 
The Matrix Trilogy 
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The Wachowski’s trilogy of films, The Matrix (1999), The Matrix Reloaded (2003), and The Matrix 
Revolutions (2003), taken as a whole present a single cyberpunk text.
77
 The first volume sets up a 
dichotomy between a virtual world which closely resembles the late twentieth century United 
States, and a real dystopic world 200 years in the future (from our contemporary perspective). After 
discovering clues to this reality, the protagonist, known in the virtual world of the Matrix as 
Thomas Anderson, is presented a choice between taking a blue pill (in which case he is returned to 
the simulated life of the Matrix) or a red pill (in which case he is freed from the Matrix and wakes 
up in the real world). Anderson, of course, selects the red pill, which allows him to be removed 
from the computer’s, intricately designed human farming system and taken to a ship, the 
Nebuchadnezzar, based out of Zion, an underground enclave of rebel humans.  
Thus, from the very beginning the dichotomy between reality and virtuality is set up in the 
trilogy, with the choice between a known domain (the virtual world of the Matrix, with which 
Anderson is familiar) and ‘truth’ (the dystopic ‘real’ future) being played out early in the first film. 
The film then proceeds to deconstruct the seeming reality of the Matrix, a world that closely 
parallels the audience’s own reality. Neo (Thomas Anderson’s new persona in the real world) learns 
to manipulate the virtual environment, which does not, necessarily, conform to the laws of the 
natural world (the simulation, although good, is a computer controlled universeand its laws can be 
hacked or circumvented). The worlds remain differentiable and distinct, via a difference in color 
palette (limited, muted colors, mostly blacks and greys, and a characteristic green reminiscent of old 
computer monitors) and brightness (the Matrix is invariably more brightly shot) as well as a 
difference in context (the characters’ clothing, surroundings, and interactions). The characters must 
be physically inserted into the Matrix by means of a physical brain link, and consequently in the 
real world they bear the mark of this input (in the back of the head, by which a spike directly enters 
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 The transmedia whole of the Matrix franchise could be seen as part of this universe, and thus all part of the single 
‘text’ for the purposes of this dissertation, which will, however, only discuss the three films.  
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the brainstem), while characters within the Matrix (their virtual selves) bear no such mark. Thus, 
not only are the worlds distinct, but so are the characters’ personæ within the various worlds, 
creating within the text two identities for each “free” individual. 
This dichotomy between the multiple characters, is quickly deconstructed, for while the 
virtual characters are not bound by natural laws within the Matrix, the real and virtual characters are 
tied together, as things that affect one affect the other. This is clearly shown in terms of life and 
death. It is stated that a character who dies in the Matrix is killed in real life (the body cannot 
sustain itself when the mind thinks it is deceased). This presumably happens to numerous virtual 
characters that are temporarily occupied by the Agents of the Matrix (computer programs designed 
to hunt down the infiltrating virtual versions of the free individuals). This is also clear throughout 
the fight scenes, when the physical harm that comes to the virtual characters cause their real bodies 
to writhe and bleed, even if they are only connected via mental link. The reverse, of course, is also 
true, as harm that comes to the real characters necessarily impacts their virtual avatars. This is 
demonstrated via the betrayal of Cypher, who kills some of his fellow crewmates by removing their 
link to the Matrix (physically ripping out the link) leading to their real deaths, and the collapse of 
their virtual characters. Thus, while there are two distinct worlds, there is, truly, only one 
personality, which can both enter, and exist apart from, the Matrix. 
The idea that the worlds themselves are distinct and differentiable is also brought into doubt 
later in the trilogy. In the second installment, The Matrix Reloaded, Neo is able to protect Zion from 
the attacking machines by stopping them with only his mind (as he was able, within the Matrix, to 
stop bullets once he gained control over his virtual self, and its relations to the natural laws or the 
code). This leads one to believe that the world that was originally presented as real, and which 
Morpheus understood to be the “truth” when offering Neo the red pill, is perhaps indistinguishable 
from the Matrix itself. If Neo can manipulate things in the real world in the same way that he 
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manipulates things in the virtual world, this calls into question the reality of the “real” world (of the 
dystopic future). How can one then distinguish between them? This is further complicated by the 
integration of Agent Smith, an evolved form of Agent, though presumably still a function of the 
computer program running the Matrix), into the world of Zion. Agent Smith is able to overwrite the 
identity of one of the characters in the real world, Bane, and assume his identity. While the ability 
of Agents to take over the simulated bodies of humans wired into the Matrix is common, and 
accepted from the very beginning, it seems impossible that a computer program can overwrite the 
identity of a human outside the constraints of virtuality. The suggestion, as with Neo’s ability to 
alter the natural laws, is that the world of Zion can be considered no more real than the Matrix. 
There is no way with the information presented to either the characters or, importantly, to the 
audience, to determine the veracity of the claim that Zion is real, that the Matrix is virtual, or that 
the worlds are, in fact, multiple. The notion that the audience is in doubt is critical to the 
postmodern approach. If the audience were given knowledge of the distinct ontological states, then 
there would be a perspective by which one could distinguish the states, even if unbeknownst to the 
characters within the narrative. By virtue of the audience’s lack of such knowledge, it becomes 
possible to identify directly with the characters, instead of having a bird’s eye view of the story, and 
thus to immerse oneself in the indeterminacy of the reality of the story. Thus, not only for the 
characters, but also for the audience, there remains no possibility of an answer to the ontological 
inquiry of what kind of world is presented in the film.  
This suspension of ontological closure represents the postmodern structure of consciousness, 
which metaphorizes postmodern poetics. This is useful in allowing the audience to question the 
constructedness of their own reality. Science fiction writer and critic Gwyneth Jones argues that 
what is necessary in science fiction is “not a suspension of disbelief, it is an active process of 
translation” (Jones 6). She claims that the construction of worlds is a necessary tool to apply the 
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lessons of SF to contemporary society. “But there is nothing like constructing a world, or 
recognizing a constructed world, for teaching you to see your own world as a construct” (Jones 6). 
In postmodern poetics, while considering ontological inquiries, however, the very boundaries that 
would be able to demonstrate that a world is constructed are broken down, after being highlighted 
and presented as boundaries. This leads one to consider not only that the world one inhabits might 
likewise be a construct (Are we in the Matrix ourselves?), but even what it would mean for such 
construct to exist. All of the boundaries and understandings of ontology, the very notions 
concerning what a world is, let alone which world we inhabit, are brought into doubt, leading to a 
discussion of the very nature of “world.”  
 
“This Snow Crash thing--is it a virus, a drug, or a religion?”  
Juanita shrugs. “What's the difference?”  
Neal Stephenson 
  
Snow Crash 
Snow Crash is a 1992 novel by Neal Stephenson, which is most often described as postcyberpunk. 
It presents a dystopic future, focused in the United States, which has been divided up into corporate 
interests functioning as independent states. This novel also presents, as do most cyberpunk novels, a 
global online network, the Metaverse (a variant on Gibson’s cyberspace), in which one enters with 
an avatar into a three-dimensionally rendered universe. As the novel explains, “Your avatar can 
look any way you want it to, up to the limitations of your equipment” (Stephenson 36). As a 
continuation of cyberpunk, it has an archetypal hacker main character, here aptly self-named Hiro 
Protagonist (Hiro being short for Hiroaki) as well as maintaining the aesthetic in terms of the 
protagonist (contrasted with the primarily suburban surroundings). Hiro, like Neo, leads a rather 
double life, a ‘warrior prince’ within the Metaverse, but an undistinguished hacker outside of it. 
This frames the virtual space as the realm of imagination – an escapist fantasy – the world in which 
Hiro is most comfortable and the place where he is accepted and belongs. 
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 Snow Crash, in contrast to Gibson’s pioneering Neuromancer represents a later generation, 
both in terms of the postcyberpunk subgenre (the novel is published 4 years after the ‘end’ of 
cyberpunk), and in terms of the protagonist (who ten years into his hacking days, is now the ‘old 
man’ of the hacker community). Stephenson thus presents science fiction for a new generation 
(assuming that the generations are moving much more quickly in the digital age), for whom virtual 
worlds, augmented reality, and digital communities have become familiar. “The postcyberpunk 
viewpoint is not outside the fishbowl looking in, but inside the fishbowl looking around” (Persson). 
The characters interact with each other in a mediated fashion, not only connecting to the Metaverse, 
but using mediated technologies, such as overlays of city maps in Hiro’s delivery truck. Entrance 
into the Metaverse is also done using existing technologies, including goggles and a computer 
interface, rather than ‘jacking-in’ as one would in the Matrix. The use of technology is not 
presented as frightening or horrific, as the dolphin character Jones is in Gibson’s “Johnny 
Mneumonic,” or singular as Case in Neuromancer, but as ordinary, even improved. “Your mistake,” 
Ng says, “is that you think that all mechanically assisted organisms – like me – are pathetic 
cripples. In fact, we are better than we were before” (Stephenson 248). Far from being an 
overarching enemy, technology has been seamlessly integrated into society.  
 Yet, one of the main elements of fear in Snow Crash is the breaking down of ontological 
boundaries. As designed the Metaverse and Reality are distinct. This is presented clearly in the 
novel in a number of ways. Hiro Protagonist, as mentioned, leads a very different life in Reality 
than he has online. “So Hiro’s not actually here at all. He’s in a computer-generated universe that 
his computer is drawing onto his goggles and pumping into his earphones. In the lingo, this 
imaginary place is known as the Metaverse. Hiro spends a lot of time in the Metaverse. It beats the 
shit out of the U-Stor-It” (Stephenson 24). Hiro spends his time within the Metaverse, primarily in a 
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virtual city he helped to construct, and specifically in the Black Sun, where the ‘rules’ of the 
Metaverse are laid out for the reader.  
Unlike the Matrix, it is not possible to ‘die’ in the Metaverse, and have this effect you in 
Reality, at least as designed. Essentially, someone who ‘dies’ in the Metaverse is simply ejected, 
more like in a video game than in the Matrix, which has one hardwired to the virtual space. An 
avatar ‘killed’ in the Metaverse prevents the user from re-logging in immediately, until the ‘body’ is 
disposed of, a program (and concept) that Hiro developed. This also causes the illusion of the reality 
of the Black Sun, and by extension the Metaverse, to break down. “It breaks the metaphor. The 
avatar is not acting like a real body. It reminds all The Black Sun’s patrons that they are living in a 
fantasy world. People hate to be reminded of this” (Stephenson 102). So, while the Metaverse is 
virtual, it is also made to look as real as possible, particularly true for the Black Sun, and the effect 
can be enhanced further if the user possesses superior technologies which render facial features 
accurately and allow for in person meetings within the Metaverse to have all of the same features as 
those in Reality. Yet, this blurring isn’t simply an illusion available to a classed elite.  
Boundaries between virtual and real spaces reinforce other such boundaries between 
technology and the body, and between hardware and software. As the novel progresses, those lines, 
clearly drawn and rule-based with the description of the Metaverse, dependent upon the novel’s 
distinct science fiction nova, get progressively blurred. The most high-profile blurring of the line 
occurs when Da5id Meier, the owner of The Black Sun, decides to try snow crash, a virtual drug. 
He insists, as Hiro does, that he is not vulnerable to its effects because his computer is protected 
against all sorts of viruses. Unfortunately, the virus is not limited to his computer. “‘Why would 
anyone show me information in binary code? I’m not a computer. I can’t read a bitmap’” 
(Stephenson 74). We come to learn that not only did Da5id’s system crash, or rather snow crash 
(the screen turned to black and white pixels), but so did Da5id himself. This virtual drug not only 
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wiped out the computer, but the hacker, outside of the machine. “’Da5id’s not a computer. He can’t 
read binary code.’ ‘He’s a hacker. He messes with binary code for a living. That ability is firm-
wired into the deep structures of his brain. So he’s susceptible to that form of information’” 
(Stephenson 200). Da5id’s snow crash isn’t depicted as an epileptic fit, or any of the other causes 
which are known to interact between a screen and its user, but is an infection directed by his ability 
to read the binary code (like Tank or Neo in the Matrix). Crossing the boundary between the virtual 
and the real, and its dangers, reinforces our anxiety with technology (as it becomes more and more 
ubitiquous), in numerous films (Videodrome, eXistenZ, Unfriended, The Ring) and recent television 
series like Black Mirror.  
While ‘classic’ cyberpunk texts typically have a conspiracy which is at the heart of the novel 
(as does this one), the snow crash virus has no such origins, it is unconnected to the religious 
movements, the novels red herrings. The origins of this virus are ancient, and are steeped in historic, 
and possibly supernatural lore. Essentially, Da5id and other hackers (Hiro included) are susceptible 
to the virus because, through their technological abilities, they have altered their brains’ deep 
structures. “You were forming pathways in your brain. Deep structures. Your nerves grow new 
connections as you use them – the axons split and push their way between the dividing glial cells – 
your bioware self-modifies – the software becomes part of the hardware. So now you’re vulnerable 
– all hackers are vulnerable- to a nam-shub. We have to look out for each other” (Stephenson 126). 
Thus, not only is there effacement between the virtual and real worlds, as presented in the Matrix 
case, but it is possible for technology to fundamentally alter the brain’s chemistry.  
The nam-shub is presented as a type of mystical incantation, a performative speech act that 
goes beyond the illocutionary forms theorized by J.L. Austin. These incantations fundamentally 
alter the brain’s deep structures. The narrative further allows that the virus, or rather the metavirus 
(which alters the brain structures which allows for the viruses to attack) is naturally occurring. “Any 
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information system of sufficient complexity will inevitably become infected with viruses – viruses 
generated from within itself” (Stephenson 396). Essentially, the system will produce its own viruses 
and these viruses then reproduce and infect other hosts, eventually taking over civilization itself.  
Interestingly, it turns out that the virus has created human civilization. Thus, it is civilization 
that Hiro and his confederates are trying to ‘undo’. The nam-shub of Enki, which is the antidote to 
snow crash, allows for ‘thinking’ and thus the solution to the dilemma. Essentially, it allows 
‘hacking’, which means altering your environment to suit your needs. The novel presents this as an 
ancient battle between the forces of civilization (and domination) and free-thinking. The “key 
realization was that there’s no difference between modern culture and Sumerian. We have a huge 
workforce that is illiterate or alliterate and relies on TV – which is sort of an oral tradition. And we 
have a small, extremely literate power elite – the people who go into the Metaverse, basically – who 
understand that information is power, and who control society because they have his semimystical 
ability to speak magic computer language” (Stephenson 406).  
In the novel, this distinction between civilization and free thinking is presented as  
two linguistic theories, the universalists, who at the core believe in a fixed structure, and the 
relativists represented by the hackers. “But it seems to me there is a key difference,” Hiro says. 
“The universalists think that we are determined by the prepatterned structure of our brains – the 
pathways in the cortex. The relativists don’t believe that we have any limits” (Stephenson 276). 
This also seems to represent the difference between the modern and postmodern condition.  
Lyotard presents postmodernism as a duality with modernism. Essentially, Snow Crash presents the 
fight between good and evil as the fight between order and free will, between a center that can hold 
and the ability to think for itself. Lyotard states that, “A work can become modern only if it is first 
postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, 
and this state is constant” (Lyotard, Postmodern 79). The virus represents an attempt to close off 
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thought, limiting the ability to manipulate one’s environment, essentially stifling creativity. The 
antidote allows for the removal of those constraints, restoring our lack of any limits. Thus, what this 
allows is a postmodernist structure of consciousness. The novel effaces the boundary between the 
real and the virtual, with the virus able to directly attack the mind in either space, and then, through 
individual actions demonstrates the virtues of the free-thinking postmodernist mindset. 
 
"We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be."  
Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night 
 
Battlestar Galactica 
The post 9/11 remake of Battlestar Galactica provides another intercultural, and individual, 
encounter in which to look at subjectivity. While Lessing’s The Marriages Between Zones Three, 
Four and Five provides a look at the classical approach, with an innate identity reinforced through 
sexual encounters within a marriage, and The Left Hand of Darkness provides a situation in which 
Genly’s identity shifts in reaction to his relationship with Estraven, Battlestar Galactica 
demonstrates a third possibility. It tells the tale of the invasion, and near annihilation, of the human 
population of a group of planets at the hands of their cyborg creations, the cylons. Although the 
conceptual lines between the humans and the cylons (an advanced generation that looks, feels, and 
bleeds like humans) are indistinct, the ontological distinction is initially maintained partly by the 
continued search for a cylon detector (within the narrative) and partly by the audience’s perspective, 
since they are clued in to which characters are cylons. Thus the audience is initially given a 
perspective by which the ontological distinction is possible, seemingly eliminating the doubts 
essential to the questions that come with the postmodern approach. Yet, throughout the series, the 
lines between cylon and human are distinctly, and progressively, blurred. Looking specifically at 
the characters of Sharon
78
 (Grace Park) - in her two distinct incarnations, Boomer and Athena - one 
                                                 
78
 The Sharons are the generic name for the Number Eights (the eighth of the twelve human-like cylons). There are two 
specific Sharons delineated in the series, Lt. Sharon ‘Boomer’ Valerii and Sharon ‘Athena’ Agathon, which I will 
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can see their attempts at understanding their own identities, first perceived as innate, then through 
comparison with the humans, and finally, through a postmodern approach, by analyzing personal 
relationships.  
Initially, Boomer is a Raptor pilot assigned to the battlestar Galactica. Her identity is 
wrapped up in that of the military, and by all accounts she is a fine officer. The show reveals, 
however, that Boomer is a secret agent of the cylons, and a cylon herself (despite her lack of 
knowledge of this state). The audience is cued into this development by the introduction of multiple 
characters played by the same actor, multiple copies of a single model of cylon. Boomer herself 
comes to understand this development after she attempts to assassinate Commander Adama 
(Edward James Olmos), captain of the Galactica (Episode 1.13). There seems to be no 
epistemological method to determine the difference between a cylon and a human, despite some 
effort made by Dr. Gaius Baltar (James Callis) at creating a test, using blood samples (Episode 1.8). 
Despite the robotic nature of the evolved humanoid cylons, they are made of organic material and a 
physically indistinguishable from humans in every way.  
Although the audience can tell the difference (they are clued in to different cylon characters 
through presentation of the doubling of cloned cylons), on a diegetic level no human character can, 
with any authority, tell the difference. This cylon/human distinction is further blurred through the 
relationship between Athena (a different iteration of Sharon) and Karl ‘Helo’ Agathon (Tahmoh 
Penikett), while they are stranded on Caprica in the first season. Caprica, at this point, is a post-
apocalypic waste land, a planet once central to human civilization which was destroyed in a cylon 
nuclear attack (shown during the mini-series backdoor pilot to the series). Helo encounters Athena, 
who he assumes is his fellow crew member from Galactica returned to the planet to rescue him 
                                                                                                                                                                  
specifically refer to by their call-signs, Boomer and Athena. Athena, a call-sign this individual only receives later in the 
series, retains the memories from Boomer’s experience on Galactica, so the identity process is known to her in her 
relationship with Helo on Caprica later in the first season. Some scholars distinguish the two characters as Galactica-
Boomer and Caprica-Boomer, or simply Boomer and Sharon.  
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(Episode 1.1). Both Helo, who is physically separated from his ship and other humans altogether, 
and Athena, who is sent by her fellow cylons on an undercover mission to find out what Helo 
knows, are separated from their own cultural context. This is particularly important for Athena, as 
she is forced to exist as an individual, despite coming from a culture of collectivity. As Robert 
Moore notes, “when we first meet her, Sharon79 is a member of a culture that does not tolerate the 
individual” (Moore 107). Just as in Le Guin’s text the androgynous nature of the Gethenians already 
challenges our sense of identity construction, here too the characteristics of the cylons present a 
challenge to the audience. These figures are both created and machines, but at the same time 
produced through strictly biological matter and experience thoughts and emotions. Matthew 
Gumpert argues that they are essentially “Haraway’s cyborgs: hybrid beings, both human and 
machine, and therefore neither human nor machine, whose very ontological indeterminacy 
represents a challenge to the old essentialist notion of identity” (Gumpert 147).  
Whether or not the cylons represent only cyborgs, or can also be read as metaphorical stand-
ins for culturally distinct humans, they still come to represent the Other for the human characters 
within the series, with whom the audience tends to identify
80
. Yet, this remains true only as long as 
the cylons don’t take on individual identities and characteristics. The series opens with several 
cylon characters having relationships with human crew members, specifically Boomer and the Six 
model that comes to be called Caprica Six (Tricia Helfer). In reaction to more individualized 
experiences, they develop individual traits which later in the series threaten the cylon society. This 
concept is carried over to the relationship between Athena and Helo. “Just as Boomer and Caprica 
Six are changed because of their having loved individual human beings, so also is Sharon changed 
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 Moore refers to Athena simply as Sharon.  
80
 Although one could read this metaphor as postethnic, following David Hollinger, I find that reading in this SF context 
to misread the application of technology. While it is probably also a postethnic, and indeed as I argue elsewhere, 
postgender, universe, this particular encounter is more aptly read as posthuman, dealing with the problems of eliding 
technology and humanity, and their inevitable fusion in the future (thus the end of both cyborgs and humans in this 
context).  
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through her relationship with Helo” (Moore 2008, 109). This alteration in Sharon’s character comes 
through an encounter on the surface of Caprica. It is in this space that Athena rejects her cylon 
culture to save Helo’s life (Episode 1.8), and also where Helo learns that Athena is a cylon and 
chooses her despite his engrained prejudices (Episode 1.13, 2.6).  
Through their relationship, both characters alter not only their prejudices towards the other, 
but fundamentally change their own identity in reaction to the change. What is more striking, 
however, is that the line between cylon and human is completely blurred through this interpersonal 
relationship. Athena’s ability to express emotion, shown to be genuine, and betray her people, 
demonstrates that the cyborg creation has evolved to the point of being indistinguishable from 
humans. Furthermore, they are reproductively compatible, as their relationship produces a daughter, 
Hera (Episode 1.13, 2.18). The identities Helo and Athena thought existed prior to their encounter, 
and their reevaluated selves in reaction to each other, fail to maintain the cylon/human dichotomy, 
showing that it is impossible to determine the difference between the species. As such, using the 
category of human and cylon (at least when referring to the evolved version) ceases to be 
meaningful, demonstrating a postmodern approach to subjectivity, one in which dichotomies 
traditionally used, such as male/female, majority/minority, and here human/cyborg, cease to be 
determinate.  
In the postmodern approach, cultural differences are elided, rendered either illusory or 
unimportant. This approach is based on an underlying commonality, which becomes, through a 
stripping away of other culturally imposed factors, the only identity markers remaining, allowing a 
reconciliation between Athena and Helo which also destroys their respective cultural identities as 
both cylon and human. This is in contrast to Le Guin’s text, in which cultural understanding it is 
achieved through perceived and yet accepted difference, the differences and Otherness being the 
new common thread. In the postmodern structure of consciousness, difference is not just 
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undetectable, but ungrounded, making a positive outcome of the encounter possible by allowing 
Helo and Athena the freedom to choose their allegiances and alter stereotypes and prejudices. 
  
In the posthuman, there are no essential differences of absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer 
simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals. 
 (Katherine Hayles 1999: 2-3)  
 
Conclusion, or What does sf tell us about Postmodernism? 
The previous discussion highlights the fact that structures of consciousness aren’t bound to generic 
categories. To position a generic category, be it detective fiction, romance, horror, or science 
fiction, has having a universal stance or approach to fiction, or aspects of fiction, does a disservice 
to both the specific genres and to the variety and breadth of literature available in all national 
traditions. Postmodernist fiction is not a generic category, but rather a mode describing literature in 
a wide range of categories. Literature that can be labelled postmodernist, reflects a postmodernist 
structure of consciousness, which can be seen in the specific literary, narrative, and conceptual 
choices made in the presentation of these works.  
 Thus, I chose canonical works of sf to demonstrate that each of the three identified structures 
of consciousness – classical, modernist, and postmodernist – can be and are reflected in the genre, 
just as in a previous chapter I presented the same pattern in detection fiction. Similar cases could be 
made for other genres, for mainstream fiction, and even literary fiction. Postmodernism is an 
aesthetic expression of a way of thinking of reality, and cannot be conceived in terms of 
chronology, even if its academic expression was first manifest in the relatively recent past, and it 
has not supplanted previous worldviews or forms of expression.  
 Thus far, we have considered a collection of texts which adhered to a specific genre, and 
considered them from a specific metaphysical vantage point. This was done by design, and as I have 
argued previously, both the genres and the specific cases are worthy of further study using a variety 
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of approaches, many of which are bound to yield fruitful scholarship. This project will now turn to a 
consideration of texts which can be shown to reflect the postmodern structure of consciousness in a 
variety of ways, and which I will term ‘postmodern novels’. Those texts, Svend Åge Madsen’s Tugt 
og utugt i mellemtiden and, as a comparison, the canonically postmodern Gravity’s Rainbow by 
Thomas Pynchon, will be discussed in order to demonstrate how the postmodernist structure of 
consciousness can be seen in the presentation of ideas such as ethics and social justice, as well as in 
particular literary techniques.  
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The Postmodern Novel 
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Much will appear incomprehensible. 
But back then, the world was incomprehensible. 
Ato Vari 
 
This chapter will focus on an analysis of Svend Åge Madsen’s Tugt og utugt i mellemtiden 
[Virtue and Vice in the Middle Time] and how, using certain literary and narrative techniques, it 
demonstrates, or enacts, a postmodern structure of consciousness. As argued previously, the 
defining characteristics of literary postmodernism are not the specific literary techniques used (i.e. 
pastiche, intertextuality, playfulness, mixing of genres, metafiction) or philosophical questions 
considered (epistemology, ontology, ethics, psychology, etc.) but rather how those techniques are 
used or how those questions are answered. Postmodern texts, as has been discussed with detective 
fiction and science fiction texts earlier, produce the understanding that questions of truth and 
identity/reality are unanswerable. The use of literary features such as pastiche and mixing of genres, 
in a postmodern context, are utilized to support the irresolvable nature of postmodern texts (whether 
consciously by the author or not) and this use is made possible by virtue of a different underlying 
structure supporting those works. Madsen’s novel reflects the postmodern structure of 
consciousness, not only with regard to epistemological and ontological questions, as we have 
explored, but also social justice, ethics and psychology. By showing how such ethical dilemmas and 
psychological entanglements are also founded on this structure, I show in this chapter how this 
methodology isn’t limited to those dominants discussed in the previous chapters. Furthermore, I 
propose to enhance the analysis by providing a comparative look at a canonical postmodern novel, 
Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow. While there are many novels that could be considered in 
such an analysis (including some of those texts discussed in the previous chapters, such as Paul 
Auster’s City of Glass and William Gibson’s Neuromancer), these two texts were particularly 
chosen for the range of philosophical questions they touch upon as well as the various narrative and 
literary strategies they use within their texts. Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow is considered a 
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canonical postmodern novel, in fact McHale argues “no matter how it is characterized, however, the 
fiction of Thomas Pynchon appears to be universally regarded as central to its canon” (McHale 97). 
I will argue that the text corresponds both with traditional readings of postmodernism but also 
supports the redefinition of postmodernism via the postmodern structure of the consciousness. 
Through a reading of Svend Åge Madsen’s novel, and comparisons in its elements to the canonical 
Gravity’s Rainbow, I will demonstrate the breadth of the analysis using the postmodern structure of 
consciousness, and how this is a better tool with which to discuss literary postmodernism. 
 
Svend Åge Madsen – Tugt og utugt i mellemtiden 
Tugt og utugt i mellemtiden, often considered Svend Åge Madsen’s major work, was first published 
in 1976. The novel is, from the beginning, a blend of genres. The main story contains characteristics 
of historical fiction, the adventure novel, detective fiction, psychological thriller, the Gothic, the 
Romantic novel, science fiction, Christmas stories, as well as letter-writing, diary entries, and 
parables (Gemzøe 351-2).
81
 This is not only a common postmodern feature, but a trademark of 
Pynchon as well. ’Especially characteristic of Pynchon is the unstable, disorienting interaction of 
his complex style with models derived from popular genre fiction, movies and television: the very 
definition of avant-pop’ (McHale 101). To further complicate the story, it contains a frame narrative 
presented as written by a future individual, Ato Vari, and both the frame story and this 
overarching
82
 author evoke interesting questions about genre, identity, and ontological boundaries, 
questions also raised in the various narrative levels evoked in Pynchon’s novel.83 Even the preface, 
which was also presented as written by a future academic, Komani, divides Madsen’s novel into 
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 These are only some of the narrative devices and forms of intertexuality identified by Anker Gemzøe, in great detail.  
82
 Gemzøe describes Ato Vari as a ‘panoramisk fortæller’ (262) with reference to Lubbock’s distinction between the 
scenic and the panoramic. He furthermore classifies Vari as having a ‘ydresyn’ (262) or ‘vision sur,’ an outside 
perspective, using Poullion’s structuralist vocabulary. This position is further complicated later in the novel, and will be 
discussed in relation to ontological levels later in the chapter.  
83
 Many of these are detailed in McHale’s Constructing Postmodernism primarily in chapters 3 and 4, though some of 
the key points, and my own interpretations, will be brought up later in the chapter.  
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two genres, a story of love and a story of hate, further defined as a ‘crime story’ (the story of hate) 
and a ‘romance’ (the story of love). This mix of genres does not serve just to demonstrate Madsen’s 
erudition, but each evocation of a genre or particular text (there are many specific allusions to, for 
example, Frankenstein, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, The Count of Monte Cristo, The Mysteries of 
Paris) is used to create reader expectations, to present a type of identification or to propose a 
method of thinking about a situation. The discourses used are familiar and often not identified 
explicitly. Madsen then twists each traditional reading to demonstrate that such a reading has, in 
fact, been constructed and therefore demonstrates the artificiality of the narrative and the underlying 
philosophical basis for the narrative.  
 This analysis will consider a range of philosophical positions, with their associated narrative 
elements, and demonstrate how each is systematically undermined through the discourse of the 
novel. These positions are undermined through the various points-of-view of the novel, through the 
mutability of the characters and their relationships, through the social construction of roles based on 
group dynamics or consideration of otherness, and finally through a question of morality, 
specifically through an analysis of the romance elements of the story. These narrative motifs will 
then be tied to the structure of consciousness, demonstrating how the metaphor of the rhizome, as 
the defining metaphor explaining epistemology, ethics, ontology, social justice, etc. within the text 
works, and can become the means by which the literary elements of the novel (even the use of 
intertextuality, genre-mixing, metafiction) become relevant and meaningful.  
 
Whodunit? And how do we know?  
Starting with the story of hate, the crime story, Tugt og utugt i mellemtiden presents a complex 
critique not only of the contemporary (mid-1970s) judicial system of Denmark (and most Western 
countries) but of the underlying epistemological system that is the basis for it. This is done in 
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several ways. Firstly, it is done diegetically (within the context of the novel), through the discourses 
and rhetoric of Alster’s three targets of revenge. Each of them, in their own way, presents an 
argument that conventional judicial systems either do not apply or are not effective in the way they 
are normally understood. On an extradiegetic level (for the reader but not the characters), the 
system of retribution and punishment is undermined through the repeated narration of the same 
scenes, through different perspectives, with each subsequent revelation adding new information and 
changing both the understanding of the crime committed within the text as well as the reader’s 
understanding of the same events. Throughout, the reader is often afforded more information than is 
generally available to most characters within the novel, specifically the legal and judicial systems. 
This is typical of many modernist forms of detective fiction, such as the police procedural. Here, 
however, this is done through specific points-of-view rather than providing objectively confirmable 
information, which allows for more doubt than traditional detective stories. I will return to the 
larger ontological questions concerning authorship and who is telling the story later in the chapter.  
The main plot (if one can identify a single overarching plot within the novel) is that of Ludvig 
Alster’s revenge. Alster was incarcerated more than 12 years prior to the beginning of the narrative, 
and the novel begins with his escape from prison, reflecting the story of The Count of Monte Cristo. 
Alster maintains his innocence (despite overwhelming circumstantial evidence) and sets out to 
avenge his removal from society on the three people he blames, the judge Michael Deden, the 
journalist Laura Jennson, and finally the detective Thomas Ard. His method of revenge is to attempt 
to frame them for crimes they also did not commit, thus condemning them to the same fate as 
Alster, false imprisonment.  
The reference to Dumas, however, functions not as simply pastiche, either in Jameson’s 
formulation as a ‘blank parody’ (16) in which the author uses another’s language and style in a 
‘random cannibalization of all the styles of the past’ (17), or in Hutcheon’s conception of a 
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“monotextual form that stresses similarity rather than difference” (Hutcheon, Parody 35). Rather 
Madsen here uses this intertextual, or interstyle, referencing to invoke certain expectations for the 
reader, to place them in a particular world. He does not focus on difference, or on similarity, but in 
a complex way similar to Hutcheon’s parody (without the sense of ridicule of either the referent text 
or any outside satirical target) represents “repetition with a critical distance” (Hutcheon, Parody 6). 
This serves to relate the two stories and “require that the decoder construct a second meaning 
through inferences about surface statements and supplement the foreground with acknowledgement 
and knowledge of a backgrounded context” (34). Critically, however, Madsen does not make many 
explicit references to these intertexts, which allows for the possibility of the situations to be evoked 
in a generic way, using the reader’s expectations based on genre and convention, even without more 
than pop cultural knowledge of the background text itself.  
 In this context, Madsen presents these three attempts split up into different books of the 
novel, although the stories bleed from one to another. While Alster remains steadfast in his selected 
targets, his point-of-view as to the desired outcome, and accomplishes his goal of framing these 
individuals for various crimes, the story becomes as much about their trials as about Alster’s 
revenge. In this way, Madsen additionally evokes the detective story genre several times within this 
element of the novel, activating for the reader certain expectations as to police and juridical 
procedure, burden of proof and the consequences of having committed a crime. The reader knows, 
throughout these trials, that these new crimes were not committed by those being put on trial, as we 
have access to further information and other points of view by which we are presented with a 
different narrative of the event. Crucially, it is not the individual crimes, each of which can 
presumably be ‘solved’ from within the context of the story, but the overall interweaving of the 
story that presents a refutation of both classical and modernist detective story structures. 
Furthermore, the exposure of the lack of underlying foundation for the processes leading to the 
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trials and incarceration of those ‘new’ criminals works to undermine both Alster’s original 
incarceration and all such methodologies. Madsen, through the continuous reproduction of 
competing narratives, each of which counteract and contradict those preceding, undermines the 
epistemological expectations of the reader, specifically evoked by reference to detective fiction 
codes, and presents the reader with so much doubt as to undermine the epistemological process 
overall. Detective fiction is particularly useful for Madsen, as is it for most postmodern writers, 
because it is a widely known and understood genre. “Hence the attractiveness of that model to the 
postmodernist writer: it is obvious when the rules are being broken because every reader knows, at 
least subliminally, what the rules of the detective story are” (Merivale 104). In addition, each of the 
‘victims’ here, within the context of the novel, presents an alternative position to the dominant view 
of social justice and epistemological methods acted out within the story, further complicating the 
situation and providing the reader with plausible alternative theories of social justice and 
epistemology, without the tools or basis to distinguish ‘accurately’ between them.  
 This invocation of the detective fiction genre is also prevalent in Pynchon’s texts. We have 
already seen a more detailed analysis of the detective fiction motif in The Crying of Lot 49, but it is 
also found in myriad of his other novels, notably V. and Inherent Vice. Gravity’s Rainbow also 
takes up the motif early in the novel with the attempt to track, systematically, the landing positions 
of the V-2 rockets, which cannot be detected as they land (the process is inverted, with the sound 
arriving after the rocket). Roger Mexico and the aptly named Pointsman are both integral to this 
aspect of the story, with Mexico’s assertions serving to undermine Pointsman’s at every turn. As 
Pointsman asserts that there are answers, and tries to interpret a pattern in the incoming rockets, 
Mexico dissuades him.  
‘Can’t you … tell,’ Pointsman offering Mexico one of his Kyprinos Orients, which he guards 
in secret fag fobs sewn inside all his lab coats, ‘from your map here, which places would be 
safest to go into, safest from attack?’ 
‘No.’ 
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‘But surely …’ 
‘Every square is just as likely to get hit again. The hits aren’t clustering. Mean density is 
constant.’ 
Nothing on the map to the contrary. Only a classical Poisson distribution, quietly neatly 
sifting among the squares exactly as it should … growing to its predictable shape … 
‘But the squares that already had several hits, I mean – ‘  
‘I’m sorry. That’s the Monte Carlo Fallacy. No matter how many have fallen inside a 
particular square, the odds remain the same as they always were. Each hit is independent of 
all the others. Bombs are not dogs. No link. No memory. No conditioning (Pynchon, 
Gravity’s Rainbow  65) 
 
Thus, Pynchon sets up the reader to both expect a positivistic searching, paralleling the 
modernist reading strategies typical of the detective genre (and most traditional readers (McHale 
Constructing 61-64)) and become open to a postmodern reading (which McHale calls negatively 
capable, invoking Keats). As we also see in Madsen, Pynchon then problematizes each of the points 
at which a complete interpretation could be plausibly maintained, here through the systematic 
dismantling of the epistemological basis for the mapping of the rockets landings (which are also 
tied to Slothrop’s erections, and the chemical Imipolex G).  
Returning to Madsen, and starting with a discussion of the individual cases (the three crimes, 
investigations and trials which are set in motion by Alster), I will then move on to a wider 
discussion of the notion of social justice and its relationship with epistemology. Ethical and 
ontological considerations, notions of subjectivity, and a consideration of the role of psychology 
will follow.  
 
The Cases - The Good, The Bad and the Practical 
Michael Deden, a local magistrate, is charged with the murder of a young woman whom he has 
brought home, rescued from a local gang and to whom he intends to provide assistance. The police 
find the mutilated body of such a woman in his home, and Deden cannot explain how she has met 
her fate. She is found in his living room, beaten beyond recognition, all while Deden has been in the 
apartment, a fact to which he freely admits. The reader has access to information that Alster tried to 
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frame Deden by premeditatedly leaving the self-latching windows ajar, coming in through the 
window and substituting the body of an (coincidentally present) accident victim for Deden’s 
‘guest,’ whom he then secreted out the window again. The window relatched itself, presenting the 
police with the exact locked room scenario as Edgar Allan Poe’s “Murders in the Rue Morgue”, to 
which they refer. “Jeg har også læst den novella. Så vidt jeg ved strejfer der ingen aber om for 
tiden” (Madsen, Tugt I 173). [”I’ve read that story, too. As far as I know, no apes are loose at the 
moment” (Madsen, Virtue 155)]. Using that literary mise-en-scene, they dismiss Deden’s 
suppositions of a similar occurrence, someone coming in through the seemingly locked windows, as 
extremely unlikely. Already here the police are functioning in a world based on probability rather 
than precision, practicality rather than ultimate truth. While Deden is asserting a world in which 
truth is determinable, and people are fundamentally honest, a world which is reflected in the 
classical detective story and maintained by classical detectives like Dupin, the story presents a 
police force reminiscent of a police procedural, in a more modern society. This represents not only 
references to detective fiction, but a blurring of the lines of the sub-genres, therefore evoking 
competing conceptions and expectations both for the diegetic participants as well as the reader. In 
some sense, Madsen presents the world of the police as more verisimilar, similar to Chandler’s 
claims for hard-boiled fiction in the 1950s, but on the other hand, the police here are inaccurate and 
the classical reference is a better parallel to the actual situation, even as it is dismissed as 
unrealistic. This blending thus serves to diminish the reliability of such generic referencing to 
provide the reader a stable ground for interpreting the story.  
 In addition to framing them for crimes that they have not committed, Madsen uses the 
character’s own personality traits as factors in how Alster attempts to frame them, a type of 
contrapasso. In this case, Deden’s inherent honesty is part of his downfall, as he does not think of 
the potential complications from the legal position before phoning the police, which is even more 
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shocking from a hard-nosed magistrate. Deden’s defense in his trial also carries through on this 
character trait, in which his ‘alibi’ is also socially embarrassing, even if the description is meant to 
extend his sense of benevolence. During the time of the murder, Deden is masturbating, sexually 
aroused by the perceived helplessness of Lilaiomai (from her perspective), despite knowing that he 
will ultimately provide assistance to the otherwise helpless and destitute girl.  
 The complication in this case comes from Deden’s honesty, or naivety, in relation to the 
police investigation. As he did not commit the crime, he sees no problem in providing information 
about his whereabouts (in the apartment), activities (masturbation), and the situation (the woman 
was a stranger he had brought back to the apartment). These facts, however, are suspect to the 
general workings of the police (and readers of detective fiction, specifically police procedurals), and 
provide him with means, opportunity, and possible motive for the commission of the crime. By 
presenting honesty to a fault, in essence, Madsen is critiquing any ideology (even truth, justice, 
honesty, and moral superiority) as being necessarily tied to the practical and is thus only relatively 
applicable. The ethical implications of this will be addressed later in the chapter.  
 Both the framing of Laura Jennson and Thomas Ard occur in similar patterns. Alster recruits 
a suicidal man to frame Jennson by killing himself in her home, in front of her, while recording a 
conversation between them. As a journalist, she thinks of the implausibility of the news story 
related to the suicide and, rather than attempt to call the police and explain the situation, tries to 
dispose of the body. In essence, she believes the truth won’t sell, and hence isn’t believable, and 
acts accordingly. Alster then returns the body to her home ahead of her return, to which Jennson 
knows the more compelling headlines would revolve around her ‘crime’ rather than the mystery of 
the returning corpse. He not only uses her cynical nature against her, but also her journalistic tools 
and epistemological point of view, i.e. the idea that truth is what sells, rather than having an 
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objective, independently confirmable value. Relying on her frame, Alster condemns her to live with 
the consequences of her standpoint on the truth, one which further undermines any value truth has.  
 In the story of Thomas Ard, Alster attempts to frame him for his own murder, expecting Ard, 
who has the opposite moral code of Michael Deden (despite his role as police detective), in that he 
essentially lies and commits criminal acts as often as possible, as a matter of course. Alster, posing 
as Ard’s driver, lures him to a deserted dock and then instigates a long planned ‘accident’ which 
should kill Alster and make it likely that Ard will be convicted, as the only one at the scene (again, 
means, motive, and opportunity are provided). Ard, however, proves too clever for Alster’s plan, 
and reacts to Alster’s accident by, against his normal behavior, pushing Alster out of the way and 
becoming injured in the process. Yet even here, Alster’s plan was to use Ard’s nature, his admitted 
behavior as one who only does ‘right’ when absolutely necessary, against him, assuming he would 
let Alster die rather than lift a finger to save him. The practical nature of Ard’s response further 
reinforces the relativity of Ard’s moral position, making it no more consistent, and therefore no 
more valid, than Deden’s, especially in the eyes of the reader. It is, in fact, his relative application 
of his moral code, which allows him a successful outcome to the attempt at framing. Alster had 
relied on Ard treating his moral code as an unalterable ethical underpinning, and the failure of that, 
with Ard committing an act of ‘good,’ undermines not only Ard’s position, but the stability of all 
ethical systems that are absolute.  
 
Let’s do it again: The use of reenactments and the retelling of the crime 
In each of the revenge plots, Deden, Jennson, and Ard, there is a distinct difference between the 
truth provided to the authorities and what the audience ‘knows’ to be true. Despite problems with 
point of view, which I will return to, even the reconstructions of the crimes come to be problematic 
from an epistemological perspective. Following Todorov, in essence the detective story can be 
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considered as the narration of an event that happens before the case begins, the narration of the 
crime. As Brooks interprets it: “Tzvetan Todorov has noted that the work of detection that we 
witness in the detective story, which is in praesentia for the reader, exists to reveal, to realize the 
story of the crime, which is in absentia yet also the important narrative since it bears the meaning.” 
(Brooks 24-5) Peter Brooks, like Todorov, initially places the truth-value on the level of the story 
(fabula) not that of the narrative (sjuzet). This is contradicted by the way Jennson and Deden see 
things (and how Ard wants people to see things). Yet, the narrative is all that the reader has access 
to, and thus is the only place meaning can reside – “The story is after all a construction made by the 
reader, and the detective, from the implications of the narrative discourse, which is all he ever 
knows” (Brooks 25). There may, in fact, be a true story beyond the narrative, but in each of these 
cases, even on the diegetic level (leaving aside the level of the competing narrators, the author, and 
the reader, for now), only the narratives present the information from which the story can be 
deciphered. And in Madsen’s novel, they contradict themselves more and more as it proceeds.  
In the nouveau roman, for example, Robbe-Grillet uses this detective story element to give the 
reader certain expectations of detection and then uses those against the reader, twisting the story to 
present a different ‘primal scene’ than the crime (which often did not happen at all).84 Madsen uses 
the detective story similarly, creating several repeated detective stories within his novel, each of 
which seems to repeat not only a previous story within the novel (often back to the Alster story, 
which is not narrated again until the end of the novel) but also literary detections (Deden’s story, for 
example, resembles the “Murders in the Rue Morgue”), such that the reader can access the 
information of how to read the story through this repetition. At the same time, each retelling is 
different, providing more information than that which was previously allowed for. Thus, as each 
                                                 
84
 Anker Gemzøe, although specifically not discussing the relationship between the two authors, implies that there is a 
connection in admitting this failure at the beginning of his work. ‘Den største blokering viste sig at være mit fravalg af 
de mest ekstreme former for fransk efterkrigsmodernisme: Alain Robbe-Grillet forekom(mer) mig kedelig og som 
teoretiker tynd’ (Gemzøe 21). ’The biggest hindrance demonstrated itself to be my neglecting the most extreme forms 
of French postwar modernism: I found Alain Robbe-Grillet boring and theoretically thin.’ (Translation mine).  
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crime is solved, and then reassessed (through subsequent investigation and the application of new 
evidence), the methodology used to make the conclusions in the first place retains less and less 
credibility. This is true both within the text as well as for the reader. The multiple narrations of the 
same event offer a type of onion peeling effect. Each offered conclusion loses its force when 
revealed to be missing, yet again, a crucial piece of evidence. One also has doubt sown into the 
process by the very action of the repetition, as the need for repetition undermines assertions of the 
accuracy of the conclusions. Pynchon’s novel offers the situation with Pökler and Ilse as an 
example, in which the annual return of Ilse to visit who is presumably her father, is brought into 
question through the repetition, as Pökler begins to doubt her ‘true’ identity. This is complicated by 
the War time scenario, the father and daughter’s imprisoned status, and their eventual (fantasy) 
relationship – the status of each erased through narrative tricks as well as the repetition of the 
elements, blending the diegetic and extradiegetic levels of this part of the novel.  
In Madsen’s text, on a diegetic level, some characters advocate for a reform in legal procedure 
to allow for more personal considerations, which are not part of the system as it stands, which 
includes these suspect retellings and renarrations of events. They promote the adoption of the 
Jutlandic code, which is also ironically the basis for the legal system in Denmark, now called the 
Danish Code. With the Jutlandic code, Madsen is referring to the period prior to 1683 in which 
Denmark had two different legal codes, Jyske Lov and Sjællandske Lov (Jutlandic Law and 
Zealandic Law, respectively). The Code of Jutland states ’Loven skal være ærlig og retfærdig, 
taalelig, efter Landets Sædvane, passende og nyttig og tydelig, saa at alle kan vide og forstaa, hvad 
Loven siger. Loven skal ikke gøres eller skrives til nogen Mands særlige Fordel, men efter alle 
deres Tarv, som bor i Landet.’ (Riis) [‘The law must be honest, just, endurable, follow the 
Conventions of the Land, appropriate and useful and clear, so that all can know and understand 
what the law says. The law is not to be made or written to any man's particular advantage, but in the 
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best interests of all who live in the land’].85 As 1683 is a part of Ato Vari’s ‘Middle Period,’ this 
could be interpreted as falsifiable information, allowing the text to be interpreted as a type of 
‘historiographic metafiction’, referring to Linda Hutcheon’s postmodern category. This claim could 
further be substantiated with the number of accurate architectural and geographical references 
Madsen provides for the city of Aarhus, both the city in which he lives and the setting for the novel. 
Gemzøe argues that his novel could be read as a samtidsroman (contemporary novel) (237) because 
both the time of writing and the setting take place in 1976-7 (this despite other factors, which, 
Gemzøe also notes, make it function more as a historical novel than a science fiction or projected 
future novel). Similar arguments to historiographic metafiction can be made in the use of real 
figures like Pavlov in Gravity’s Rainbow, the use of the V-2 rocket, and the Wartime (including 
both immediately before and in the postwar period, as we transverse time in the novel) setting, each 
of which evokes and air of authority and reality.  
Madsen’s novel uses the idea of reenactments to demonstrate to the general public how the 
crime took place (a type of narrative within the narrative), but each of the reenactments 
demonstrates their failings within the story. In the case of Laura Jennson’s reenactment, her own 
release is foreshadowed (while the audience is in on the joke from the start due to information 
acquired from the narrator previously) by her inability to complete the elements of the reenactment 
clearly (or even to recall what she was supposed to be reenacting), despite her own confession. The 
driver (a disguised Alster, and also the actual perpetrator of the crime) has to stand in for her at key 
points (exactly those points in which he was present, performing those exact actions, like moving 
the body and replacing it in her house and in the boot of her car). Thus the reenactment, if looked at 
objectively (rather than allowing the driver a pass as he is ‘standing in’ for the defendant in those 
places) would note that she could not have performed those tasks as the reenactment suggested (as 
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 Translation mine.  
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she was physically unable, and could not have been in two places at once). Even without the 
reader’s privileged position, it seems that the investigation was faulty but the reader’s knowledge 
further emphasizes the structural failure of the process.  
Alster’s own conviction, consequently, was also based on such a reenactment. The end of the 
novel presents yet another reenactment of that crime (with the new, supposedly true ending) which 
exonerates Alster. Yet, this reenactment is also interrupted, with new elements entering, new 
characters being present in previously unsearched and undisclosed locations (Uwe hiding where he 
had access to Lilaiomai, for example) and is never completed. This reenactment, the embodiment of 
the narrative that is meant to finally explain the plot of the ‘primal’ story, is thus also tainted by an 
inability to be properly and completely narrated. Is this the truth? Does Rimby explain everything? 
Or does the story simply end here, as it was ultimately Alster’s story and, now that he is exonerated 
and chooses his exile (suicide?), he is no longer interested in the truth (if there is such a thing). In 
any case, the truth seems just as elusive as ever, because each of the methods used to produce the 
truth have been undermined, either through appeal to inadequate systems of truth (Deden’s, 
Jennson’s), the inability to reenact or narrate the story itself, or through the inability to access 
enough points of view to gain complete access to the information (and with all of the information 
undermined, it presents no possibility that such an outside perspective could be, credibly, achieved). 
This demonstrates postmodern structure of consciousness, as we remain ‘in’ the system and there is 
no outside perspective from which to gain knowledge of the true nature of things. So, while this is 
different than the situation in Auster’s City of Glass, in which things are clearly contradictory, in 
essence, Tugt and utugt i mellemtiden ends in roughly the same way as The Crying of Lot 49. 
Stefano Tani describes it this way: “The result is open-endedness, suspension of the solution; 
Oedipa the artist and post-modern detective quits sizing up clues and accepts mystery as her story 
‘ends’ as it started” (Tani, ‘Dismemberment’ 29). Here it is the reader, as with Pynchon’s novel, 
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who is left in the most suspense. As with Oedipa, we are left with no way to solve the mystery we 
are originally presented with, but are rather presented with multiple solutions each of which have 
doubt, as well as a process which is equally dubitable. A ‘solution’ is no longer achievable.  
 
‘Back then I thought we shouldn’t punish one another.’ (Virtue and Vice, 266) 
In addition to the impact on social justice from this epistemological uncertainty, there are also 
ethical considerations. Individual morality, alluded to in the situation with Thomas Ard above, is 
presented as even more varied and nuanced than the multiple epistemological stances above. A 
number of characters act out forms of morality on a relatively consistent basis, as well as reflect 
upon the general sets of beliefs to which they refer when making such decisions. Dominic Rainsford 
argues that this is specifically what we mean by ethics.  
Our decisions in these matters, even if we do not believe in a morality grounded on anything 
more than contingency, expediency, or self-interest, can be said to be governed by moral 
concepts: ideas of how to behave when we find ourselves in certain relations to other 
individuals, relations which affect their happiness or well-being. In so far as we reflect upon, 
question and theorize these moral concepts we may be said to be engaging in moral 
philosophy or ethics. (Rainsford 1)  
 
Michael Deden is perhaps the most consistent individual in the story, who acts very rationally 
with a system of conformity to the law and in general acting out what he perceives to be good, 
which is equivalent to contemporary moral standards of 1970s Århus (from Ato Vari’s perspective, 
a common caveat). His exposition of his theory is given in court, while he stands trial, presenting 
the reader with his (and arguably, Ato Vari’s interpretation of Aarhusian) ethics. On the other end 
of the spectrum, Thomas Ard, for example, works under the assumption that he is in fact evil, and 
those acts which he commits (and finds exciting) are exactly the opposite to acts that Deden 
normally pursues. Within the novel, the only seeming referent to whether a given system is 
considered good or not is based on its acceptance by others. In different contexts, different ethical 
behaviors are rewarded, with no overarching ethics being consistently promoted. For example, 
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within the criminal underworld, Uwe is originally consistent with that world’s morality and only in 
reaction to individual stimuli (the encounter with Lilaiomai) does he deviate. Madsen is describing 
a world of moral relativity, with the only basis for ‘choosing’ being conformity to a social group or 
class, in larger (all of Danish or Århusian society) or smaller (leather jackets) degrees.  
On the other side of the spectrum, there is the idea of moral mutability. Uwe, originally a 
member (leader) of the white leather jackets, an organized crime group which has a reactionary 
morality to which he conformed, transforms his behavior after meeting the female protagonist of the 
novel, Lilaiomai. He initially saves her from sexual assault and enslavement at the hands of his 
gang, in an intertextual reference to Sue.
86
 This action violates their social code, in that he 
considered someone else’s feelings. After his expulsion from the gang, he adopts a wholly different 
moral stance, affected by his feelings for Lilaiomai, but also consciously changes his behavior (and 
dress and language) as he no longer needs to conform to the leather jacket social norms. He rather 
changes to conform to the opinion that she expresses of him.  
Jeg synes slet ikke, du ligner en læderjakke, Uwe. / Jamen, ….. hvad så? / En flink 
fyr med en brækket næse. Lidt romantisk og megle selvstændig – det er næsen der 
gør det – men også en der trænger til hjælp – det er øjnene – og som godt kan lide 
at hjælpe andre. / Jeg tror du har ret, Lilaiomai. Du har beskrevet mig helt rigtigt. 
Jeg kan mærke at det allerede er på vej, det var derfor jeg havde det så underligt 
før (Madsen, Tugt I, 113).  
 
I don’t think you look like a leatherjacket, Uwe. / Well, …… what then? / A nice 
guy with a broken nose. A bit romantic and very independent – it’s the nose that 
does that – but also one who needs help – that’s the eyes – and who likes to help 
others. / I think you’re right Lilaiomai. You’ve described me to a T. I can feel it 
starting already, that’s why I felt so strange before (Madsen, Virtue, 98)].   
 
Thus Uwe changes his ethical code, as well as other parts of his identity, in reaction to 
those surrounding him, having thus no internal guiding set of moral principles. His ethics, 
although unexamined, seem to be reactionary and greatly influenced by conformity and 
                                                 
86
 Sue is also alluded to in Pynchon’s novel, with Prentice Pirate’s ‘long-running fantasy of his own, rather a Eugène 
Sue melodrama, in which he would be abducted by an organization of dacoits’ (Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow 15) 
having similarities with Lilaiomai’s actual experiences in underground Aarhus.  
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emotion. This individual nature of ethical discourse resembles Levinasian considerations 
of ethics. Later in the novel, it is insinuated that his membership in the criminal gang was 
similarly reactionary and contrary to his upbringing and genetic predisposition (although 
he further calls those ideas in question).  
Uwe is not the only character with ethical mutability within the novel. Ludvig Alster 
also changes his moral stance at least twice in the period of the novel. The first change 
occurs due to his long prison term, as he becomes a different person with a specific moral 
stance, that of revenge. After a series of encounters with Lilioaimai and Clara, who both 
evoke his sense of internal justice, Alster recants some of his previous stances on revenge 
and its suitability. In one sense, it could be argued that Alster has retained, or regained, a 
conventional sense of morality that does not rely on social conventions, which he has 
shunned at this point. However, that would presuppose that his previous actions had been 
absent moral considerations, when in fact they were well thought through and logically 
based. His ethics, the careful consideration of his moral actions in relation to an other, have 
changed, as did Uwe’s, in reaction to the influence of a single individual, in this case Clara. 
Both for Alster and Uwe, the moral change has come in recognition of another individual, 
one who was a stranger at the time of their influential encounter. Both individuals 
recognize a responsibility to this other, which is prior to their own establishment of self-
identity or subjectivity. This notion of a pre-ontological ethical responsibility reflects 
Levinasian ethics. Levinas claims that the encounter with the other starts a process, but one 
prior to the epistemological and foundational to the ontological, which make one 
responsible for the other. “The process of reflection stirred by the face of the individual is 
not a thought about – a representation – but at once a thought for, a non-indifference 
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towards the other which upsets the equilibrium of the calm and impassive soul of pure 
knowledge” (Levinas 67, original emphasis). This is presented in both Uwe and Alster.  
Uwe alters his nature, going against social conventions, his adopted morality, and the ethical 
norms of his sub-culture, the white leather jackets, at the prospect of Lilaiomai’s injury. Somehow, 
Lilaiomai’s claim on Uwe, a perfect stranger, takes precedence over his own subjectivity (however 
constructed). As Levinas states, “what concerns my selfhood is the specific circumstance in which 
that right has meaning. It is as if the shadow of death the other face confronts were my business, as 
if that death were my concern. In this reminder of my responsibilities by means of a face that has a 
claim on my selfhood, the stranger is my neighbour” (Levinas 67). Uwe becomes responsible for 
saving Lilaiomai, even if it means eradicating his own sense of identity (which is later reconstructed 
in the image she sees of him).  
Alster forms a relationship with Clara, whom he first encounters at the train station as he 
escapes from prison. Her actions then, in saving him (although this certainly breaks her own moral 
conventions), and his actions later in releasing Deden and Jennson, reflect the moral obligations that 
Levinas describes. Both come with a full-scale revaluation of his identity (and ethical stance) after 
the recognition of their responsibilities for the lives of others. Furthermore, both encounters 
potentially lead to the death of the person involved in the change (as do Uwe’s actions as the 
penalty for defying the leather jackets is also death). Clara is strangled by Rimby (although she 
thinks it was in fact Alster). Alster, after releasing Deden and Jennson, confines himself to a piece 
of underground (in the canal) bricking himself in. Levinas further claims that one’s own death is a 
potential price of the responsibility of living with others. “In my closeness to my fellow beings, and 
the promise of peace it brings, lies my responsibility for someone else, the impossibility of leaving 
that person to face the mystery of death alone. In practical terms, this entails a willingness to die for 
him. Living in peace with others can demand that much” (Levinas 67). 
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Levinas argues that one’s ethical responsibility precedes the consideration of one’s own 
identity. This is particularly true if one’s identity is constructed in relief, based on an encounter with 
an other, for if one has a responsibility towards the other, then that encounter is already 
predetermining aspects of one’s individual identity construction. However, Madsen presents a 
number of ways in which identity is constructed throughout the novel, creating uncertainty in terms 
of subjectivity and ontology, just as he has done in the realms of social justice, epistemology and 
ethics, reflecting the novel’s postmodern structure. 
 
Who am I? - It is all so subjective 
The notions of identity and subjectivity are already not identical. Donald Hall makes a distinction 
between the two concepts, defining subjectivity as a meta-term evaluating and interrogating the 
more innate phenomenon of identity.  
For our purposes, one’s identity can be thought of as that particular set of traits, beliefs, and 
allegiances that, in short- or long-term ways, gives one a consistent personality and mode of 
social being, while subjectivity implies always a degree of thought and self-consciousness 
about identity, at the same time allowing a myriad of limitations and often unknowable, 
unavoidable constraints on our ability to fully comprehend identity. (Hall 3-4)  
 
Madsen leads the reader to consider variations in the concept of identity, and the construction of 
one’s identity, through a series of characters whose identities are in flux. Through the character of 
Dr. Knud Monnike, psychologist, he further invites both the characters and reader to consider 
subjectivity, and the possibility of a conscious changing or controlling of one’s identity. However, 
he also presents the idea of identity as not having “a particular set of traits, beliefs, and allegiances 
… [that give] one a consistent personality” (Hall 3) through characters whose personality, and in 
essence their identity, changes throughout the text to assume another’s identity. Identity is presented 
as both essential and entirely socially constructed, as both unalterable and irreducibly performative 
(in the Butlerian sense). In this presentation, he challenges the reader to consider the problems of 
 214 
subjectivity, which is “the intersection of two lines of philosophical inquiry: epistemology (the 
study of how we know what we know) and ontology (the study of nature of being or existence)” 
(Hall 4). He does this by presenting a number of different scenarios, four of which are neatly 
summed up in the novel by Monnike, who intends to write a monograph.  
 The cases are the following, which will be discussed more in detail both with regards to Dr. 
Monikke’s assessment (and the italicized titles are the proposed chapter titles of his monograph) the 
means by which they undermine theories of subjectivity for the reader. The first case is that of the 
double-body, where by means of a traffic accident two “consciousnesses” are made to share the 
same bodies. The second, body-borrowing, consists of an inmate (in a mental facility) through some 
means of mental prowess borrows the body of another individual. The third case, assumption of 
identity, consists of a friend of a wealthy and generally well-respected young man admiring this 
figure and both psychologically and physically changing to the point in which he assumes his 
identity, effectively creating two of the same (yet, to a certain degree distinct) individuals with the 
same identity. The final case, the complete person, consists of two people, who, similar to the 
proposal in Plato’s symposium, are each born with only part of a consciousness (and accompanying 
physical defects, i.e. deafness and blindness) are rejoined to form a complete individual. (556) 
The first case, presented in the third book of the novel entitled “A Stranger in His Own 
Body,” presented in two successive chapters, tells the story of two characters who, as the result of 
an automobile accident, share a body. The body is divided between them, with their 
consciousnesses remaining intact, with each mind taking half of the day (the remaining time they 
dream the other mind’s experiences).  Madsen uses this situation not only to comment on identity, 
but to demonstrate differences in social status, including their individual reactions as well as 
societies treatment of each of them. Through these social concepts he furthers a social critique, 
while at the same time reconsiders the boundary between one mind and one body, the sort of 
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Cartesian dualism some forms of subjectivity are based upon. Regenia Gagnier describes this as one 
of the forms of subjectivity, the concept that “the subject is a body that is separate (except in the 
case of pregnant women) from other human bodies; and the body, and therefore the subject, is 
closely dependent upon its physical environment” (Gagnier 8). In this case, there are two subjects 
occupying the same body (so rather than just double-body, it is actually also double-mind).  
Each of the characters, however, retains their individual sense of identity, which is most 
clearly represented by their sense of morality. This is demonstrated in Bimpel’s reaction to a 
paranoid episode by Einvald, when he claimed that his sister’s deaf-mute housekeeper was 
spreading malicious rumors against his family. “How could he bring himself to do that to a deaf-
dumb girl? How can you dream things like that?” (232) Bimpel here, the lower class character, 
asserts his morality, as well as questions it as he doesn’t yet realize the situation. The blurring of 
ethical standards coupled with social norms helps challenge accepted notions of higher morality 
associated with higher classes. This is seen throughout the novel, and is constantly unpeeled as 
competing stereotypes are juxtaposed as they are here. This is further inversed by the actions of 
Einvald in attempting to thwart Bimpel’s criminal activities, while also gaining control of his 
memory and new identity. It is an encounter with an uncannily familiar part of town that allows him 
to understand the “truth” of the situation.  
Han nærmer sig huset. Alle detaljer passer. Men indeni bor der sikkert en lille tyk mand, 
eller en forvirret familie med et hav af bærn og hunde. Sådan arbejder fantasien. Det ville 
alligevel være interressant at få et kig indenfor. … Det er kvinden fra drømmen der lukker 
op. Hende husker han tydeligt. Langt tydeligere end huset, end vejen, end noget andet. 
…Han kender situationen fra utallige bøger. (Madsen, Tugt I 260) 
 
He approaches the house. All the details fit. But inside there certainly lives a short fat man, 
or a chaotic family with a sea of children and dogs. That’s how imagination works. Anyway, 
it would be interesting to take a look inside. … It’s the woman from the dream that opens 
the door. He remembers her vividly. Much more vividly than the house, than the road, than 
anything else. … He remembers the situation from innumerable books. (Madsen, Virtue 
240) 
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Initially, Einvald does not recognize the situation that he is presented with, finding himself 
in unfamiliar surroundings. As he begins to recognize his surroundings, he begins to associate them 
with his dreams, and is intrigued by the similarity between apparent reality and the dream state. He 
further connects the concept to that of literature, allowing Madsen to make a comment on the 
concept of life imitating art, all the while presenting seemingly unlikely real circumstances as fact 
in his fiction. Ironically, Einvald, whose reality and dream states have been blurred, becomes 
involved with Jennsøn, the journalist who argues she creates reality.  
The social critique is furthered by Einvald and Jenssøn’s ability to have Bimpel committed 
to the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Knud Monikke, and the psychiatrist’s willingness to incarcerate one 
of the two individuals that have precisely the same symptoms. This demonstrates both the arbitrary 
nature of the process of committal, which depends not solely on the ‘facts’ of the given case but 
also on the source of the knowledge and social standing of the patient. Bimpel is committed to Dr. 
Monikke’s basement on the advice of Jenssøn and Deyk, upstanding members of society, while 
Deyk, who has the same symptoms, in fact the identical situation, is allowed to be free, and in fact, 
the committal of Bimpel with the subsequent instructions actually allows him to maintain a much 
more ‘normal’ life. Normal here is of course also an arbitrary social determination, as it is assumed 
that the life and actions of Bimpel would hurt society and are therefore dangerous enough to have 
him medically incarcerated, a condition only slightly better than that of the justice department. 
“He’s led into one of the cages. It’s better than a prison cell. Bigger and with somewhat normal 
furniture. But it’s still a cage. With stout bars, a secure lock.” (293) The exact details of the 
‘merger’ are left unclear, whether there was a physical meshing of brain which allowed the ‘soul’ of 
the individuals to ‘possess’ the body of the other, but clearly the personalities remain distinct, 
reinforcing the concept of an unalterable, essential identity which is not material in nature, but 
resides in consciousness.  
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The second case, body-borrowing, consists of the character of Gustav Nonnetit (Crooked), 
an escaped felon incarcerated in a psychiatric facility on the orders of the police. Nonnetit provides 
some foreshadowing of this episode at the time of his arrest, in which he presents the Hellerian 
logic of his incarceration.  
--Men der er et problem, fortsætter Skæven. – Man fængsler for at få folk til at vende om.  
Jeg har allerede siddet i fængsel, og jeg har vendt om. Det viser sig jo ved at jeg melder mig 
frivilligt. Jeg vil gerne i fængsel. Men man vil vel ikke risikere at jeg vender om endnu 
engang? 
…--Jeg er uegnet til straf, for jeg vil gerne sættes ind, og så bliver det jo ikke nogen straf.  
Skæven kan ikke tilbageholde et smil. Men Art lyser op, han har netop haft et af sine gode 
øjeblikke.  
--Hvis du gerne vil stræffes, så er du gal. Du må desværre spærres inde. Af stede med ham. 
(Madsen, Tugt I 231-2) 
 
--But there’s a problem, continues Crooked. –You put people in prison to transform them. 
I’ve already been to jail and I’ve been transformed. You can see that by my having turned 
myself in voluntarily. I’d love to go to jail. But do you want to risk my being transformed 
yet again? 
… --I’m not suitable for punishment because I want to go to jail, and so that won’t be any 
punishment.  
Crooked can’t hold back a smile. But Ard brightens, he’s just had one of his good moments.  
--If you’d like to be punished, you’re crazy. Unfortunately, you’ll have to be locked up. 
Take him away. (Madsen, Virtue 212) 
 
Thus Ard and the police, unable to preserve a legitimate justification for the incarceration of 
criminals (if this is to be a means of retribution by society or a means of rehabilitation of the 
criminal as to protect society) falls into the trap of Nonnetit’s logic, which is then compounded with 
the decision to admit Nonnetit to Monikke’s psychiatric facility, on even less logical grounds. “Jeg 
overvejede at springe over Gustav Nonnetit (kaldet Skæven). Han er tvangsanbragt her, først og 
fremmest fordi politiet ikke kan få medhold i at han vil have gavn af at sidde i fængsel, og de kan 
ikke unde ham at gå fri (Madsen, Tugt II 91)  [“I considered skipping Gustav Nonnetit (known as 
Crooked). He was committed to this institution largely because no one will agree with the view of 
the police that he would benefit from being in prison, and because on the other hand they cannot 
bring themselves to release him” (Madsen, Virtue 401)]. This means of incarceration, the idea that 
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the insane and criminal are overlapping categories, is not new or unique to this text, but in fact 
present some of the analysis by Foucault in his treatment of the history of madness. “In short, the 
asylum restored to its truth as a cage” (Foucault 207). 
However, Nonnetit’s condition did not manifest itself before his commitment to the 
institution, but ironically as a consequence of it. Nonnetit wanted to be free so strongly that, in a 
type of generic intertextuality
87
 with the genre of science fiction, he uses mental prowess to take 
over the body of Emil Bønhose, an upstanding member of society. The story is initially presented in 
the chapter, “Dr. J’s recipe” a further intertextual reference to Dr. Jekyll, as well as the name of a 
drink that Emil Bønhose prepares from a book of alcoholic beverage recipes.  
Essentially, it becomes possible for Nonnetit to occupy, for periods of time, the body of 
Bønhose. In this scenario, not only is there a separation between the mind and the body (the 
consciousness can transfer from one mind to another, as in the case of the double-body) but that the 
mind can act independently of the body and then return, at will (even if only in special 
circumstances). In this way, the mind becomes the sole location of consciousness, without being 
tied to any specific body, and completely separating from any materialist hypothesis (which the 
previous example had left intact).  
Emil’s actions, as well as the conversations that he has, acknowledge a long held prejudice 
against the mad and recalls charges of the connection between insanity and old forms of 
communicable disease like leprosy that were held in the same locations historically, indicating that 
Nonnetit’s insanity (which he assumes) or his consciousness (as the reader seems to understand) is, 
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 This type of intertextuality is presented by Anker Gemzøe in his disseration on Svend Åge Madsen. “In my final 
“Positioning” I suggest a Bakhtinian ‘reinterpretation’ of the concept of intertextuality, but underline how much of all 
of the critics mentioned have inspired me. For literary purposes like my own I suggest the following framework of 
categories: --Specific intertextuality: direct influences or polemics, all specific references. – Epochal intertexuality: the 
objective common features between texts in a given period, the ‘optics’ (‘ideologeme’, ‘episteme’) of the given period. 
–Generic intertextuality: all genre relations. –Stylistic intertextuality: relations to genre-transcending styles. –General 
intertextuality: the elementary interaction with linguistic, literary, intellectual traditions, in modernity, ever-present as 
an ‘anxious’ metaconsciousness.” (Gemzøe 538) This quote is presented in the English summary of his disseration 
presented at the end of the text.  
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to a degree, infectious. In a conversation with a friend, Emil states the fears of living so close to the 
asylum. “—Du ved vi bor i Risskov. Lige over for Asylet, sagde han. … Det påvirke en at bo der. I 
et lange løb. Man kan ikke slippe for det. Al den påvirkning. Der er ikke noget at gøre. Når man har 
samlet al den ondskab og galskab man kunne hitte på sådan et lille område, så er det ikke så sært at 
det går galt. Det siver ud” (Madsen, Tugt II 101-2) [“--You know we live in Risskov. Right across 
from the asylum, he said. … Living there has an effect on you. You can’t avoid it. The whole effect. 
There’s nothing to be done about it. When you’ve gathered all the evil and craziness you can find 
into one little area, it’s not surprising that things go wrong. It leaks out” (Madsen, Virtue 411)]. This 
fear is discussed by Foucault, who claims both that, “People were in dread of a mysterious disease 
that spread, it was said, from the houses of confinement and would soon threaten the cities” 
(Foucault 202). A similar case to the spreading of the criminal mind of Nonnetit through his taking 
over the body of Emil, but also to the connection between madness and evil, whether it be 
intentional or not. “But now the estate of confinement acquired its own powers; it became in turn a 
birthplace of evil, and could henceforth spread that evil by itself, instituting another reign of terror” 
(Foucault 202). The asylum in Madsen’s text is not presented as a birthplace of evil, but rather as a 
home of evil and the criminal, who society has placed in the same category as the insane, treating 
them both to incarceration to, supposedly, protect society from the harms they present.  
This situation is paralleled in Pynchon’s text in the strange powers of Prentice Pirate, who 
has a “strange talent for – well, for getting inside the fantasies of others: being able, actually, to take 
over the burden of managing them” (Pynchon, Gravity’s 13). In both texts the introduction of the 
science fiction genre calls forth considerations of ontology and otherness. The identities not of 
Nonnetit and Pirate, but rather those whose minds they occupy, are challenged, as are the 
understandings by which we generally understand identity and subjectivity. Prentice also presents 
one of the narrative challenges, or opportunities, of Gravity’s Rainbow, as in modernist attempts to 
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find a ‘solution’ to the novel (or at least a coherent reading of its various narrative levels and plot 
twists) Prentice “the fantasist-surrogate, would be a good candidate for this all-encompassing 
consciousness” (McHale, Constructing 89). In such a reading, Prentice would be able to manage the 
other characters, and their fantasies, because they would be part of his own consciousness. This is 
suggested based on the opening sequence of the novel, in which it seems the narrative awakens 
from a dream containing Prentice, challenging the objective narratorial stance. I argue that this 
would negate large portions of the novel (objections McHale also makes), but even such a reading 
wouldn’t allow one to present the novel as a product of a modernist structure of consciousness. 
Even if explaining the embedded layers, the challenges to effective norms, here of subjectivity and 
the power of the mind, would be at least introduced, and thus should be read as late modernist. The 
lack of a consistent presence of Prentice in a narrative voice, and the problems (to be discussed later 
in the chapter) with the ending of the novel, further challenge the viability of the Prentice as 
consciousness reading, and suggest that this scene needs to be read within the diegesis of the novel. 
In that circumstance Pynchon, earlier than Madsen, challenges accepted norms of the limits of the 
power of the mind, and forces the reader to begin to accept certain scientific nova as a trope in the 
novel. This invocation of science fiction leans the novel into the ontological dominant, following 
McHale’s modernist and postmodernist distinction. However, the identities Prentice occupies are 
also immediately challenged, thus making categories of subjectivity already suspect. This is further 
compounded by the previously discussed invocation of the detective fiction genre, which is coded 
as epistemological and modernist. We shall return to that them, and the figure of Slothrop, when 
discussing narrative structure later in the chapter.  
The third and fourth cases round out the possibilities, and in a typical Madsenian fashion, 
exhausts the possibilities of the identity constructions (as we have also done with ethics and 
morality), but without specifically privileging any of the categories. Thus, those norms that society 
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imposes are undermined, but no replacement category is forthcoming. Instead we are given a range 
of possibilities, from an essential identity, absent the body condition (double body), a migrating 
consciousness (body borrowing), migrating identity (assumption of identity) and identity division 
(merged identity). In the third case, far from demonstrating that Vilhelm is the rare exception of a 
normal individual in a world full of crazy or psychically unstable people, he instead demonstrates 
the fragility of the individual identity, and the means by which the psychiatric establishment, as 
presented in the novel, manifests problems that it has needs of solving; creating, rather than treating, 
cases of interest and the mad. As Foucault states, “Madness deals not so much with truth and the 
world, as with man and whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive” (Foucault 27). 
Vilhelm becomes Christian, while Christian relinquishes the identity, leaving only Vilhelm in 
possession of the identity, one created by the particular set of circumstances of Christian’s 
upbringing, and corresponding to that ‘particular set of traits, beliefs, and allegiances’ that 
correspond. Madsen here separates identity from the fixed set of values belonging to a single 
consciousness, allowing for those to change so completely as to be unrecognizable. Furthermore, 
the body is also not the locus of such identity, as here Vilhelm replicates Christian’s physical 
characteristics, and earlier there were cases of identity transcending the body.  Identity here is not 
innate, but can be wholly learned, wholly performed, in the best Butlerian sense. Vilhelm performs 
as Christian better than he ever could have (and he has no doubt with regards to his role).  
The fourth case, however, presents the possibility that identity is not only innate but 
predetermined. As well as being a positive outcome to the love story half of the novel (for two 
characters who had been systematically mistreated throughout), it presents a notion of predestined 
love, fate, and a fixed inherent identity characteristic of Oedipus and reminiscent of Plato’s 
symposium. In contrast to the third case, that of Christian, whose class identity was based on his 
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‘birth’ and dissolves just as quickly, here birth and physical defects play a pivotal role in their 
identity.  
As a consequence of these four cases, all possibilities for one, true, nature of identity are 
removed. It is plausible for identity to be materialist, fundamentally tied to a body, or entirely 
transcendent, able to be removed from a body. It is possible for identity to be fixed and innate, or 
wholly performed. It is possible for identity to be indivisible, even when sharing a body (or two) 
with another consciousness, and yet also to be split and reunited by fate. Each of these are presented 
as equally true within the text, and yet represent contradictory means by which identity can be 
understood, thus undermining any means by which to definitively ascribe the notion. The concept of 
identity is in question, and the development of a subjectivity for the characters through their own 
identity consideration is equally problematic. Just as with social justice, ethics, and epistemology, 
subjectivity is also uncertain in the text, through structural design. Furthermore, it is presented as 
problematic that all of these forms of identity construction exist, simultaneously, in the text. It is a 
curiosity, for Dr. Monikke, but is rendered as unremarkable to the characters as a whole. Wilde 
would suggest that this represents more than simply modernist conventions, even taken to an 
extreme end, but rather an example of postmodern irony.  
Modernist irony, absolute and equivocal, expresses a resolute consciousness of different and 
equal possibilities so ranged as to defy solution. Postmodern irony, by contrast, is suspensive: 
an indecision about the meanings or relations of things is matched by a willingness to live 
with uncertainty, to tolerate and, in some cases, to welcome a world seen a random and 
multiple, even, at times, absurd. (Wilde, 44)  
 
This suspensive attitude is found in all of these cases, from Emil Bønhøse’s wife, to Irmelin 
Dyck’s reaction to the ‘conversion’ of her son. Uncertainty is simply the new norm, reflective of the 
society in which they live.  
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Who is telling this story anyway? – Narratological levels and ontological uncertainty 
Madsen’s novel, in a typical motif of postmodernism, embeds his main narrative in an outside 
frame story, which isolates the author, and questions the traditional position of the author, narrator, 
and narrative itself. The “author” of the main narrative is a character from a time in which books 
were no longer written (Madsen, Tugt I 12) [(Madsen, Virtue 1)] and feelings such as pain, 
emptiness and joy are no longer understood (Madsen, Tugt I 100) [(Madsen, Virtue 85)]. This 
already puts Madsen’s narrative into focus, as the ‘author’, Ato Vari, is grappling with how one 
writes a story. Traditional narrative devices are employed, and undermined, as the “author” of the 
story presents a “‘novel’ (a fictitious description of a portion of reality)” (preface) set in the Middle 
Time, defined as between 1500 and 2000. This is characteristic of Linda Hutcheon’s historiographic 
metafiction, which “self-consciously uses the trappings of what [Stanley] Fish calls ‘rhetorical’ 
literary presentation (omniscient narrators, coherent characterization, plot closure) in order to point 
to the humanly constructed character of these trappings – their arbitrariness and conventionality” 
(Hutcheon, Poetics 45). This she further calls “typically contradictory postmodern exploitation and 
subversion of the familiar staples of both realist and modernist fiction” (Hutcheon, Poetics 45). The 
historical distance that is made possible by the postmodern narrative device that Madsen employs, 
also allows him to present a social critique of his own time as a historical narrative and present an 
alternative future that is no less appealing for the reader, further complicating categories of history 
and reality, fact and fiction, and past, present and future.   
The ontological lines are also blurred as the frame story and diegetic narrative intermingle. 
Towards the middle of the novel, Ato Vari declares he is unable to adequately feel the characters 
and have the requisite emotions to depict the world of the middle time. He thus inserts himself into 
the novel in the form of the character Sjat, who is the manifestation of the sentiment of the writer 
Stan Pekoral, and will serve to present his view of the way the world should be to the future. This is 
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characteristic of metafiction, or as Patricia Waugh explains, a particularly category of it. “The entry 
of the narrator into the text is also a defining feature of what has been called ‘surfiction’” (Waugh, 
Metafiction 14), which further “impl[ies] a fiction that self-consciously reflects upon its own 
structure as language” (Waugh, Metafiction 14). In using surfiction, Madsen is calling the reader’s 
attention to the self-conscious nature of the narrative, yet Madsen takes this further, using 
surfiction, and other metafictional characteristics as a further means of undermining all standard 
devices and loci of meaning in the text, reflecting its rhizomatic nature.  
In this use of surfiction, Ato Vari becomes a character in the novel he is writing, set 
specifically in Århus, Denmark in the 1970s (the book was first published in 1976) and, as stated in 
the preface, “gives a splendid and realistic insight into the mores and customs of the period, which 
the author appears to have studied in detail” (Preface). This preface, “written” by Komani, an 
historian and specialist in Denmark of the Middle Time, provides the first place by which one can 
see this novel as a criticism of the customs of Madsen’s own society and time (Madsen was and still 
is a resident of Århus, living in a northern part of the city known as Risskov), and which, in 
retrospect, also presents an ironic statement, in the guise of academic discourse, of how this 
‘insight’ was acquired.  Sjat, furthermore, is set to become the descendent of Ato himself, as Stan 
Pekoral states: 
Jeg er i færd med at skabe en fremtidsperson, lad os kalde ham Ato, i mangel af bedre 
navn. Men jeg går den anden vej. Jeg skaber ikke en fiktiv person, men en rigtig man i 
kød og blod. En mand som skal levendegøre os. Sjat here er hans forfar. Jeg lærer Sjat 
hvordan vores verden hænger sammen. Denne visdom skal gå i arv til hans barnebarn, 
og igen videre til det næste barnebarn. (Madsen, Tugt II 180) 
 
I am in the process of creating the person of the future, let’s call him Ato for want of a 
better name. But I’m taking the opposite tack. I’m not creating a fictitious person, but a 
real man of flesh and blood. A man who will make us come alive. Sjat here is his 
predecessor. I’m teaching Sjat how our world operates. This knowledge will be passed 
down to his grandchildren, and farther on to their grandchildren, and again farther on to 
the next grandchildren. (Madsen, Virtue 486) 
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Not only does Madsen blur the diegetic lines between the frame and ‘main’ narrative,´ 
presenting ontological intermingling between the various worlds of the novel, with interaction 
between the world of the author and that of the characters in the novel (as in Pirandello’s Sei 
personaggi in cerca d’autore), but complicates that by providing the possibility of an unresolved 
hierarchy of worlds, which one would not find in the Italian modernist play.  The circular logic of 
Ato Vari creating a character, Sjat, who creates a real life human, Ato, who writes a text in which 
he creates a character who … and so on, makes any resolution to the ontological levels structurally 
impossible to resolve. This is the very problem with ontological uncertainty, following Quine. 
“What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken absolutely is not universality but 
circularity. A question of the form ‘What is an F?’ can be answered only by recourse to a further 
term: ‘An F is a G.’ The answer makes only relative sense: sense relative to the uncritical 
acceptance of ‘G.’” (Quine, 53). Without being able to accept any level of the world as primary, the 
levels remain inevitably blurred and uncertain. Madsen however, also takes this further, implicating 
his own time into that of the text. This is done through the use of real events and locations, 
seamlessly blended into the narrative, and intermingled in such a web of intertextuality as to make it 
seemingly impossible to reconcile for the reader (despite the efforts of Niels Dalgaard to do just that 
in Dage med Madsen).   
Similar strategies are invoked in Gravity’s Rainbow, and the unresolvability of the narrative 
elements is often cited as one of its postmodern features. Shawn Smith argues that it “owes much of 
its complexity to its challenging narrative form, which avoids closure and establishes fragmentation 
as its primary formal device” (Smith 60). This is a deliberate device used by Pynchon, and also by 
Madsen as we have detailed above, and requires the subversion of our traditional reading and 
interpretive strategies, forcing the reader into accepting that the novel functions with a postmodern 
structure of consciousness. As McHale argues, “by confronting us with irreducibly ambiguous, or, 
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better, multiguous features such as the second-person pronoun, Pynchon compels us to reflect upon 
our own critical practices, inviting us to become metareaders, readers of our own (and others’) 
readings – and, more to the point, of our own inevitable misreadings” (McHale Constructing 113). 
While I disagree with the term ‘misreading’, which implies an accurate reading available (even if 
not to us), McHale’s fundamental point is that the novel forces us to read differently, and to 
challenge the assumptions that are standard reading practice. This is specifically done through the 
blurring of narrative boundaries in Madsen, as also here prominently in Gravity’s Rainbow, 
particularly at the end of the novel. Many scholars, taking the final part as the film reel, assert that 
the entire novel is written as a film. Even if one suggests the line ‘the film is broken, or a projector 
bulb has burnt out’ breaks the diegetic frame, the entrance of Gottfried in the rocket complicates the 
situation immensely. If the you in the final ‘frame’ is the you of the reader, or even the audience, 
that still indicates a crossing of narratorial levels for characters (Gottfried) and objects (the Rocket) 
to enter into the theatre which is also being written of them. This creates the kind of ontological 
uncertainty that is characteristic of the postmodern structure of consciousness. Yet, I would argue 
that Gravity’s Rainbow, similar to Madsen’s novel, functions primarily as a quest narrative, with 
simply a multitude of epistemological narratives to which characters like Pointsman, Slothrop and 
even Enzian are seeking clear answers. That both the ontological and epistemological aspects of 
Pynchon’s novel are unresolvable defines it as postmodern, rather than an overwhelming focus on 
ontological issues, which I argue first becomes prominent as the narrative consistency begins to 
break down, well after the epistemological dominant is asserted.   
 
The problems of the psyche  
“Not only can man’s being not be understood without madness, it would not be man’s being if it did 
not bear madness within itself as the limit of his freedom.” (Lacan 215) This quote from Lacan’s 
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“On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis” bears out two important notions 
relating madness and the construction of the individual and consequently society and civilization. 
First, the notion that it is by defining a limit, an other from which to distinguish oneself, that it is 
possible to create an identity and truly understand the nature of the individual. Lacan here relates 
the concept of madness as a means by which to define and understand the concept of sanity itself, 
and particularly the sanity of an individual. Secondly, it establishes that this identity, this 
subjectivity created through a distinction between itself and an other, need be necessarily contained 
within a given identity in order to limit and continually establish itself as a coherent whole. 
Specifically, Lacan states the concept of madness, perhaps understood as its definition or the 
understanding of the concept, but also implicitly the very state itself, the capability of madness born 
within an individual by which to understand ones own sanity and by virtue of this concept be 
considered a subject, i.e. man. 
Lacan’s concept, if extended to a society, can be interpreted to create a social definition of 
sanity and normality, and be a part of the development of a national, ethnic, or group identity.
88
 
This notion need not imply a means of psychoanalytic consideration, simply the means by which a 
given group identifies itself through relations to an outside group, defined by the limits of the other. 
If related to the concept of normality, madness can be viewed as the limit of a given social norm. 
Foucault, in Madness and Civilization, develops the archaeology of the relationship between society 
and the concept of madness (in the western tradition) which develops the establishment of a social 
norm through the segregation, public display, and confinement of the mad, insane, and those unable 
to contribute positively to society. Furthermore, Madsen’s position on the future conceptualization 
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 This theoretical consideration is paralleled in the structuralist theorist Lévi-Strauss, as he similarly contemplates the 
exclusion and inclusion of the Other. “If we studied societies from the outside, it would be tempting to distinguish two 
contrasting types: those which practise cannibalism - that is, which regard the absorption of certain individuals 
possessing dangerous powers as the only means of neutralizing those powers and even of turning them to advantage - 
and those which, like our own society, adopt what might be called the practice of anthropoemy (from the Greek émein, 
to vomit); faced with the same problem, the latter type of society has chosen the opposite solution which consists in 
ejecting dangerous individuals from the social body and keeping them temporarily or permanently in isolation, away 
from all contact with their fellows, in establishments specially intended for this purpose.” (Lévi-Strauss, Tristes.388) 
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of madness, and whether it is possible to read Lacan’s statement, as understood above, as a push 
towards the reintegration of the insane or mad into society to serve as an internal limit and reminder 
of our own subjective position, questions whether it is in fact possible to continue to identify a 
distinction between sanity and madness at all.  
Madsen, in his novel, presents various cases of madness, and the psychiatric establishment’s 
relationship to individuals considered or treated as mad, as well as those incarcerated in hospitals 
for the insane. These cases serve to undermine the establishment of the doctor as an objective 
individual in the treatment of a recognizable disease, and to establish the correlation between 
madness and criminality, if not in actual behavior, at least in the means of treatment. Foucault 
claims that, “The madman is not the first and the most important victim of confinement, but the 
most obscure and the most visible, the most insistent of the symbols of the confining power.” 
(Foucault 225) This is a fitting sentiment for a system, as presented by Madsen, where both the 
psychiatric facilities and the justice system incarcerate people arbitrarily and the truth has a dubious 
relationship with reality. This evaluation of madness serves as part of an attack on a larger 
epistemological issue presented in the text. The idea of knowledge, truth, justice, as well as 
madness are undermined, and exposed as tools of a social system that is biased towards certain 
social classes, and dependent on the punishment of those less fortunate, and the undermining of the 
poor and disenfranchised for its furtherance. It questions the knowledge that is supposed to lead to 
justice, and the objectivity that should lead to accurate assessment and treatment of the ill. With this 
system of knowledge and truth undermined, it leads to the questioning of all basis of authority, and 
the awareness of the arbitrariness of the system presented.  
Madsen’s four main cases, as presented earlier, may traditionally be understood in terms of 
psychosis and are presented by Dr. Knud Monikke in defense of a new theory of body-soul relations 
(in a parody of psychoanalytic style). His theory is presented as follows: 
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Den for øjeblikket herskende teori lyder, at legemet er det eneste der er til. Sjælen er navnet 
på visse egenskaber, reaktioner hos legemet. Denne teori vil jeg i det følgende benøvne den 
materialistiske.  
Jeg har imidlertid gennem mine undersøgelser fået visse empiriske erfaringer, som skarpt 
modsiger denne teori. Disse tvinger mig til at formulere og hævde den stik modsætte 
opfattelse: Det er de mentale processer der er til. Det er dem, og kun dem, der har egentlig 
existens. Legemet er kun til some en fysisk manifestation, en materiel følgevirkning af de 
mentale processer. (Madsen, Tugt II 250) 
 
The theory prevalent at the moment says that the body is the only thing in existence. Soul is 
the name of various characteristics, reactions in the body. This theory I shall call, in what 
follows, the materialistic theory.  
I have in the mean time, through my research, made certain empirical discoveries, which 
sharply contradict that theory. These force me to formulate and to hold the diametrically 
opposed view: It is the mental processes, which exist. It is they, and only they, which have 
actual existence. The body exists only as a physical manifestation, a material concomitant of 
the mental processes. (Madsen, Virtue 554-5) 
 
 The very nature of the presentation, in which Monikke presents his new metaphysical theory 
based on empirical evidence, can already be presented as critical of the method of psychoanalytic 
theory, yet it is a theory both not understood by his contemporaries in the novel, nor Madsen’s own 
contemporaneous Danish society. It is, however, presumably the prevalent theory in the future, as 
represented by Ato Vari (the “author”). Ato Vari, whose extranarrative commentary between books 
throughout Madsen’s novel presents a picture of the future world to the reader, states in one such 
passage: 
 Man opfatter mennesket som en enhed, der ikke kan ændres ved og som ikke kan have 
noget fælles med et andet individ. Man ser dem som ubodeligt adskilte størrelser. Når et 
menneske døde betragtedes det som uhjælpeligt mistet. Nogle fantatikere prædikere den 
opfattelse, og fik en del tilslutning, at det kun var kroppen der var død, mens sjælen levede 
videre. Skønt det virker så inlysende faldt ingen på den tanke, at det forholdt sig omvendt. 
Til trods for at man kan se at kroppen er den samme efter døden, mens ånden er blevet tavs, 
ville folk der påstod dette være blevet betragtet som kættere. (Madsen Tugt I 232) 
 
The human being is held to be a unit which cannot be changed and which cannot have 
anything in common with another individual. They are viewed as irretrievable separated 
quantities. When a human being died he was felt to be lost without hope. Some fanatics 
preached the concept, and found widespread agreement, that it was only the body which had 
died, while the soul lived on. Even though it appears so obvious, no one came up with the 
idea that the opposite was true. Despite the fact that one can see the body is the same after 
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death while the soul has fallen silent, people who made that claim would have been seen as 
heretics. (Madsen, Virtue 213) 
 
The nature of human understanding in the future seems based on the same empirical analysis 
as discussed in Dr. Monikke’s account of the body-soul theories. As Ato Vari here supports his 
view of the position of life (in the body rather than in the soul) based upon “obvious” empirical 
analysis, Dr. Monikke similarly presents isolated case studies, which implicitly would represent, or 
allow us a window on which to view the normal situation (again similar in process to case studies 
often presented by psychoanalytic studies, such as Freud.)  
Pynchon’s constant invocation of Pavlov (a real referent) and Dr. Laszlo Jamf, also places 
such scientific theories at the fore. The implication of the ties between Slothrop and the chemical 
Imipolex G, and young Tyrone Slothrop’s conditioning at a young age, lends an air of authority to 
the matter. Yet, those ties are systematically removed. Despite the early assertions of the near one-
to-one relationship between Slothrop’s sexual exploits and the arrival of the Rockets in the London 
Air Raids, this is subsequently called into question as we realize that many of those incidents were 
simply fantasies, including the long and detailed story of Darlene and her mother Mrs. Quoad. So, 
just as it seemed possible to catalogue the world using Monikke’s methods, it also seemed possible 
to use (Pynchon’s version) of Pavlov and the figure of Jamf. Yet both overarching scientific 
possibilities are equally undermined by the situations with the narrative. Jamf’s theories are 
challenged not only by the Pökler singularity (Pynchon 833), which threatens the final application 
of his product, but also the assertion that Jamf was fictional all along, as asserted by Mickey 
Wuxtry-Wuxtry, and that Jamf (and hence the entire scientific sub-plot) was really a psychological 
projection of Slothrop himself. So, while Madsen undermines the psychology with various aspects 
of plot, Pynchon uses the psychological to further destabilize the ontology, and suggest that the 
narrative is even less reliable than we had been led to believe.  
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The Postmodern Novel – Madsen style 
Although I have divided the novel into thematic and philosophical categories, the interlacing of the 
novel presents the same structure of consciousness (to use William Spanos’ term) that corresponds 
to postmodernism. Each philosophical standpoint, whether epistemological or ontological (as 
presented in previous chapters) or dealing with ethics, social justice or psychology, represent a 
scenario whereby fixed and conclusive answers to questions are not only unanswered, but the very 
questions being raised are undermined and stripped of potential explanative value. There remains no 
way to determine, for example, inside and outside the narrative when the ‘author’ of the story is 
descended, either literally or intellectually, from one of the characters, a character explicitly 
introduced into the narrative, self-consciously, by the ‘author’. The vantage point by which ‘truth’ 
is determined is equally undermined. Not only are we not provided with a single narrative which 
explains the crime committed, as Todorov would suggest, but we are left with the most likely 
scenario that no such vantage point could possibly exist.  
This questioning of grand narratives, of justice, societal norms, and social hierarchy
89
 is 
presented in a manner which reinforces the idea that Madsen’s novel, like Pynchon’s, has a 
rhizomatic structure. None of the conventional means by which one can analyze a novel allows for 
cohesive endings, and the very nature of the narrative itself switches, providing multiple internal 
narrators who in turn provide competing and unreliable narrations throughout. On both a diegetic 
and extradiegetic level (if those can be distinguished here), the narrative reinforces structureless 
structure, both in terms of philosophical questions as well as in terms of literary techniques, in the 
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 The discussion of social hierarchy is further extended in subplots including the quick identification of “rogue” and 
fringe elements of society as criminal or poor, the assessment of those that are indigent, homeless, or disenfranchised by 
the social system as lazy and unable to contribute to the social good (however that may in fact be determined) and 
finally by the concept of madness, both as a temporary or assigned concept (as assigned to above groups by those in a 
more “normal” social position) or as traditionally defined including admission and treatment by psychiatric 
professionals and the medical community. 
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distinct usage of pastiche and intertextuality, in the blending of genres, in the covert use of 
interstyles and generic intertextuality, all of which reinforce this pattern.  
As noted by Hutcheon, “postmodern novels problematize narrative representation, even as 
they invoke it” (Hutcheon, Poetics 40), which is certainly true here. Thus, I argue, that due to its 
structural pattern, Tugt og utugt i mellemtiden is an example of a postmodern novel. It is not simply 
metafictional, although it uses metafictional and surfictional elements, and it is more than simply 
historiographical metafiction, as it does not have a specifically historical dimension.
90
 This 
discussion is contrasted with readings of a canonical example of a postmodern novel, Thomas 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, and how that novel addresses the same consideration using different 
narrative strategies yet by using the same underlying postmodern structure of consciousness. 
  
 
                                                 
90
 Gemzøe notes it is a ‘contemporary’ novel, although presents as an historical novel, yet still not falling well into that 
category, another of its genre-blurring elements (Gemzøe 544-5).  
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Coda:  
 
Where do we go from here?:  
 
Postmodernism’s Possible Afterlives?
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So, what is postmodernism? 
Postmodernism, by many estimations
91
, is an illusory term, a term that evades fixed definition 
as one pursues the attempt. This is, in part, because it was defined (always tentatively) as the 
genre was being initially developed by writers, arguably attempting to show the complete 
picture from a position in media res or worse, ab ovo. In addition, many of the early attempts 
at definition consisted of lists of heterogeneous characteristics exemplifying the particular 
texts that were held up as examples. Now, in 2015, we are in a position to look back over the 
past decades and, using that vantage point, draw more consolidated conclusions about the use 
of literary postmodernism, from which we can discuss the larger cultural phenomenon. A 
reductive definition, rather than a collection of characteristics, is both needed to properly 
define the movement and is now in reach.  
In summary, I propose that postmodernism represents a different ‘structure of 
consciousness’ from modernist and classical periods. Essentially, for writers and readers, the 
world reflected in literature maps onto a different understanding of reality, which can be 
represented using a spatial metaphor. As opposed to classical and modernist literature, the 
postmodernist structure of consciousness can be defined as a rhizomatic structure. Texts that 
implement this structure throughout, who operate both diegetically and for the reader with a 
postmodern structure of consciousness, can be considered postmodern. Thus, through the use 
of the metaphor of the rhizomatic labyrinth, I provide a model by which postmodernism can 
be more fully understood. I call this metaphor ‘the postmodern metaphor,’ as I contend that 
elucidating the characteristics of the rhizomatic labyrinth, and viewing postmodern literature 
with this in mind, incorporates other definitions or explanations, such as those of Hassan, 
Lyotard, Baudrillard, Barthes, Waugh and Hutcheon, as well as how techniques like 
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 By scholars on both sides of the debate, such as Richard Rorty and Terry Eagleton.  
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intertextuality, metafiction, pastiche, playfulness and the mixing of genres, are understood 
and explicated in a new way with reference to this structural paradigm.  
Throughout the dissertation, I have discussed the identification of the postmodern 
structure of consciousness, focused specifically on the exploration of this structure with 
regard to metaphysical questions, and defined the use of postmodern structure as that 
structure which demonstrated uncertainty with regard to those questions. In discussing 
detective fiction in chapter two, I focused exclusively on epistemological questions, 
elucidating the differences of classical, modernist and postmodernist structure with regard to 
questions of knowledge. In the third chapter, on science fiction, a similar project was 
developed with a focus on ontological issues. The postmodern structure of such fiction was 
defined with texts that resulted in epistemological or ontological uncertainty, which did not 
allow for the possibility of finding an ‘answer’ or absolute truth, but rather, through its very 
structure, ruled out such certainty as a possibility. In the final chapter, on postmodern novel, 
the scope was broadened to include other questions – ethical, psychological, political – which 
were purposefully bracketed earlier, in order to focus on the way the structure worked in a 
limited, and more easily explained, context. These analyses of Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow, considered a canonical postmodern novel, and Svend Åge Madsen’s Tugt og utugt i 
mellemtiden [Virtue and Vice in the Middle Time] demonstrate how the texts correspond both 
with traditional readings of postmodernism but also support the redefinition of 
postmodernism via the postmodern structure of the rhizome. Furthermore, the characteristics 
ascribed in the critical literature support the rhizomatic nature of postmodern structure as the 
underlying metaphor that explains the other characteristics often cited as features of 
postmodernism. The final chapter, through explicating the similar structure using different 
literary and narrative techniques, demonstrated that it is the underlying rhizomatic structure 
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that is common and not simply the techniques used or philosophical vantage points 
considered.  
Through those discussions of the metaphysical structures underlying the novel, I 
present a reductive definition of postmodernism. This definition relies on the structure of 
consciousness of both the author and reader, and can be most clearly demonstrated in terms 
of how certain literary techniques are applied within literature, especially narratological 
techniques, but also techniques such as the use of irony, metaphor, metafiction, 
intertextuality, pastiche. By producing open works, to use Eco’s terms, authors allow readers 
to avail themselves of patterns and possibilities that modernist and classical structures 
eschewed. This reflects postmodern understandings of reality, which mimic and map onto the 
narrative structures presented in texts by authors like Paul Auster, Thomas Pynchon, and 
Svend Åge Madsen, to name just a few of the prominent authors in the study. These 
structures can also be seen in filmic texts, which this project treats using literary readings of 
film, as we have seen in works by the Wachowski siblings and Christopher Nolan.  
 
Where do we go from here? The Possibility of the Postpostmodern 
So, are we at the end of postmodernism, now that we are at the end of this dissertation? The 
opening presentation of the introduction was a rhetorical paradox, for if postmodernism is 
representative of an alternative structure, then ascription to that structure is the requisite of 
postmodernism, and not any specific historical timeframe. Following that logic, the structure 
of consciousness for which I argue is not a teleological end, but rather a metaphorical 
representation of the understanding of the world we live in. So, as long as this structure can 
be seen as mimetic of experience, it remains a valid and fruitful measure by which literature 
can be understood. That stated, it is possible that authors, and readers, have changed (not 
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developed per se) their perspective. Can one move on from postmodernism? What would that 
mean?  
On one hand, there are constant thematic and focal point changes in literary history, 
so while postmodernism as a literary tool does seems to have had a critical heyday in the late 
twentieth century, its impact cannot be properly understood until some distance has been 
acquired. Whether a distance of 15-25 years (by some estimations) is sufficient will take an 
academic consensus, one which arguably has still not been reached even in modernism, given 
the current resurgence of that field. On the other hand, the very structure of consciousness 
that I identify as postmodern does not seem to allow for anything beyond or after.  
I argue that there are fundamentally three structures of consciousness, which represent 
different, historically understood, mindsets by which we operate and comprehend the world. 
These are reflected and represented in literature, as I argue that essentially through both the 
content and the structure one can come to some tentative understanding of the vantage point 
of the text itself. As such, literary postmodernism reflects, in a mimetic way, the ways in 
which its authors and readers understand postmodernity and the postmodern condition, just as 
modernist writers and readers reflected modernity in their writings. This, however, is 
tempered by the reader’s reaction, as I treat literature as an open process, pushing towards the 
ideal goal of the writerly text.  
These three structures of consciousness, which I term the classical, modernist and 
postmodernist, can be spatially mapped onto the skein, the maze and the rhizomatic labyrinth, 
with each of those spatial metaphors containing consequences and patterns which guide 
fundamental understandings within the text. The classical structure of consciousness takes 
concepts as given, and answers as absolute. The modernist structure of consciousness is 
arborescent, and can be exhibited only after such unitary worldviews have been questioned. 
There remains truth and error, right and wrong, and thus quest and discovery come to the 
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fore. The postmodernist structure of consciousness has no such hope, nor a nostalgic look 
towards points ancient or Other. Functioning within the spatial metaphor of the rhizomatic 
labyrinth, the postmodern structure calls into question the calcification of boundaries and 
constructions, by demonstrating their lack of foundation, and examining the concept of 
foundation itself. It is through consensus, through the acceptance of new ideas that change 
becomes not only possible, but explainable. If boundaries of gender and identity, nation and 
state, field and discipline are arbitrary, consensus driven notions, then it can become possible 
to begin a process of destabilizing existing categories and reconstituting boundaries which 
represent contemporary locally understood constructions. While the postmodern structure of 
consciousness remains open, it allows for political agency through the construction of an 
arbitrary, temporary modernist frame with which to operate momentarily, while recognizing 
this as no more than a Baudrillardian simulacrum, and not an absolute truth or reality. 
As stated, Deleuze’s rhizome maps a territory in which all concepts are leveled on the 
same surface, and are thus weighted equally. There is no hierarchy or privileging, in any 
objective sense, and any such ‘arborization’ would be done arbitrarily, thus becoming 
alterable (with limitations only through those of power relations, rather than natural or 
essential characteristics). In many ways this is the way knowledge is located and organized in 
the information age, structured in a postmodern pattern. My use of Deleuze’s term employs 
this larger, three-dimensional conception of the rhizome, in carrying over the rhizomatic 
labyrinth as the metaphor for a postmodern structure of consciousness. One might also 
consider this four-dimensionally, taking into consideration time which becomes particularly 
relevant given shifting conceptions over time and, in particular, the challenges of 
historiographic metafiction and the emerging Neo-Victorian.  
Conceptualizing the rhizome in this way seems to render possibilities of moving 
beyond or outside of postmodernism as someone misunderstanding the point. Fields that are 
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seemingly disregarded in current postmodern paradigms are not beyond, after, or outside, but 
simply employ or interrogate aspects not yet considered. In a rhizomatic pattern, I argue, it is 
not that all points are connected with all other points, but that there is the potential for such 
connections. Those new avenues of academic inquiry are found in those interstices yet 
unidentified, and do not challenge the structural paradigm I describe.  
 
Pro-Post-Postmodernism – Or how one argues for postmodernism’s afterlife 
Contemporary movements, like the post-ironic, postpostmodernism, New Sincerity, and Neo-
Victorianism, suggest potential avenues of this ‘post’postmodern (chronologically speaking) 
era. Philosophical movements such as New Materialism could also be considered in this 
rubric. While there are many movements that could be seen as successors to postmodernism, 
there is no current academic consensus about these. As such it seems relevant to discuss those 
current and emerging approaches as potential successors of postmodern theory and how those 
function in light of my proposed definition. I will commence by specifically discussing the 
academic considerations of the works of David Foster Wallace, which are relevant to both 
discussions of New Sincerity and the post-ironic, and then I will move on to discuss the 
emerging field of the Neo-Victorian. Similar arguments to those I put forth could be made 
with regard to New Materialism and other postpostmodern movements, some of which I put 
forward elsewhere. I will further propose three logically possible positions that can be, “not 
innocently” (Eco, Postscript 67), posited as reactions to postmodernist literature.  
I commence by considering the movement called New Sincerity. This view, expressed 
in the work of David Foster Wallace, and picked up by scholars like Adam Kelly, attempts to 
find a movement which reacts to what it terms the early postmodernists of John Barth and 
Thomas Pynchon. Wallace’s key critical text, ‘E unibus pluram’ also makes an argument 
against current forms of literature and tries to postulate how literature will persist in the ever 
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more dominant world of television. Part forward thinking, and part nostalgic for an age of the 
novel’s cultural dominance (which corresponds to his own artistic mode), Wallace questions 
the efficacy of what he views the main mode of postmodern literature – the ironic stance. 
While accepting of a view that suggests a positive critical stance of irony and postmodernism 
(aligned in his view), he then suggests that this position isn’t constructive, only 
deconstructive. “This is because irony, entertaining as it is, serves an exclusively negative 
function. It’s critical and destructive, a ground-clearing. Surely this is the way our 
postmodern fathers saw it. But irony’s singularly unuseful when it comes to constructing 
anything to replace the hypocrisies it debunks” (Wallace 183).  
Wallace presents several stances as possible outs to this situation. One position, as 
A.O. Scott refers to it, is to return to the literature from before, a version of neo-modernism, 
as advocated in texts like Jedidiah Purdy’s For Common Things, and which calls for a return 
to common sense. This is not Wallace’s position, however. As A.O. Scott claims in his article 
‘The Panic of Influence’: “If one way to escape from the blind alley of postmodern self-
consciousness is simply to turn around and walk in another direction—which is in effect what 
Purdy advises, and what a great many very interesting writers, without making a big deal 
about it, simply do—Wallace prefers to forge ahead in hopes of breaking through to the other 
side, whatever that may be” (Scott 7).  
Wallace is seemingly looking for a position beyond postmodernism, by which he can 
create new, authentic, art. One such out, for Wallace, is to follow the example of Mark 
Leyner, and revel in the ironic. “We can solve the problem by celebrating it. Transcend 
feelings of mass-defined angst by genuflecting to them. We can be reverently ironic” 
(Wallace 190, original emphasis). The problem is that this rings hollow for Wallace. A clever 
novel, like Leyner’s, that is all surface and seems to have nothing to say represents his exact 
critique in his imposed dichotomy of literature versus television. The split seems to rest on 
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Wallace’s common sense understanding of high versus low art, with literature’s purpose 
belonging to the former. Literature made to resemble the format and essence of television – 
as an aesthetic choice – is unpalatable for Wallace, even if he presents it as a possibility.  
Another proposed possibility is the diversity of providing the reader with choice, not 
just the limited choices of television channels, but the ability to manipulate content freely. 
Wallace cites the theories of George Gilder, who postulated a television which would give 
one such access, more akin to a combination of modern day internet, personal computing, and 
social media technologies. We are, in fact, close to achieving Gilder’s vision, which for 
Wallace was simply a future possibility, a negative version of the ubiquity shown by Lerner 
in his novel. Wallace, however, also criticizes this choice. For Wallace, the ever expanding 
level of choice is detrimental, as long as it is not paired with some filter, some reason to 
choose one thing rather than another. “Jacking the number of choices and options up with 
better tech will remedy exactly nothing, so long as no sources of insight on comparative 
worth, no guides to why and how to choose among experiences, fantasies, beliefs, and 
predilections, are permitted serious consideration in U.S. culture” (Wallace 189, original 
emphasis). Thus, while Gilder, and even Lerner’s novel, present the free expansion which 
resembles the structure of consciousness I argue is postmodern, Wallace remains nostalgic 
for the filter of the elite, the authority which guides and informs one’s way through the 
vastness of opinions and ideas, of how to distinguish what is meant behind what is 
presumably an ironic stance.  
Finally, what Wallace seems to present as the alternative to the pervasive stance, is a 
return to sincerity, a writing of what you mean. Wallace’s agenda, which is picked up by 
scholars like Lise Mortensen, Adam Kelly, Stephen Burn and Tore Rye Andersen, is to 
discuss how to write a literature that has a sense of grounding in reality, or common sense, 
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despite a lack of elucidation of either of those concepts. In ‘E Unibus Pluram’ he discusses 
the next generation of writers, stating:  
The next real literary ‘rebels’ in this country might well emerge as some weird bunch 
of anti-rebels, born oglers who dare somehow to back away from ironic watching, 
who have the childish gall actually to endorse and instantiate single-entendre 
principles. Who treat of plain old untrendy human troubles and emotions in U.S. life 
with reverence and conviction. Who eschew self-consciousness and hip fatigue … 
The new rebels might be artists willing to risk the yawn, the rolled eyes, the cool 
smile, the nudged ribs, the parody of gifted ironists, the ‘Oh how banal” (Wallace 
193, original emphasis).  
 
Wallace’s ‘single entendre principles’ are meant to be a return to a clear one to one 
relationship between the intention and the reception, but not in a retreat but a reassertive 
method, well aware of the eye-rolling that will come from such an outlined stance by those 
purveyors of postmodernism. Wallace’s stance is specifically criticized in John Barth’s later 
work, for examples, as Barth reinscribes Wallace’s sincerity into a postmodern novel. 
“Alternatively, did my maybe-imitation penchant for imitation lead me down the path of a 
certain Hollywood waitress-friend who assured me, one smoggy night on the beach in 
Malibu, that ‘in acting, the crucial thing is Sincerity. Once you’ve learned to fake that, 
you’ve got it made’? (Barth, Coming Soon!, 21, original emphasis). 
Danish scholar Tore Rye Andersen picks up on this position and labels it the post-
ironic, identifying this as the postpostmodern position.
92
 He argues ‘det postironiske er ikke – 
som vist i læsningen af Infinite Jest – et rent brud mod postmodernismen, men repræsenterer 
snarere en revideret videreførelse, der på en gang er et brud og en forlængelse. Det 
postironiske forholder sig derved i det store og hele til postmodernismen, som 
postmodernismen forholder sig til modernismen” (Andersen 21) [The postironic is not – as 
shown in reading Infinite Jest – a pure break with postmodernism, but more closely 
represents a revised continuation, which is at once a break and a continuation. Therefore the 
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 For clarity, Andersen identifies and labels the term postironic as a philosophical position pushed by Wallace 
and a few others. He does recognize, as he discusses later in the same article, that such a position is not against 
postmodernism per se, but against a version of that assimilated by television and the mainstream that Wallace 
discusses in ‘E Unibus Pluram’ (Andersen 22). 
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postironic relates to postmodernism, for the most part, in the same way postmodernism 
relates to modernism] (translation mine). This position perpetuates one line of 
postmodernism, which suggests that postmodernism both shares affinities with previous 
literary movements, even while reacting to them, as a defining characteristic. While it is true, 
in bricolage fashion, that all literary movements both continue and break with their 
predecessors, highlighting the double bind does less to define the novelty of the post- 
position. What the postironic seems to highlight is a reversal of the use of irony in the 
succeeding period to postmodernism, rather than irony serving as a foundation of a critique, it 
stops the discussion. The postironic positions itself as an articulation of the New Sincerity 
position, which is actually anti-ironic in the sense that irony is to be eschewed. This is meant 
to be done openly. 
The question becomes how does one find, or identify, the sincere in postironic 
literature. Wallace seems to argue that author intention is critical, using the concept of single 
entendre principles to suggest the reader’s affinities with the author’s ideas. At the same time, 
Wallace is aware of the text being read ironically, by reference to the eye-rolling that would 
accompany someone attempting to write in a ‘banal’ fashion. Which reading is sincere? This 
returns us to the problem of postmodern irony in the first place, as given a postmodern 
structure of consciousness, we have no way of determining the ‘correct’ reading of a text. A 
postmodern context removes the underlying assumptions of common ground on which irony 
is based, and without common understandings, the case for irony is moot. What would a 
‘correct’ reading be? Would it be a ‘straightforward’ reading – the non-ironic? Would it be 
the ironic reading, which Wallace is also aware of (and thus also seems to intend, even to 
eschew)? On which ground, given the postmodern structure of consciousness, would one 
make that determination? Furthermore, even if one were to search for sincerity in literature, 
in contrast to irony, this implies a level of homogeneity of responses. If irony is based, as 
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Booth argues, on some people ‘missing the point’ (or you cannot have the double reading of 
the ‘meant but not said’ behind the ‘said but not meant’ position), then sincerity, especially 
once irony has been understood as not just a possibility but a common trope, also has the 
tinge of the same double bind. A ‘sincere’ or banal utterance would also be taken, by some, 
ironically, which would be ‘missing the point’ and only the identities of those ‘out of the 
loop’ would be reversed.  
What Wallace wants to assert is fixity within a postmodern structure of 
consciousness. I argue that such an inscription is possible, but represents an assertion of a 
modernist frame within a postmodern field, a determination. He can, like Mark Twain did 
famously in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, tell the reader how to read and interpret the 
text, but the risk becomes that the reader will simply not oblige. Thus Wallace, in his call for 
sincerity, is hoping for the return of a simpler interpretative strategy, and the convenience of 
common understandings of literature and even its role in society. This position cannot be 
asserted without accounting for the postmodern, as even Wallace agrees, and from the 
position of the postmodern structure of consciousness, it does not seem possible to identify a 
clear position of sincerity, other than asserting one without specific epistemological basis. 
The common sense or banal cannot be interrogated to provide the grounding Wallace is 
nostalgically looking for.  
 
Neo-Victorianism 
Each of the scenarios for ‘after Postmodernism’ seems to have two trends. One trend is a neo-
modernist trend, which seeks out a nostalgic return to a modernist idealized past, a 
reconnection with the perceived real, often viewed through common sense. This is a 
prominent trend at the outset of the next movement discussed, that of the Neo-Victorian. This 
movement, consolidated as a distinct academic field with the foundation of the Journal of 
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Neo-Victorian Studies in 2008, studies texts which were written in this millennium but which 
deal with, discuss, and are primarily set in the Victorian period.
93
 Since the publication of 
A.S. Byatt’s Booker award winning Possession, in 1990, there has been increased interest, 
both by writers and scholars, in this period, and a proliferation of texts which fit into the 
category. In seeking a definition of the movement, various scholars have tried to define its 
relationship with the past, as well as its conceptual frame.  
One prominent early scholar of the movement, Christian Gutelben, proposed the 
following: “Apparently unable to propose a new model for the present, today’s novel is 
turning back towards canonical tradition. Postmodernism returns to a period before 
modernism as if it were not able to progress and had to turn around and step back: this is the 
fundamental aporia of nostalgic postmodernism” (Gutelben 10, original emphasis). Taking 
this stand, in which Gutelben tries to come to terms with the turn towards texts set in the 
Nineteenth Century, yet were written from, or with full knowledge of, the postmodern 
condition. In his text, Nostalgic Postmodernism, he takes the position that literature is in 
some ways teleological, and thus we can ‘return’ along the path we have travelled to a 
previous age, for which we are nostalgic. That includes the reconnection with the historical 
truth afforded in the area ‘before’ postmodernism.  
 Similarly, in Dana Schiller’s concept of the Neo-Victorian, she frames the 
recuperation of the Victorian period in a similar inside and outside frame.  
Neo-Victorian fiction addresses many of Jameson’s concerns by presenting a 
historicity that is indeed concerned with recuperating the substance of bygone eras, 
and not merely their styles. These historical novels take a revisionist approach to the 
past, borrowing from postmodern historiography to explore how present 
circumstances shape historical narrative, and yet they are also indebted to earlier 
cultural attitudes towards history. … [Peter] Ackroyd also manages to create a 
postmodern novel that plays on (and with) our certainties about history while 
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 The exact definition, and time period, is still in flux. As Lea Madsen argues, ‘a neo-Victorian novel can 
indeed have a non-Victorian timeframe and that a new label, for this novel, is unnecessary’ (Heiberg Madsen, 
‘Revision’ 74) as she specifically considers Sarah Waters The Little Stranger, but makes a claim which renders 
the neo-Victorian novel thematic rather than chronological in scope.  
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simultaneously delighting in what can be retrieved from the past (Schiller 539-540, 
original emphasis).  
 
In this argument, she wants to provide a type of synthesis between the postmodern 
aspects she sees descended from Jameson, and the tangible ‘known’ past. This position 
argues, in essence, that there is a framework outside of postmodernism, a real that can be 
reached or accessed, and truths (specifically historical truths) that can be known. It is a mesh 
of two structures of consciousness, in my reading, with her reading of postmodernism 
inscribed into a modernist structural framework.  
What I would argue, however, is that the limits that she sees placed upon the frame, 
and the need to reach ‘beyond’ to get to something more real, demonstrates that the 
boundaries of her framework simply need to be altered. The ‘knowledge’ that she seeks 
remains tentative, but the new perspectives should just become incorporated into a now 
larger, altered, arbitrary framework that produces enhanced understanding of the underlying 
conditions. While we remain within a postmodernist frame, those boundaries that we create 
and by which we define our localized knowledge, once reified, need to be called into question 
and reassessed with each new set of information or changed approach, like that of the Neo-
Victorian. This approach can be contrasted with more contemporary definitions of the Neo-
Victorian, which render the tensions that Marie-Louise Kohlke identifies in her introductory 
article in the Journal of Neo-Victorian Studies differently. She declares that “We need to 
question the assumptions we bring to the neoVictorian – as postmodern, as nostalgic, as 
traumatic, as commemorative, as cathartic, as liberatory, and so forth – and the implicit 
pedagogic protocols and strategic aims we employ/deploy neo-Victorianism for” (Kohlke 
14). Both Gutleman’s (Nostalgic Postmodernism) and Schiller’s (‘The Redemptive Past in 
the Neo-Victorian Novel’) understandings, both early in Neo-Victorian thinking, show how 
postmodern is a term that is still invoked, but not in following with my structure of 
consciousness framework. Using my framework, those approaches can be split off as either 
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modernist or neo-modernist – depending on whether they are rejecting the notion out right, or 
looking back to a modernist frame, which seems to be the case here.  
Representing the other trend, Anne Heilmann and Mark Llewellyn, in their 
introduction to Neo-Victorianism: The Victorians in the Twenty-First Century, 1999-2009, 
argue clearly that neo-Victorian literature is not just a nostalgic return to a fixed historical 
timeframe. They rather argue that ‘the ‘neo-Victorian’ is more than historical fiction set in 
the nineteenth century. To be part of the neo-Victorianism [Heilmann and Llewellan] discuss 
in this book, texts (literary, filmic, audio/visual) must in some respect be self-consciously 
engaged with the act of (re)interpretation, (re)discovery and (re)vision concerning the 
Victorians” (Heilmann 4, original emphasis). Thus, what is required is the double bind of a 
historical period, whose interpretation is up for debate, coupled with an ever-changing 
present, the interstice of which is the space in which the neo-Victorian novel is created and 
interpreted. This allows the interpretation to be the malleable form that I argue remains 
possible within a postmodern context, rather than harkening back to a supposedly fixed past 
era, as early neo-Victorian scholars seemed to argue for. This is also the approach of Lea 
Heiberg Madsen as she defines the Neo-Victorian. She claims that, “The neo-Victorian text, 
thus, goes beyond its historical setting and plots. It deconstructs and subverts the Victorian 
novel, explores and re-works the nineteenth century’s preoccupations with, for example, race, 
gender and sexuality while, simultaneously, working as an approach to our own age’s 
anxieties” (Heiberg Madsen, ‘Lesbian’ 106). As Lea Madsen presents it, the neo-Victorian 
has a postmodern conception of the ever-changing relationship between the present and what 
is known of our Victorian past which can allow a constant reconception of both time periods, 
as well as their interaction, allowing excavation of concepts as our motivations and interests 
change through time. This framework represents a reworking of the assumed or supposed 
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boundaries, but with recognition of the postmodern nature of reality which allows one to see 
those boundaries, non-ironically, as open to change.  
 
The ‘Outs’ of Postmodernism 
Theoretically, using the premise of the postmodern structure of consciousness, there are a 
limited set of reactions that can be contemplated to the revelation, or understanding, of the 
underlying structural consequences. We can draw on literary and media examples to 
underscore these dilemmas. The recognition of the postmodern condition, as we have seen 
historically, and throughout the dissertation, is not always acceptable, and requires a 
reconception not only of one’s role in the world, but of one’s understanding of its 
metaphysics, its existences, and one’s own subjectivity. Essentially, I argue, there are three 
possible reactions when faced with the postmodern condition, which I term Denial, 
Dissolution and Determination. Each of these three ‘solutions’ to postmodernism can be 
found in the cases presented in the course of the dissertation.  
The first reaction, denial, is best represented by Oedipa Maas in The Crying of Lot 49. 
As noted, Oedipa finds both the classical and modernist structures lacking, in attempting to 
come to an understanding of Trystero. Her reaction, when faced with such uncertainty, with 
an abundance of supposed clues and no way to reconcile them into a consistent narrative, is 
to simply deny that she was faced with a new reality. She steadfastly refuses to believe the 
facts presented, and holds out hope (seemingly false hope) of a future change, a next piece of 
evidence that will change the picture. This is tantamount to rejecting an objectively scientific 
presentation for an article of faith. Once the grounding of the theory is removed, it is simply a 
matter of faith that there is an underlying cause, or abstract notion of (unsubstantiated) truth 
backing up one’s theory. Oedipa’s solution is a denial, an intractable modernist stance despite 
‘knowledge’ that the enterprise is doomed to failure. Oedipa, of course, doesn’t ‘know’ that 
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there is not a correct solution. Basically there is no position from which to tell if there is a 
solution, and any postulation of such a position (the position of God in many philosophies of 
religion, for example) has no substantiation. What is ‘known’ is that the answer cannot be 
known.  
 There are parallels to this solution in other genres as well. Several characters in 
Battlestar Galactica, such as Samuel Anders and Saul Tigh, express such initial denial of 
their newly revealed identities as members of the Final Five revealed humanoid cylons. That 
reaction parallels the Kübler-Ross model for grief, which is used in contemporary society for 
life losses on a larger scale than grief. Denial is often seen as the first step in a process – 
through anger, bargaining and depression – that leads to ultimate acceptance, reinscribing the 
new narrative of subjectivity in confrontation with a changed reality. Stephen Joyce argues 
that Gaius Balter’s character is problematized by his lack of ability to understand his personal 
narrative.  
Either way he would have a narrative that defined his identity but in the postmodern 
apocalyptic scenario it is the not knowing that destabilizes Baltar’s sense of self. 
Whereas classical apocalypticism defines exactly who we are and what roles we must 
play, in the postmodern apocalypse the absence of meaning destabilizes not only 
narratives of history but the identity of its agents, leaving us only the twin demons of 
doubt and dread (Joyce 8).  
 
Baltar, like Anders and Tigh, initially denies his own role (for nearly four seasons) before 
finally coming to acceptance at the end of the series.  
 The other parallel scenario is presented in the film The Matrix. Newly freed 
individuals, as we are shown in the encounter between Morpheus and Neo, are given a choice 
to accept their status in the artificial construct we know as the Matrix, or to accept the 
knowledge of the new reality. “This is your last chance. After this, there is no turning back. 
You take the blue pill—the story ends, you wake up in your bed and believe whatever you 
want to believe. You take the red pill—you stay in Wonderland, and I show you how deep 
the rabbit hole goes. Remember: all I'm offering is the truth. Nothing more” (Wachowski). 
 250 
 
The story presents a choice, and one of the choices available is denial, choosing the illusion 
known over the uncertainty of the reality offered by Morpheus (though we come to 
understand throughout the trilogy, that the certainties that Morpheus presents here are not 
certain at all).  
The critical corollary to this position is to reject postmodernism because of the 
undesirability of a full exploration of its tenets. This is what, arguably, bell hooks is calling 
for in her article ‘Postmodern Blackness.’ “Any critic exploring the radical potential of 
postmodernism as it relates to racial difference and racial domination would need to consider 
the implications of a critique of identity for oppressed groups” (hooks 627). Her argument 
implies that the political implications of the theory need to be considered before (or at least 
simultaneous with) an exploration of the theory itself. Essentially, this position argues that 
postmodernism must be denied if the consequences of entertaining the theory would be 
unpalatable. Thus, it is rejected not on its own merits, but on its inability to be inscribed 
within an existing discourse. Taken to an extreme, this attitude could hinder the very 
exploration of potentially radical theories, like postmodernism, if they do not first conform to 
a given political agenda, as Patricia Waugh discusses in “Postmodernism and Feminism.” 
 The second conceivable reaction is that of dissolution. In this scenario, characters are 
faced with a challenge to their worldview, especially by a postmodern structure of 
consciousness which represents a large break from the continuity between the classical and 
modernist paradigms in terms of potential certainty and clarity of purpose. When confronted 
of the lack of such teleological possibilities, of narrative closure and absolute truth, some 
characters simply cannot cope, and turn to self-destruction or dissolution. This is the case of 
solipsism, retreating into one’s own self in a self-destructive way, as Quinn does in Auster’s 
text, and Ludvig Alster does at the end of Tugt og utugt i mellemtiden. This solution is often 
posed by those critical of postmodernism as the only possible outcome if one accepts the 
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tenents of postmodernism, and it becomes the reason to reject its findings (without 
confronting them). In this proposed nightmare scenario the stability of a grand narrative is 
required, regardless of its grounding. The uncertainty of not having absolutes, supported by 
some foundation of truth, is terrifying, so many cannot accept this as a possibility.  
 In City of Glass, this is posed as a slow descent into seeming madness, reflecting to a 
degree the descent in King Lear. After using all of the available tools he has to discover 
order, or even create order out of the seemingly random wanderings of a character that may 
or may not be the person he is meant to follow, Quinn eventually disappears, seemingly into 
the text itself, the character not making to the end of the narrative. This can be paired with 
characters from science fiction, whose dissolution is presented as an attempt to restore order, 
but in a larger scope only serves to emphasize the seeming purposelessness of any human 
action. Neo, at the end of the trilogy in Matrix Revolutions, is returned to the computer 
collective as a solution to the break in the pattern. This is despite the scene laid out by the 
Architect identifyin the numerous iterations of the resolution of the rise of a ‘Neo’ within the 
framework of the narrative, thus it could be interpreted that confronted with the seeming 
meaninglessness of his break, Neo’s solution amounts to dissolution in a return to the world 
of the computer.
94
 
Neither denial nor dissolution can be seen as a positive development of 
postmodernism. Denial is similar to the return to the modernist frame discussed above in 
relation to New Sincerity and some versions of Neo-Victorian thought. Even when framed as 
having gone ‘through’ postmodernism, such positions presuppose an exterior upon which the 
neo-modernist stance can be grounded, thus denying basic tenets of postmodernism. 
However, the final possibility, determination, is what I see as the most positive and 
productive outcome of the postmodern stance, so rather than decry the position (as Gerald 
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 This reading would presuppose that the celebrations of those in Zion, at the end of the film, are an already 
accounted for possibility within the larger Matrix frame.  
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Graff and others did, as mentioned in the introduction), I view postmodernism as a liberating 
understanding of reality, which allows for change and is arguably the most democratic 
position.  
This is the position of Leonard Shelby in Memento, who when faced with the 
postmodern condition, chooses to act, rather than wait. In this film, as discussed in a previous 
chapter, Shelby has a form of temporary amnesia by which he cannot create new memories. 
The film’s narrative, and unique chronological style, forces a constant reevaluation and 
skepticism of any facts within the narrative, leaving nothing ‘true’ remaining in the film at 
the end, for either the protagonist or the viewer. Shelby, at this point, creates his own new 
reality, forcing a new epistemological certainty onto the situation, knowing full well 
(although also knowing he will soon forget) that it has no justification but creating this reality 
regardless. This, I argue is the most positive possible outcome (although hopefully done with 
much more thought and less violence than Leonard’s choice) from the lessons of 
postmodernism. Recognizing the need for answers, but with structurally no answers possible, 
determination is the only possible productive path. Thus, when confronted with the infinite 
possibilities of a rhizomatic labyrinth, one could also choose, consciously, a particular frame 
in which to understand reality. By viewing this as a free choice, rather than an imposed 
grande narrative, with its implications of fixity and authority (or sincerity), such a position 
recognizes those boundaries created as mutable and tentative. 
 This position is also shown in some of the science fiction examples, again including 
Battlestar Galactica with determinations made as to what constitutes Earth, and even by 
individual crew members to determine, despite ontological uncertainty, their own identity and 
loyalties – Boomer/Athena in particular. This is the flip side of the choice originally offered 
in The Matrix, the choice of the ‘new reality’, but with the recognition that that reality is not 
fixed but ever changeable, placing the individual closer to the side of Neo than that of pre-pill 
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Andersen. The difference would be that the larger social and structural changes involve many 
people, and thus any individual choices would be tempered by the collective mindset. This 
reading of the postmodern condition explains the possibility of change over time, but leaves 
no promise of a quick fix to social ills, which would still take hard work and the changing of 
many minds to make a larger collective difference in understanding. What this framework 
allows for is an explanation of how change is possible, specifically change that does not 
require rejection of a previous paradigm as an error, and furthermore the removing of 
inhibitions as to the implementation of such possibilities. One could theoretically call this 
tack neo-modernism, to return it to Lyotard’s framework in the Postmodern Condition, but it 
would have to be a modernism that is conscious of its lack of foundation.  
 So, I argue, that given the postmodern structure of consciousness, the only viable ‘out’ 
is one in which, not ironically, a temporary framework is constructed. This allows both for 
the security of a framework, but for the possibility of change necessary due to the ‘made from 
within’ nature of any understanding. It also allows for meaning to be self-determined, and 
also understood collectively, which includes not only the realm of metaphysics, but ethics 
and aesthetics as well. It follows the understanding of Umberto Eco, in which he makes his 
case for moving beyond irony.  
The postmodern reply to the modern consists of recognizing that the past … but with 
irony, not innocently. I think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a 
very cultivated woman and knows he cannot say to her, ‘I love you madly,’ because 
he knows that she knows (and that she knows that he knows) that these words have 
already been written by Barbara Cartland. Still, there is a solution. He can say, ‘As 
Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly.’ At this point, having avoided false 
innocence, having said clearly that it is no longer possible to speak innocently, he will 
nevertheless have said what he wanted to say to the woman: that he loves her, but he 
loves her in an age of lost innocence. If the woman goes along with this, she will have 
received a declaration of love all the same. Neither of the two speakers will feel 
innocent, both will have accepted the challenge of the past, of the already said, which 
cannot be eliminated; both will consciously and with pleasure play the game of irony 
… But both will have succeeded, once again, in speaking of love. (Eco, Postscript 67-
8) 
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This is essentially the game that needs to be played, once one is operating with a postmodern 
structure of consciousness. Fully aware of the limitless nature of reality, we need to, 
collectively, agree on boundaries under which life can operate, and a sense of normality can 
develop, but always remain aware that such a construction is artificial. It is the recognition of 
the arbitrary nature of the boundaries, which authors whom Wallace called the ‘early 
postmodernists’ spent much time exposing, which allows for the positive nature of living 
within the postmodern condition. And it is through the structural nature of this understanding 
that I see this as reflective of a postmodern understanding of society, allowing for the change 
sought after within society as currently constructed, and this project as identifying the 
structural means by which such change can come about.  
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